We analyze the relation between insider trading and the networks of executive and non-executive directors in UK listed companies. While most existing studies focus on firm-specific private information, we find that non-firm-specific information – such as information on other companies and information on industry and market trends – plays an important role in insider trading behavior and performance. Well-connected directors trade shares less frequently and for smaller values. However, their transactions are more profitable, especially when they make consecutive opportunistic purchases in the multiple companies on whose boards they sit. Taken together, well-connected directors are likely to outperform their peers with inferior connections.

We study the relation between the chair of the board of directors and the CEO. We argue that substantial age dissimilarity between the two—giving rise to cognitive conflict—increases board monitoring and firm value for firms with greater monitoring needs. We find evidence for our hypothesis using data on German two-tier boards. German law mitigates endogeneity concerns as it prevents CEO duality and also restricts CEO power in other ways. Additional identification attempts include CEO-firm and chair-firm fixed effects, random effects, dynamic panel data estimations, and the use of the 2007 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to monitoring needs. We find that during the crisis, when fast decision making and managerial discretion were needed, the link between age dissimilarity and firm value changed.

Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation SK, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining or separating the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous, comprise more words, and have a more positive tone for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering firm's characteristics. Our evidence enhances the understanding of firms' endogenous decision to opt for CEO duality and its value consequences.

This paper studies the factors that influence the CEO succession decision in family firms whose incumbent CEO is a member of the controlling family. The sample includes all such firms from France, Germany and the UK. We propose a new measure of directors' independence, which adjusts for various links with the controlling family. While we find that conventionally defined directors' independence has no impact on the CEO succession decision, our corrected measure reduces the likelihood of the successor being another family member. There is also evidence that firms from France that are cross-listed in the UK or USA are less likely to appoint another family CEO.

Dividends of German firms are often perceived to be more flexible than those of Anglo-American firms. We analyse the decision to change the dividend for 221 German firms over 1984–1993. Consistent with Lintner [Am. Econ. Rev. 46 (1956) 97], net earnings are key determinants of dividend changes. However, our findings also refine those of Lintner [Am. Econ. Rev. 46 (1956) 97] and Miller and Modigliani [J. Bus. 34 (1961) 411]. First, the occurrence of a loss is a key determinant of dividends in addition to the traditional key determinant, the level of net earnings. Second, the majority of dividend cuts or omissions are temporary. This stands in marked contrast with DeAngelo et al. [J. Finance 47 (1992) 1837] who report that US firms are more likely to reduce their dividend when earnings deteriorate on a permanent basis. Finally, we find that firms with a bank as their major shareholder are more willing to omit their dividend than firms controlled by other shareholders.

We show that in countries with more societal trust shareholders cast fewer votes at shareholder meetings and are more supportive of management proposals. This result is confirmed by instrumental variable regressions. It also holds at the U.S.-county level and for voting by U.S. institutional investors. Lower monitoring via voting relates less negatively to future firm performance in high-trust countries, suggesting that managers do not exploit greater discretion when trust is high. We also find a negative relation between trust and bond spreads. Our evidence supports theory arguing that trust substitutes for monitoring and has implications for investors’ optimal monitoring effort.

We explore differences in the levels of dispersed ownership that lead to a returns-based free float hedging factor in addition to size, which augments the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in explaining the cross-section of stock returns . Using the S&P 1500 stocks in the US between 1985 and 2023, the results support the advantages of free float within a three-factor CAPM including size over alternative models based on liquidity, book-to-market value, and momentum. We argue that this yields a useful means for hedging effectively against the risks associated with the fundamental underlying likelihood of expropriation in a specific firm based on its ownership structure.

Using credit ratings as an uncertainty-reducing mechanism, we provide evidence of the beneficial impact of multiple credit ratings on reducing IPO underpricing and filing price revision. We find that the acquisition of multiple ratings in the pre-IPO period mitigates uncertainty more than the acquisition of a single rating. Multi-rated firms also have higher probabilities of survival than those with a single rating, whereas credit rating levels matter only for IPOs with more than one rating. The IPOs that are awarded the first rating on the borderline between investment and non-investment grades are more likely to seek an additional rating.

We examine how firms' dividend policy affects the initial compensation of their newly appointed CEOs. We focus on newly appointed CEOs to isolate the effect of dividends on compensation and to provide new insights into an aspect largely neglected by compensation research. We show that the dividend payout is positively related to new CEO compensation. Further, the positive effect of dividends is stronger for firms with no dividend cuts over the past two, three and four years, firms with relatively high institutional ownership, and those with strong boards, consistent with new CEOs receiving higher pay as compensation for greater dividend pressure.