This paper examines post-revision return drift, or PRD, following analysts’ revisions of their stock recommendations. PRD refers to the finding that the analysts’ recommendation changes predict future long-term returns in the same direction as the change (i.e., upgrades are followed by positive returns, and downgrades are followed by negative returns). During the high-frequency algorithmic trading period of 2003–2010, average PRD is no longer significantly different from zero. The new findings agree with improved market efficiency after declines in real trading cost inefficiencies. They are consistent with a reduced information production role for analysts in the supercomputer era.

Studies suggest that underwriting syndicates provide marketing services and certify the fairness of offer prices. We argue that syndicate lead banks also monitor manager effort, increasing the value of capital‐raising companies. A given level of monitoring is associated with a given level of intrinsic value, so there is a “schedule” of certifiable offer prices, depending on the level of monitoring. Monitoring, marketing, and certification are, therefore, all legitimate syndicate functions. New evidence supporting the conclusion that syndicates provide corporate monitoring is presented.

Studies suggest that underwriting syndicates provide marketing services and certify the fairness of offer prices. We argue that syndicate lead banks also monitor manager effort, increasing the value of capital-raising companies. A given level of monitoring is associated with a given level of intrinsic value, so there is a “schedule” of certifiable offer prices, depending on the level of monitoring. Monitoring, marketing, and certification are, therefore, all legitimate syndicate functions. New evidence supporting the conclusion that syndicates provide corporate monitoring is presented.

When raising new equity capital managers have historically rejected the direct offer method favoring instead the seemingly more expensive underwritten public issue. This paper provides a resolution for this equity financing paradox by demonstrating empirically that firms which engage in direct offers enjoy a comparative cost advantage that is more than sufficient to account for the absolute reported cost differences between the two methods of equity financing.

We assess investment banks’ influence over the agreement between their analysts’ research behavior and their clients’ interests, in the post-reform era. Competing banks discipline their analysts with worse career outcomes for producing biased reports, issuing shirking reports, and for involvement in the earnings guidance game, showing meaningful monitoring of their analysts. Highly reputable banks provide more monitoring discipline of their analysts and bonding of their moral hazard than other banks. The findings agree with the banks taking responsibility for aligning analysts’ behavior with clients’ interests.