[This article offers a tractable monetary asset pricing model. In monetary economies, the price level, inflation, asset prices, and the real and nominal interest rates have to be determined simultaneously and in relation to each other. This link allows us to relate in closed form each of the dependent entities to the underlying real and monetary variables. Among other features of such economies, inflation can be partially nonmonetary and the real and nominal term structures can depend on fundamentally different risk factors. In one extreme, the process followed by the real term structure is independent of that followed by its nominal counterpart.]

This paper examines the competition between money and credit in a search model with divisible commodities. It is shown that fiat money can be valuable even though it yields a lower rate of return than the coexisting credit. The competition between money and credit increases efficiency. The monetary equilibrium with credit Pareto dominates the monetary equilibrium without credit whenever the two coexist. When a credit is repaid with money, the competition also bounds the purchasing power of money from below by that of credit and so eliminates the weak inefficient monetary equilibrium found in previous search models. With numerical examples, three different monetary equilibria are ranked and the properties of the interest rate are examined.

This paper examines the value relevance of fair value data disclosed under SFAS 107 by banks for 1992 and 1993. Collectively, the evidence suggests differences between fair and book values of financial instruments are associated with market-to-book ratios. However, fair value disclosures for financial instruments other than securities are value-relevant only in limited settings. In addition, only in 1992 are fair value variables associated with market-to-book ratios after incorporating existing historical cost information. Further analysis suggests the weaker 1993 results are not necessarily due to increased measurement error in fair value numbers.

Abstract. This paper examines audit report lags and earnings announcement lags for a sample of firms that switched auditors. We investigate whether audit report and earnings announcement lags are associated with the timing of auditor changes in relation to firms' fiscal year‐ends. It is hypothesized that firms which replace their auditor early (late) in the fiscal year do so for positive (negative) reasons and experience shorter (longer) reporting lags. Conflicts over reporting issues can be difficult to resolve and consequently lead to reporting delays. In other cases, clients may be more concerned about adhering to customary reporting practices or improving reporting timeliness. These are likely to be considerations in auditor realignment decisions and are predictably reflected in the timing of the auditor change. Résumé. Les auteurs s'intéressent aux décalages dans la production des rapports des vérificateurs et dans la publication des bénéfices, pour un échantillon d'entreprises ayant changé de vérificateurs. Ils se demandent si ces décalages sont reliés au choix du moment du changement de vérificateurs par rapport à la date de clôture de l'exercice. Selon leur hypothèse, les entreprises qui remplacent leurs vérificateurs tôt (tard) dans l'exercice le font pour des raisons positives (négatives), et les décalages enregistrés dans la production de l'information sont plus courts (plus longs). Les conflits touchant les questions relatives à l'information à fournir peuvent être difficiles à résoudre et, en conséquence, conduire à des retards dans la publication de l'information. Dans d'autres cas, les entreprises clientes peuvent être davantage préoccupées par le respect des méthodes coutumières de présentation de l'information ou par l'accélération de la publication de l'information. Ces facteurs sont susceptibles d'entrer en ligne de compte dans les décisions de réorientation des vérificateurs, et il est à prévoir qu'ils se refléteront dans le choix du moment du changement de vérificateurs.

In this study we specify a simple earnings model, present managerial discretion hypotheses from existing literature, and assume efficient markets in order to evaluate five discretionary-accrual models. The five discretionary accrual models are the same as those evaluated in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995]. The models are Healy [1985]; DeAngelo [1986]; Jones [1991]; Jones as modified in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995]; and the industry model proposed by Dechow and Sloan [1991]. We specify three managerial discretion hypotheses. First, under the performance measure hypothesis, discretionary accruals help managers produce a reliable and more timely measure of firm performance (i.e., earnings) than using nondiscretionary accruals alone. Second, the opportunistic accrual management hypothesis is that discretionary accruals are employed to hide poor performance or postpone a portion of unusually good current earnings to future years. Finally, discretionary accruals are noise in earnings. This is the noise hypothesis. Our contribution is to make the joint hypotheses explicit and generate explicit predictions about the relative variability of earnings components,

This paper examines the strategic role of high levels of debt and bankruptcy threats in deterring entry into monopolistic markets. In the context of an infinite horizon entry game, we show that if a potential entrant has access to debt financing with limited liability, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium involves the entrant successfully issuing a high level of debt, entering the market and being met with cooperation. If, in addition to the entrant, the incumbent also has access to debt with limited liability, it will be highly levered and will completely pre-empt any entry in equilibrium. Finally, if the incumbent faces a variety of potential entrants with differing abilities to capture market shares, its optimal capital structure will help pre-empt the entry of the tougher entrants, while allowing the weaker ones to share the market. The results of extreme leverage are also shown to hold in an alternative formulation analyzed by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and thus are robust to model specifications. The empirical implications and possible application to high leverage industries are briefly discussed.

This article explores the optimal trading and pricing of taxable securities with asymmetric capital gains taxes and transaction costs. In the long-term region, investors realize all gains below some critical cutoff level, which we derive analytically. In the short-term region, investors defer all gains and, depending upon the time remaining in the short-term region, may also defer small losses. Contrary to common intuition, deferral of short-term losses can be optimal even without transaction costs. The value of tax timing is considerably higher under the optimal trading strategy than under alternative strategies previously analyzed. The impact of offset rules is also explored.

[This article explores the optimal trading and pricing of taxable securities with asymmetric capital gains taxes and transaction costs. In the long-term region, investors realize all gains below some critical cutoff level, which we derive analytically. In the short-term region, investors defer all gains and, depending upon the time remaining in the short-term region, may also defer small losses. Contrary to common intuition, deferral of short-term losses can be optimal even without transaction costs. The value of tax timing is considerably higher under the optimal trading strategy than under alternative strategies previously analyzed. The impact of offset rules is also explored.]

This paper examines how interaction between endogenous human capital accumulation and technological change affects relative wages and economic growth. Private incentives to invest in human capital finance the employment of skilled labour in the education sector, while non-rival technology is a by-product of the education process. The absorption of new technologies into production is skill intensive, creates skill-biased labour demand, and increases the relative wage of skilled to unskilled labour. In contrast to recent models of endogenous growth, higher rates of technological change and growth may be accompanied by a higher relative wage but lower relative supply of skilled labour. Thus the model provides a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed relation between technological change and relative demand, supply and wages of skilled labour.