We develop 50 indices of state-level economic policy uncertainty (SEPU) based on newspaper coverage frequency using 204 million newspaper articles from Mar. 1984 to Dec. 2019. We assess the validity of our measures. Our SEPU indices vary counter-cyclically with respect to state-specific economic conditions, rise before close gubernatorial elections, and exhibit a large cross-sectional variation. We demonstrate that SEPU indices are associated with the cross-sectional variation in state-level GDP, employment, income as well as industry investment decisions. Our findings highlight the importance of economic policy uncertainty at the state level in addition to the nationwide level.

There is widespread agreement that corporate debts’ recovery rates are time varying, but empirical work in this area is limited. We show that the joint information from the term structure of senior and subordinate credit default swaps can identify the level and the dynamics of recovery rates. We estimate a reduced-form no-arbitrage model on 46 firms across different industries. We find that the term structure of expected recovery rates is, on average, downward sloping. However, an inversion occurs during the 2008 crisis, suggesting the market expects higher recoveries conditional on short-term survival. The inversion is more pronounced for firms in distressed industries.

We develop a dynamic capital structure model to study how agency conflicts between managers and shareholders affect the joint determination of financing and investment decisions. We show that there are two agency conflicts with opposing effects on a manager’s choice of investment: first, the consumption of private benefits channel leads managers not only to choose a lower optimal leverage, but also to underinvest, and second, compensation linked to firm size may lead managers to overinvest. We fit the model to the data and show that the average firm slightly overinvests, younger CEOs invest more than older ones, while CEOs with longer tenure overinvest more than CEOs with shorter tenure.

Assessments of the trade-off theory have typically compared the present value of tax benefits to the present value of bankruptcy costs. We verify that this comparison overwhelmingly favors tax benefits, suggesting that firms are under-leveraged. However, when we allow firms to experience even modest (e.g., 1–2% annualized) financial distress costs prior to bankruptcy, the cumulative present value of such costs can easily offset the tax benefits.

Nous prsentons les rsultats d'une tude portant sur l'valuation de crances ventuelles de style europen pour une grande varit de caractristiques lies au rendement des actifs sousjacents. Les rsultats de notre valuation proposent en temps discret une formule tat-espace infinie, partir du principe de non-arbitrage et d'une mesure de martingale quivalente. Notre approche permet de tenir compte de formes gnrales d'htroscdasticit dans les rendements et d'obtenir, dans des cas spciaux, des rsultats d'valuation lis aux processus homoscdastiques. Elle permet aussi de considrer les innovations conditionnellement non normales en matire de rendement, ce qui reprsente un facteur critique, compte tenu du fait que l'htroscdasticit ne permet pas, elle seule, de saisir pleinement le caractre ironique de l'option. Nous analysons une catgorie de mesures de martingale quivalentes dont la dynamique du rendement risque-neutre obtenu est de la mme famille de distribution que la dynamique du rendement physique. Dans ce cas, notre cadre d'tude soutient les rsultats d'valuation obtenus par Nous tendons ces rsultats aux mesures de martingale quivalentes plus gnrales et aux modles de volatilit stochastique en temps discret et analysons aussi la relation entre nos rsultats et ceux obtenus dans le cas des modles en temps continu.

Most extant structural credit risk models underestimate credit spreads—a shortcoming known as the credit spread puzzle. We consider a model with priced stochastic asset risk that is able to fit medium‐ to long‐term spreads. The model, augmented by jumps to help explain short‐term spreads, is estimated on firm‐level data and identifies significant asset variance risk premia. An important feature of the model is the significant time variation in risk premia induced by the uncertainty about asset risk. Various extensions are considered, among them optimal leverage and endogenous default.

Principal customers have strong incentives to screen and/or monitor suppliers to ensure supply-chain stability; consequently, the implicit certification from the existence of long-term relationships with principal customers has reputational consequences that potentially spill over to other markets. We argue that one such consequence is smaller loan spreads and looser loan covenants on bank loans, as firms that are able to hold on to principal customers longer are perceived as safer firms by banks. We address causality and endogeneity issues via a variety of tests and find consistent results. Our study suggests that non-financial stakeholders can have important effects on the decisions of financial stakeholders.

In a model of dual-agency problems where borrower–lender and bank–nonbank incentives may conflict, we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness. As bank participation declines, covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold, at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in spread. We find support for the hockey stick relation with bank’s stake in covenant-lite loans averaging 8% (0% median). We also find that covenant-lite loans are more likely when borrower moral hazard is less severe and when bank relationship rents are high.