ABSTRACT Why do some firms, especially financial institutions, finance themselves so short‐term? We show that extreme reliance on short‐term financing may be the outcome of a maturity rat race : a borrower may have an incentive to shorten the maturity of an individual creditor's debt contract because this dilutes other creditors. In response, other creditors opt for shorter maturity contracts as well. This dynamic toward short maturities is present whenever interim information is mostly about the probability of default rather than the recovery in default. For borrowers that cannot commit to a maturity structure, equilibrium financing is inefficiently short‐term.

[We provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity (i.e., the ease with which it is traded) and traders' funding liquidity (i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding). Traders provide market liquidity, and their ability to do so depends on their availability of funding. Conversely, traders' funding, i.e., their capital and margin requirements, depends on the assets' market liquidity. We show that, under certain conditions, margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. The model explains the empirically documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up, (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) is subject to "flight to quality," and (v) co-moves with the market. The model provides new testable predictions, including that speculators' capital is a driver of market liquidity and risk premiums.]

Forward-looking agents care about expected future utility flows, and hence have higher current felicity if they are optimistic. This paper studies utility-based biases in beliefs by supposing that beliefs maximize average felicity, optimally balancing this benefit of optimism against the costs of worse decision making. A small optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to first-order gains in anticipatory utility and only second-order costs in realized outcomes. In a portfolio choice example, investors overestimate their return and exhibit a preference for skewness; in general equilibrium, investors' prior beliefs are endogenously heterogeneous. In a consumption-saving example, consumers are both overconfident and overoptimistic.

The price of a safe asset reflects not only the expected discounted future cash flows but also future service flows, since retrading allows partial insurance of idiosyncratic risk in an incomplete markets setting. This lowers the issuers’ interest burden. As idiosyncratic risk rises during recessions, so does the value of the service flows bestowing the safe asset with a negative β. The resulting exorbitant privilege resolves government debt valuation puzzles and allows the government to run a permanent (primary) deficit without ever paying back its debt, but the government faces a debt Laffer curve.

Abstract This paper finds noninterest income is positively correlated with the total systemic risk for U.S. banks. Decomposing total systemic risk into three components, we find that noninterest income is positively related to a bank’s tail risk, positively related to a bank’s interconnectedness risk, and an insignificantly related to a bank’s exposure to macroeconomic and finance factors. We also find that noninterest income is more volatile and negatively related to interest income. Finally, we find trading and other noninterest income to be positively correlated with systemic risk. Other noninterest income, compared with trading income, has a slightly larger economic impact. (JEL G01, G18, G20, G21, G32, G38) Received October 31, 2019; editorial decision February 3, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

We provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity (i.e., the ease with which it is traded) and traders' funding liquidity (i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding). Traders provide market liquidity, and their ability to do so depends on their availability of funding. Conversely, traders' funding, i.e., their capital and margin requirements, depends on the assets' market liquidity. We show that, under certain conditions, margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. The model explains the empirically documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up, (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) is subject to “flight to quality,” and (v) co-moves with the market. The model provides new testable predictions, including that speculators' capital is a driver of market liquidity and risk premiums.

We propose a measure of systemic risk, Δ CoVaR, defined as the change in the value at risk of the financial system conditional on an institution being under distress relative to its median state. Our estimates show that characteristics such as leverage, size, maturity mismatch, and asset price booms significantly predict Δ CoVaR. We also provide out-of-sample forecasts of a countercyclical, forward-looking measure of systemic risk, and show that the 2006:IV value of this measure would have predicted more than one-third of realized Δ CoVaR during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. (JEL C58, E32, G01, G12, G17, G20, G32)

We study a simple model of liquidity risk management in which a firm is subject to rollover risk. When a firm is unable to rollover its maturing bonds by issuing new bonds, it may have to seek more expensive sources of financing or even liquidate its assets, possibly at fire-sale prices. One way to reduce this risk is to hold excess cash reserves, which can be expensive in practice (Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole 2000; 2001). In this paper, we focus on an alternative way of managing liquidity risk, through the optimal (dynamic) choice of the maturity structure of debt. Our analysis highlights one advantage of short-term financing. The firm, while in good financial health, can readjust its maturity structure more quickly in response to changes in its asset value. Ideally, the firm would secure long-term financing just prior to when its financial health may worsen. Through this strategy, the firm can secure financing for the longest continuous period possible without rollover failure, avoiding inefficient restructuring costs. Put differently, the objective of the firm with long-term assets is to maximize the effective maturity of its liabilities across several refinancing cycles, rather than to maximize the maturity of the current bonds outstanding.

We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to investigate how households' portfolio allocations change in response to wealth fluctuations. Persistent habits, consumption commitments, and subsistence levels can generate time-varying risk aversion with the consequence that when the level of liquid wealth changes, the proportion a household invests in risky assets should also change in the same direction. In contrast, our analysis shows that the share of liquid assets that households invest in risky assets is not affected by wealth changes. Instead, one of the major drivers of household portfolio allocation seems to be inertia: households rebalance only very slowly following inflows and outflows or capital gains and losses. (JEL D14, D31)