We examine the lending behavior of banks during anxious periods. The main characteristic of anxious periods is that the perceptions and expectations about economic conditions worsen for economic agents even though the economy is not in a recession. We identify distinct periods of anxiety for consumers, CEOs (firms) and analysts. Subsequently, we study the lending behavior of US banks during the anxious quarters from 1985 to 2010, using bank-level data. The results show that banks’ lending falls when consumers and analysts are anxious, and this effect is more pronounced when banks hold a higher level of credit risk. These effects are more pronounced in anxious periods that were followed by recessions, and in these periods loan growth also responds negatively to the anxiety of CEOs. Yet, these effects are quite less prevalent in the period after 2001.

We study an equilibrium risk and return model to explore the effects of the coronavirus crisis and associated skewness on the market price of risk. We derive the moment and equilibrium equations, specifying skewness price of risk as an additive component of the effect of variance on mean expected return. We estimate our model using the flexible skewed generalized error distribution, for which we derive the distribution of returns and the likelihood function. Using S&P 500 Index returns from January 1980 to mid-October 2020, our results show that the coronavirus crisis generated a deeply negative reaction in the skewness and total market price of risk, more negative even than the subprime and the October 1987 crises.

We suggest that forward guidance, via publicly committing the central bank to future actions and creating associated expectations, fundamentally affects bank lending decisions independently of other forms of monetary policy. To test this hypothesis, we build a forward guidance measure based on the language used in the Federal Open Market Committee meetings and match this measure with syndicated loans. Our results show that expansionary forward guidance decreases corporate loan spreads and that this effect is stronger for well-capitalized banks lending to riskier firms. Forward guidance also affects nonprice lending terms, such as covenants, performance pricing provisions, and the loan syndicate structure. Additionally, banks tend to initiate new lending relationships with lower spreads after forward guidance issuance.

By examining the impact of capital regulation on bank risk-taking using a local estimation technique, this paper attempts to quantify for the first time the heterogeneous response of banks towards this type of regulation in banking sectors of western-type economies. Subsequently, using this information, we examine the sources of heterogeneity. The findings suggest that the impact of capital regulation on bank risk is very heterogeneous across banks and the sources of this heterogeneity can be traced into both bank and industry characteristics, as well as into macroeconomic conditions. An important implication of the findings is that common capital regulatory umbrellas are not sufficient to promote financial stability, especially if they are not accompanied by supervisory effectiveness. On the basis of our findings, we contend that more focus should be placed on the actions needed to restrain excessive risk-taking of banks.

This study investigates whether regulations have an independent effect on bank risk-taking or whether their effect is channeled through the market power possessed by banks. Given a well-established set of theoretical priors, the regulations considered are capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities and official supervisory power. We use data from the Central and Eastern European banking sectors over the period 1998–2005. The empirical results suggest that banks with market power tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default. Capital requirements reduce risk in general, but for banks with market power this effect significantly weakens or can even be reversed. Higher activity restrictions in combination with more market power reduce both credit risk and the risk of default, while official supervisory power has only a direct impact on bank risk.

We provide estimates of profit shifting for over 2 million firm-year observations in 100 countries over the period 2009–2020. Employing nonparametric estimation techniques within a mainstay model of profit shifting, we examine how the profits of both parent and subsidiary firms within a multinational group respond to marginal changes in the composite tax indicator. The key advantage of this approach is that it yields firm-year estimates of profit shifting. Multinational firms engage in extensive profit shifting by maintaining affiliates in low-tax countries and zero-tax havens. Multinational groups with an ultimate tax-haven owner exhibit the largest profit response to tax incentives. Our new database opens important avenues for analyzing the sources and effects of profit shifting.

Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizable negative effect on loan spreads: a 1-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.

Corporate taxation can have redistributive effects on income and wealth. We hypothesize and empirically establish such an effect working via bank credit. We use a unique sample of small majority-owned firms that apply for credit, where only some firms (treated) experience a corporate tax cut. We show that after the decrease in corporate tax rates, the treated poorer business owners get easier access to credit. However, this policy also considerably increases loan amounts and decreases loan spreads for the treated richer. Ultimately, reducing the corporate tax rate predominantly increases the future income and wealth of richer business owners.

We hypothesize that financial risk-taking originates in preindustrial interpersonal population diversity. We use data on immigrants residing in the United States and show that controlling for all known determinants of portfolio decisions and more than 100 control variables, diversity in the country of immigrants’ origin positively affects stock market participation and the level of risky asset holdings. Our results remain robust when instrumenting diversity with plant variety. We also identify the channels through which the effect of diversity operates (mostly individualism and human capital), but also conclude that diversity exerts an independent effect.

Lending to corporates in foreign currencies can expose banks to substantial currency risk. Using global syndicated loan data, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in exchange rate volatility increases loan spreads somewhere in the range between 5.5 and 16.1 basis points for loans made in a currency different from the lenders’. This implies excess interest of approximately 1 to 3 USD million for loans of average size and duration. We also show that this finding is mostly attributed to credit constraints and deviations from perfect competition in international lending markets, and that borrowers can lower the extra cost by forming strong lending relationships with their banks.