The dynamics of the unobservable short rate are frequently estimated directly using a proxy. We examine the biases resulting from this practice (the “proxy problem”). Analytic results show that the proxy problem is not economically significant for single-factor affine models. In the two-factor affine model of Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), the proxy problem is only economically significant for pricing discount bonds with maturities of more than five years. We also describe two different numerical procedures for assessing the magnitude of the proxy problem in a general interest rate model. When applied to a nonlinear single-factor model, they suggest that the proxy problem can be economically significant.

Conventional estimates of the costs of taking liquidity in options markets are large. Nonetheless, options trading volume is high. We resolve this puzzle by showing that options price changes are predictable at high frequency, and many traders time executions by buying (selling) when the option fair value is close to the ask (bid). Effective spreads of traders who time executions are less than 40% of the size of conventional measures, and the overall average effective spread is one-quarter smaller than conventional estimates. Price impact measures are also affected. These findings alter conclusions about the after-cost profitability of options trading strategies.

The offering prices of 64 issues of a popular retail structured equity product were, on average, almost 8% greater than estimates of the products' fair market values obtained using option pricing methods. Under reasonable assumptions about the underlying stocks' expected returns, the mean expected return estimate on the structured products is slightly below zero. The products do not provide tax, liquidity, or other benefits, and it is difficult to rationalize their purchase by informed rational investors. Our findings are, however, consistent with the recent hypothesis that issuing firms might shroud some aspects of innovative securities or introduce complexity to exploit uninformed investors.

We use brokerage account records to study trading during the Chinese put warrants bubble and find evidence consistent with extrapolative theories of speculative asset price bubbles. We identify the event that started the bubble and show that investors engaged in a form of feedback trading based on their own past returns. The interaction of feedback trading with the precipitating event caused additional buying and price increases in a feedback loop, and estimates of the trading volume due to this mechanism explain prices and returns during the bubble.

Most models of trade in speculative markets assume that agents interpret public information identically. The authors provide empirical evidence on the relation between the volume of trade and stock returns around public announcements, and they argue that the evidence is inconsistent with this assumption. They then develop a model of trade around public announcements that incorporates differential interpretations and is consistent with the observed volume-return relation. Then the authors test the standard model of belief revision underlying most models of trade using stock brokerage research analysts' earnings forecasts. The hypothesis of identical interpretations seems inconsistent with the forecast revisions in these data. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

We use tick-by-tick quote data for 39 liquid US stocks and options on them, and we focus on events when the two markets disagree about the stock price in the sense that the option-implied stock price obtained from the put-call parity relation is inconsistent with the actual stock price. Option market quotes adjust to eliminate the disagreement, while the stock market quotes behave normally, as if there were no disagreement. The disagreement events are typically precipitated by stock price movements and display signed option volume in the direction that tends to eliminate the disagreements. These results show that option price quotes do not contain economically significant information about future stock prices beyond what is already reflected in current stock prices, i.e., no economically significant price discovery occurs in the option market. We also find no option market price discovery using a much larger sample of disagreement events based on a weaker definition of a disagreement, which verifies that the findings for the primary sample are not due to unusual or unrepresentative market behavior during the put-call parity violations.

There are a number of circumstances in finance in which it is useful to estimate diffusion processes conditional on some event. In this paper, we develop the theoretical and numerical tools necessary to perform conditional estimation of diffusion processes within a generalized method of moments framework. We illustrate our method by estimating a univariate diffusion process for a standard time-series of interest rate data conditioned to remain between lower and upper boundaries. A test statistic fails to reject by a wide margin the linearity of the conditionally estimated drift coefficient.

Despite the fact that taxable investors would prefer to defer the realization of capital gains indefinitely, most open-end mutual funds regularly realize and distribute a large portion of their gains. We present a model in which unrealized gains in the fund's portfolio increase expected future taxable distributions, and thus increase the present value of a new investor's tax liability. In equilibrium, managers interested in attracting new investors pass through taxable capital gains to reduce the overhang of unrealized gains. This model contains a number of empirical predictions that are consistent with data on actual fund overhangs.

This article uses a unique option data set to provide detailed descriptive statistics on the purchased and written open interest and open buy and sell volume of several classes of investors. We also show that volatility trading through straddles and strangles accounts for a small fraction of option trading volume and presents evidence that a large percentage of call writing is part of covered call positions. Finally, we find that during the stock market bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000 the least sophisticated investors in the data set substantially increased their purchases of calls on growth but not value stocks. (JEL: G0, G1, G12, G13, G14)

Using recent U.S. data, we find that long-horizon abnormal returns following repurchase announcements made after 2001 are much lower than those following earlier announcements. The equity-linked compensation of senior management of buyback firms exceeds that of matching firms, especially for repurchases announced after 2001. Transient institutional investors equity holdings of buyback firms are smaller than their holdings of matching firms following buyback announcements by repeat repurchasers during 2002–2006. The results suggest that many recent buybacks have not been motivated by fundamentals-based factors such as undervaluation, and that non-fundamentals-based factors such as managerial self-interest have become more important.