We empirically investigate the effect of uncertainty on corporate hiring. Using novel data from the labor market for MBA graduates, we show that uncertainty regarding how well job candidates fit with a firm’s industry hinders hiring and that firms value probationary work arrangements that provide the option to learn more about potential full-time employees. The detrimental effect of uncertainty on hiring is more pronounced when firms face greater firing and replacement costs and when they face less direct competition from other similar firms. These results suggest that firms faced with uncertainty use similar considerations when making hiring decisions as when making decisions regarding investment in physical capital.

We investigate households’ bank switching exploiting a unique representative dataset from Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth that follows the households and their bank(s) over time. First, we document that bank switching is quite prevalent in our sample, with almost a quarter of households changing their main bank in a biannual horizon. Next, we relate the decision to switch to the features and dynamics of household bank relationship, and to the characteristics of both households and banks. In line with the switching cost theory, we find that using more than a single bank, as well as the intensity (number of services used), and the scope (bank services used) of the relationship with the main bank play a role in shaping the households’ decision to switch. Moreover, bank switching is strongly and positively correlated with both taking out and having paid off a mortgage.

We treat rising inequality as an equilibrium outcome in which human capital investment fails to keep pace with rising demand for skills. Investment affects skill supply and prices on three margins: the type of human capital in which to invest, how much to acquire, and the intensity of use. The latter two represent the intensive margins of human capital acquisition and utilization. These choices are substitutes for the creation of new skilled workers, yet they are complementary with each other, magnifying inequality. When skill-biased technical change drives economic growth, greater inequality reduces growth.

We study how securities analysts influence managers’ use of different types of earnings management. To isolate causality, we employ a quasi-experiment that exploits exogenous reductions in analyst following resulting from brokerage house mergers. We find that managers respond to the coverage loss by decreasing real earnings management while increasing accrual manipulation. These effects are significantly stronger among firms with less coverage and for firms close to the zero-earnings threshold. Our causal evidence suggests that managers use real earnings management to enhance short-term performance in response to analyst pressure, effects that are not uncovered when focusing solely on accrual-based methods.

This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with a continuum of privatelyobserved agent types that are persistent over time.For a sufficiently productive relationship, a full pooling contract exists in which all agent types continuing the relationship choose the same action.When some separation is feasible, the parties can do better than with full pooling.When future actions are optimal, however, full separation of all types is not possible.There is, though, an equilibrium with separation into pools each containing a non-degenerate interval of types and fully separating individual types is not generally optimal.Separation results in an increase in output.

We estimate a dynamic investment model in which firms finance with equity, cash, or debt. Misvaluation affects equity values, and firms optimally issue and repurchase overvalued and undervalued shares. The funds flowing to and from these activities come from investment, dividends, or net cash. The model fits a broad set of data moments in large heterogeneous samples and across industries. Our parameter estimates imply that misvaluation induces larger changes in financial policies than investment. The investment responses are strongest for small firms but nonetheless modest. Managers' rational responses to misvaluation increase shareholder value by up to 4%.

ZIP codes with high concentrations of originators who misreported mortgage information experienced a 75% larger relative increase in house prices from 2003 to 2006 and a 90% larger relative decrease from 2007 to 2012 compared with other ZIP codes. Several causality tests show that high fractions of dubious originators in a ZIP code lead to large price distortions. Originators with high misreporting gave credit to borrowers with high ex ante risk, yet further understated the borrowers' true risk. Overall, excess credit facilitated through dubious origination practices explain much of the regional variation in house prices over a decade.

This study shows that shifts in political climate influence stock prices. As the party in power changes, there are systematic changes in the industry-level composition of investor portfolios, which weaken arbitrage forces and generate predictable patterns in industry returns. A trading strategy that attempts to exploit demand-based return predictability generates an annualized risk-adjusted performance of 6% during the 1939 to 2011 period. This evidence of predictability spans 17%–27% of the market and is stronger during periods of political transition. Our demand-based predictability pattern is distinct from cash flow-based predictability identified in the recent literature.