In an effort to improve the small sample properties of generalized method of mo-ments (GMM) estimators, a number of alternative estimators have been suggested. These include empirical likelihood (EL), continuous updating, and exponential tilt-ing estimators. We show that these estimators share a common structure, being members of a class of generalized empirical likelihood (GEL) estimators. We use this structure to compare their higher order asymptotic properties. We find that GEL has no asymptotic bias due to correlation of the moment functions with their Jacobian, eliminating an important source of bias for GMM in models with endo-geneity. We also find that EL has no asymptotic bias from estimating the optimal weight matrix, eliminating a further important source of bias for GMM in panel data models. We give bias corrected GMM and GEL estimators. We also show that bias corrected EL inherits the higher order property of maximum likelihood, that it is higher order asymptotically efficient relative to the other bias corrected estimators.

We use a database of recent high tech IPOs to estimate opportunity cost of capital for venture capital investors and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs face the risk-return tradeoff of the CAPM as the opportunity cost of holding a portfolio that necessarily is underdiversified. For early stage firms, we estimate the effects of underdiversification, industry, and financial maturity on opportunity cost. Assuming a one-year holding period, the entrepreneur's opportunity cost generally is two to four times as high as that of a well-diversified investor. With a 4.0% risk-free rate and 6.0% market risk premium, for the sample average, we estimate the cost of capital of a well-diversified investor to be 11.4%, which equates to 16.7% before the management fees and carried interest of a typical venture capital fund. For an entrepreneur with 25% of total wealth invested in the venture, our corresponding estimate of cost of capital is 40.0%.

We use a sample of 8, 163 venture-backed companies over three decades to test the competing hypotheses that levels and relative shares of IPO (initial public offering) and M&A (mergers and acquisitions) exits are affected by market timing, versus pseudo-market timing that reflects market conditions. We find evidence of pseudo-market timing. Venture-backed issuers react to market or sector runups but do not predict downturns. We find no evidence that firm-specific market timing contributes to IPO or M&A waves. We also find that acquirers turn to acquisition when other opportunities are unattractive, and that the market may be slow to recognize that such opportunities are declining. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We examine Japan's 1997 introduction of book building as an alternative to a previously required hybrid auction method. Despite higher cost for some issuers, all issuers in Japan now select book building. Book building enables more accurate valuation of firms, but gains from accurate valuation are partly redistributive. Thus book building can drive auction-method offerings from the market even if it yields no aggregate benefit. Compared to the auction regime, book building reduces issue costs for large issuers. Auctioning is less costly for small issuers, but appears to foreclose some small firms from issuing. The aggregate costs of book building and auctioning are similar.

Trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay payment. In this paper we document the rich variation in interfirm credit terms and credit policies across industries. We examine empirically the firm's basic credit policy choices: whether to extend credit or to require cash payment; and, if credit is extended, whether to adopt simple net terms or terms with discounts for prompt payment. We also examine determinants of variations in two‐part terms. Results are supportive primarily of theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer creditworthiness.

Using country-level data, we study the relation between institutionalization of capital and various measures of reliance on public equity markets. For developed and developing countries, assets under institutional management (mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies) are negatively related to the number of listed companies, market capitalization, and trading volume. The negative relationships are estimated on the margin, as other factors such as GDP have countervailing positive partial effects and are generally stronger for more highly developed countries. Results indicate that as direct ownership of equity by retail investors is displaced by investing through institutions, financial systems become less public-market-centric.

We document discretionary underpricing and partial adjustment of IPO prices in the public offer tranche of Japan's hybrid auction regime, in which investor information differences are not important, there are no roadshows, preferential allocations are negligible, institutional investing is low, and the public offer tranche cannot fail. The magnitude and variation of underpricing in our sample, which spans relatively hot and cold markets, are similar to those reported for US IPOs. The evidence is most consistent with underpricing arising from an implicit contract to allocate risk related to initial mispricing where, in exchange for guaranteeing a minimum price, the underwriter participates indirectly in upside performance. The results raise important questions about interpretations of IPO underpricing in the US.

This paper develops a theory of the role of the underwriter in certifying that risky issue prices reflect potentially adverse inside information. The theory derives from the literature on the use of reputational capital to guarantee product quality. An underwriting cost/benefit paradigm is employed to generate testable implications related to announcement effects, issue underpricing, the choice of competitive versus negotiated underwriting, and the level of underwriter compensation as a function of firm-specific information. Existing empirical literature is reviewed in the context of the certification hypothesis and several new tests are conducted. All of the findings are supportive of the hypothesis.