[This article uses a unique dataset to study how firms managed liquidity during the 2008—2009 financial crisis. Our analysis provides new insights on interactions between internal liquidity, external funds, and real corporate decisions, such as investment and employment. We first describe how companies used credit lines during the crisis (access, size of facilities, and drawdown activity), the characteristics of these facilities (fees, markups, maturity, and collateral), and whether managers had difficulties in renewing or initiating lines. We also describe the dynamics of credit line violations and the outcome of subsequent renegotiations. We show how companies substitute between credit lines and internal liquidity (cash and profits) when facing a severe credit shortage. Looking at real-side decisions, we find that credit lines are associated with greater spending when companies are not cash-strapped. Firms with limited access to credit lines, in contrast, appear to choose between saving and investing during the crisis. Our evidence indicates that credit lines eased the impact of the financial crisis on corporate spending.]

Using an effort-sharing framework for VC syndicates, we assess how syndication impacts investment returns, chances of successful exit, and the time taken to exit. With data from 1980 to 2003, and applying apposite econometrics for endogeneity to these different performance measures, we are able to ascribe much of the better return to selection, with the value-addition by monitoring role significantly impacting the likelihood and time of exit. While the extant literature on Venture Capital (VC) syndication is divided about the relative importance of the “selection” and “value-add” hypotheses, we find that their roles are complementary.

[We study games in which the decision to exercise an option is a signal of private information to outsiders, whose beliefs affect the utility of the decision-maker. Signaling incentives distort the timing of exercise, and the direction of distortion depends on whether the decision-maker's utility increases or decreases in outsiders' belief about the payoff from exercise. In the former case, signaling incentives erode the value of the option to wait and speed up option exercise, while in the latter case option exercise is delayed. We demonstrate the model's implications through four corporate finance settings: investment under managerial myopia, venture capital grandstanding, investment under cash flow diversion, and product market competition.]

We study games in which the decision to exercise an option is a signal of private information to outsiders, whose beliefs affect the utility of the decision-maker. Signaling incentives distort the timing of exercise, and the direction of distortion depends on whether the decision-maker's utility increases or decreases in outsiders' belief about the payoff from exercise. In the former case, signaling incentives erode the value of the option to wait and speed up option exercise, while in the latter case option exercise is delayed. We demonstrate the model's implications through four corporate finance settings: investment under managerial myopia, venture capital grandstanding, investment under cash flow diversion, and product market competition.

One consequence of the shift to fair value measurement is the emergence of voluntary disclosures in audited financial statements that question the reliability of mandated fair value information. We refer to these disclosures as reliability disavowals. We examine stock option volatility estimates disclosed under SFAS 123 and test whether disavowals are informative (opportunistic) by examining whether ex ante firm characteristics, forecast bias, and prediction difficulty are consistent with informative (opportunistic) disclosure. Our results support the hypothesis that disavowals inform users about the reliability of volatility estimates, but there is also limited evidence consistent with managers using disavowals opportunistically.

We show that the negative relation between realized idiosyncratic volatility, measured over the prior month, and returns is robust in non-January months. Controlling for realized idiosyncratic volatility, we show that the relation between returns and expected idiosyncratic volatility is positive and robust. Realized and expected idiosyncratic volatility are separate and important effects describing the cross-section of returns. We find the negative return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long high realized idiosyncratic volatility stocks and short low realized idiosyncratic volatility stocks is dependent on aggregate investor sentiment. In cross-sectional tests, we find the negative relation is weaker for stocks with a large analyst following and stronger for stocks with high dispersion of analyst forecasts. The positive relation between expected idiosyncratic volatility and returns is not due to mispricing.

We analyze the relationship between charter high school attendance and educational attainment in Florida and in Chicago. Controlling for observed student characteristics and test scores, we estimate that among students who attended a charter middle school, those who went on to attend a charter high school were 7–15 percentage points more likely to earn a standard diploma than students who transitioned to a traditional public high school. Similarly, those attending a charter high school were 8–10 percentage points more likely to attend college. We find even larger effects when we treat high school choice as endogenous.

We use incremental and joint implementation of multiple SOX‐based control effectiveness disclosure and audit mandates to assess relative performance of alternatives for small U.S. public companies. Using data from several low‐ and high‐effort management disclosure and audit regimes implemented from 2003 to 2008, we find substantial and statistically significant increases in material weakness disclosure rates for small firms undergoing initial SOX 404(b) internal control audits, but find quantitatively and statistically similar increases for initial management reports of small firms exempt from such audits. As to audit cost, fees more than double for initial 404(b) audits in 2004 and remain high, while 404(b)‐exempt firms’ fees grow about 10% annually. Our results support the view that, for small firms, management internal control reports and traditional financial audits may be a cost effective disclosure alternative to full application of SOX 404(b). Also, our results suggest that, even without management reports on internal control, analysis of the cause of known accounting mistakes may yield substantial material weakness disclosures.