This study examines firm characteristics that lead to shareholder activism and analyzes the effects of activism on target firm governance structure, shareholder wealth, and operating performance for the fifty-one firms targeted by the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) over the 1987-93 period. Firm size and level of institutional holdings are found to be positively related to the probability of being targeted, and 72 percent of firms targeted after 1988 adopt proposed changes or make changes resulting in a settlement with CalPERS. Shareholder wealth increases for firms that adopt or settle and decreases for firms that resist. No statistically significant change in operating performance is found.

This paper provides a new perspective on the validity of the so-called 'leverage theory'. In a model of preemptive innovation in 'systems' markets, 1 examine the effect of bundling on R&D incentives. 1 find that bundling provides a channel through which monopoly 'slack' in one component market can be shifted to another, with the effect of mitigating rent dissipation in the systems market. Bundling can be profitable if this beneficial effect of reduced rent dissipation outweighs the negative effect of intensified price competition. After demonstrating the private optimality of bundling, its welfare implications are considered. There is a discrepancy between the market outcome and the socially optimal outcome which can be explained in terms of externalities conferred on consumers' surplus and the rival firm's profits due to bundling. Finally, the results can be reinterpreted to analyze the relationship between compatibility decisions and R&D incentives in mix-and-match models.

We show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a competitive retail market may wish to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the emergence of discount retailers. In our model, discounters offer low prices made possible by low probability of being saddled with unsold inventories in the event of slack demand. Full-price retailers are compensated for a higher probability of unsold inventories by a higher retail price when they sell. We show that preventing discounting increases the manufacturer's wholesale demand and profits, and we delineate demand conditions under which equilibrium inventory holding and consumer welfare increase.

developed and under general conditions an increase in the disregard is shown to increase both the part-time and overall re-employment hazards. Data from the Current Population Survey's Displaced Worker Supplements are used to test these predictions. Estimates from a competing risks model with correlated risks and time-varying coefficients shows that increasing the disregard significantly increases the conditional probability of part-time re-employment during the first three months of joblessness.

This study investigates firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission for alleged violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. We investigate: (i) the extent to which the alleged earnings manipulations can be explained by extant earnings management hypotheses; (ii) the relation between earnings manipulations and weaknesses in firms' internal governance structures; and (iii) the capital market consequences experienced by firms when the alleged earnings manipulations are made public. We find that an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at low cost. We show that this motivation remains significant after controlling for contracting motives proposed in the academic literature. We also find that firms manipulating earnings are: (i) more likely to have boards of directors dominated by management; (ii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who simultaneously serves as Chairman of the Board; (iii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who is also the firm's founder, (iv) less likely to have an audit committee; and (v) less likely to have an outside blockholder. Finally, we document that firms manipulating earnings experience significant increases in their costs of capital when the manipulations are made public. Résumé. Les auteurs analysent les entreprises assujetties aux mesures d'exécution prises par la Securities and Exchange Commission dans les cas de présomption de transgression des principes comptables généralement reconnus. Ils s'intéressent aux aspects suivants de la question: i) la mesure dans laquelle les présomptions de manipulations des bénéfices peuvent être expliquées par les hypothèses existantes de gestion des bénéfices; ii) la relation entre les manipulations de bénéfices et les faiblesses des structures de régie interne des entreprises; et iii) la réaction du marché financier à l'endroit des entreprises au sujet desquelles les présomptions de manipulation des bénéfices sont rendues publiques. Les auteurs constatent qu'un incitatif majeur à la manipulation des bénéfices est le désir d'obtenir du financement externe à moindre coût. Ils démontrent que cet incitatif demeure important même après le contrôle des motifs contractuels que mettent de l'avant les travaux théoriques. Ils constatent également que les entreprises qui manipulent les bénéfices sont: i) davantage susceptibles d'avoir des conseils d'administration dominés par la direction; ii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui joue simultanément le rôle de président du conseil; iii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui est également le fondateur de l'entreprise; iv) moins susceptibles d'avoir un comité de vérification; et v) moins susceptibles d'avoir un bloc de titres détenus par un actionnaire extérieur. Enfin, les auteurs établissent le fait que le coût du capital, pour les entreprises qui manipulent les bénéfices, enregistre des hausses appréciables lorsque ces manipulations sont rendues publiques.

We re-examine the day-of-the-week effect for eleven indexes from nine countries during the 1969–1992 period. The standard methodology as well as the moving average methodology are used and we find returns to be lower at the beginning of the week (but not necessarily on Monday) for the full period. As in Chang et al. (International evidence on the robustness of the day-of-the-week effect, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28 (1993), 497–514), the anomaly disappears for the most recent period in the USA. However, the effect is still strong for European countries, Hong-Kong and Toronto.

This paper provides evidence that financial markets can directly affect economic growth by studying the relaxation of bank branch restrictions in the United States. We find that the rates of real, per capita growth in income and output increase significantly following intrastate branch reform. We also argue that the observed changes in growth are the result of changes in the banking system. Improvements in the quality of bank lending, not increased volume of bank lending, appear to be responsible for faster growth.

This paper explains why developed countries impose more trade barriers on middle-income countries than on either poor or other developed countries. We use a median voter model of the choice between trade and autarky embedded within an intraindustry trade model similar to Krugman. Our main result is the derivation of conditions under which a rich country rejects trade with middle-income countries, but accepts trade with either similar or poor countries. We also show that if increased inequality lowers median wealth in the developed country, the range of countries for which free trade is rejected is enlarged.

Patricia M. Dechow, Amy P. Hutton, Richard G. Sloan, Economic Consequences of Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 34, Studies on Recognition, Measurement, and Disclosure Issues in Accounting (1996), pp. 1-20

Hans van Ophem (1993) employed a switching regression model with earnings entering the choice equation to investigate earnings differentials between the public and private sectors. Ophem also described a 'modified switching regression model' in which only the equation for unknown earnings is substituted into the choice equation. He argued that the coefficients in the choice equation can be identified in the modified switching regression model without exclusion restrictions and that estimates from the modified switching regression model are more efficient than estimates from the standard switching regression model. The authors show that there are flaws in Ophem's analysis which invalidate his claims.