In an effort to bolster economic performance in light of a looming downturn in economic activity, on February 13, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. More than two-thirds of the $152 billion bill consisted of economic stimulus payments to be sent beginning in May to approximately 130 million households. To qualify, recipients had to have a valid Social Security number, an income tax liability, or at least $3,000 of “qualifying income” that included earned income and some benefits from Social Security, Veterans Affairs, or Railroad Retirement, and have filed a 2007 federal tax return. For the most part those who filed as single individuals received between $300 and $600, while those who filed jointly received between $600 and $1,200. Additionally, parents with children under 17 who were eligible for a Child Tax Credit and had a Social Security number received an extra $300 per child. The tax rebate phased out at higher levels of income, as the payment was reduced by 5 percent of the amount of adjusted gross income over $75,000 for singles, or over $150,000 for married couples. The Treasury remitted payments either by direct deposit, mainly in the first half of May, or by mail, mainly from mid-May through mid-July. The effect of these stimulus payments depends on how much was spent. This paper reports new survey evidence on the propensity of consumers to spend the 2008 rebate. It also relates the survey evidence to aggregate data and to evidence about spending from the 2001 tax rebate.

Many households received income tax rebates in 2001 of $300 or $600. These rebates represented advance payments of the tax cut from the new 10 percent tax bracket. Based on a survey of a representative sample of households, this paper finds that only 22 percent of households receiving the rebate would spent it. Instead, they would either save it or use it to pay off debt. This very low rate of spending represents a striking break with past behavior, which would have suggested a much higher rate of spending. The low spending rate implies that the tax rebate provided a very limited stimulus to aggregate demand.

[Was the Depression forecastable? After the Crash, how long should it have taken contemporary forecasters to realize how severe the downturn was going to be? Data assembled by the Harvard and Yale forecasters--together with modern historical data--are subjected to statistical analysis. Neither contemporary forecasters nor modern times-series analysts could have forecast the large declines in output following the Crash.]

Much recent work emphasizes the joint nature of the consumption decision and the portfolio allocation decision. In this paper, we compare two formulations of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The traditional CAPM suggests that the appropriate measure of an asset's risk is the covariance of the asset's return with the market return. The consumption CAPM, on the other hand, implies that a better measure of risk is the covariance with aggregate consumption growth. We examine a cross-section of 464 stocks and find that the beta measured with respect to a stock market index outperforms the beta measured with respect to consumption growth.

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze and quantify the aggregate effects of the timing of tax rate changes enacted in 2001 (which called for successive rate reductions through 2006) and 2003 (which made immediate tax rate cuts scheduled for 2004 and 2006). The phased-in nature contributed to the slow recovery from the 2001 recession, while the elimination of the phase-in helped explain the increase in economic activity in 2003. The simulations suggest while the tax policy was a drag on the economy in 2001 and 2002, it increased economic growth in 2003, once phase-ins were eliminated.

This paper presents and implements statistical tests of stock-market forecastability and volatility that are immune from the severe statistical problems of earlier tests. It finds that although the null hypothesis of market efficiency is rejected, the rejections are only marginal. The paper also shows how volatility tests and recent regression tests are closely related, and demonstrates that when finite sample biases are taken into account, regression tests also fail to provide strong evidence of violations of the conventional valuation model. Copyright 1991 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

Using equipment‐level data from aerospace plants that closed during the 1990s, this paper studies the process of moving installed physical capital to a new use. The analysis yields three results that suggest significant sectoral specificity of physical capital and substantial costs of redeploying the capital. First, other aerospace companies are overrepresented among buyers of the used capital relative to their representation in the market for new investment goods. Second, even after age‐related depreciation is taken into account, capital sells for a substantial discount relative to replacement cost; the more specialized the type of capital, the greater the discount. Yet, capital sold to other aerospace firms fetches a higher price than capital sold to industry outsiders. Finally, the process of winding down operations and selling the equipment takes several years.

Recent work demonstrates serious statistical problems with standard volatility tests. This paper proposes new tests that are unbiased in small samples and that do not require assumptions of stationarity. The new tests continue to find evidence against the model positing rational expectations and a constant required rate of return on equity.

ABSTRACT Recent work demonstrates serious statistical problems with standard volatility tests. This paper proposes new tests that are unbiased in small samples and that do not require assumptions of stationarity. The new tests continue to find evidence against the model positing rational expectations and a constant required rate of return on equity.

This paper asks whether the slow recovery of the US economy from the trough of the Great Recession was anticipated, and identifies some of the factors that contributed to surprises in the course of the recovery. We construct a narrative using news reports and government announcements to identify policy and financial shocks. We then compare forecasts and forecast revisions of GDP to the narrative. Successive financial and fiscal shocks emanating from Europe, together with self-inflicted wounds from the political stalemate over the US fiscal situation, help explain the slowing of the pace of an already slow recovery.