Economics publishing proceeds much more slowly than in the natural sciences, and more slowly than in the other social sciences and finance. It is relatively even slower at the extremes. Much of the lag, especially at the extremes, arises from authors’ dilatory behavior in revisions. Additional rounds of resubmissions at top economics journals are related to additional citations; but conditional on resubmission, the delays are unrelated to greater scholarly attention. We offer several proposals for speeding publication, including no-revision policies such as Economic Inquiry’s, the use of “cascading referee reports,” limits on authors’ time revising, and limits on editors waiting for dilatory referees. (JEL A11, B29)

ABSTRACT Can culture explain regional differences in minority shareholder expropriation? Examining regional variation in China, we document that the influence of historical Confucian values persists, despite decades of political movements clamping down on these values, and that these values reduce minority shareholder expropriation in local public firms. The effect on minority shareholder expropriation, in part, operates through the establishment of oversight mechanisms (i.e., greater financial reporting quality and dividend payouts) that constrain expropriation. The findings have important implications for understanding the origins of enduring regional differences in minority shareholder expropriation and capital market development.

Consider a bipartite network where N consumers choose to buy or not to buy M different products. This paper considers the properties of the logit fit of the N × M array of “ i ‐buys‐ j ” purchase decisions, <a:math xmlns:a="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <a:mi mathvariant="bold">Y</a:mi> <a:mo>=</a:mo> <a:msub> <a:mrow> <a:mo stretchy="false">[</a:mo> <a:msub> <a:mrow> <a:mi>Y</a:mi> </a:mrow> <a:mrow> <a:mi>i</a:mi> <a:mi>j</a:mi> </a:mrow> </a:msub> <a:mo stretchy="false">]</a:mo> </a:mrow> <a:mrow> <a:mn>1</a:mn> <a:mo>≤</a:mo> <a:mi>i</a:mi> <a:mo>≤</a:mo> <a:mi>N</a:mi> <a:mo>,</a:mo> <a:mn>1</a:mn> <a:mo>≤</a:mo> <a:mi>j</a:mi> <a:mo>≤</a:mo> <a:mi>M</a:mi> </a:mrow> </a:msub> </a:math>, onto a vector of known functions of consumer and product attributes under asymptotic sequences where (i) both N and M grow large, (ii) the average number of products purchased per consumer is finite in the limit, (iii) there exists dependence across elements in the same row or same column of Y (i.e., dyadic dependence), and (iv) the true conditional probability of making a purchase may, or may not, take the assumed logit form. Condition (ii) implies that the limiting network of purchases is sparse : only a vanishing fraction of all possible purchases are actually made. Under sparse network asymptotics, I show that the parameter indexing the logit approximation solves a particular Kullback–Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC) minimization problem (defined with respect to a certain Poisson population). This finding provides a simple characterization of the logit pseudo‐true parameter under general misspecification (analogous to a (mean squared error (MSE) minimizing) linear predictor approximation of a general conditional expectation function (CEF)). With respect to sampling theory, sparseness implies that the first and last terms in an extended Hoeffding‐type variance decomposition of the score of the logit pseudo composite log‐likelihood are of equal order. In contrast, under dense network asymptotics, the last term is asymptotically negligible. Asymptotic normality of the logistic regression coefficients is shown using a martingale central limit theorem (CLT) for triangular arrays. Unlike in the dense case, the normality result derived here also holds under degeneracy of the network graphon. Relatedly, when there “happens to be” no dyadic dependence in the data set in hand, it specializes to recently derived results on the behavior of logistic regression with rare events and i.i.d. data. Simulation results suggest that sparse network asymptotics better approximate the finite network distribution of the logit estimator. A short empirical illustration, and additional calibrated Monte Carlo experiments, further illustrate the main theoretical ideas.

We study the role of litigation risk in M&A valuations. Specifically, we hypothesize that litigation risk leads to strategic valuations in fairness opinions (FOs) obtained in M&A transactions. Employing a regulatory shock to merger litigation risk and focusing on the most common valuation techniques – peer firm comparables and DCF analysis – we find that target-sought FOs exhibit lower valuations when litigation risk is high. The effect is concentrated in deals with greater agency conflicts between target management and outside shareholders. Furthermore, downward-biased valuations reduce appraisal litigation but are also associated with lower premiums. In contrast to prior work suggesting that target-sought FOs are used to negotiate a higher takeover price, our findings imply that they are used, at least in part, to mitigate litigation risk and facilitate successful deal completion. Our findings are relevant to academics, practitioners, and regulators interested in M&A price formation, and highlight the role litigation plays therein.

Since January 2014, the U.S. Treasury has been issuing floating rate notes (FRNs). These notes pay quarterly interest based on an average of the constant maturity rates of newly issued three-month T-bills during the quarter. We show how to price such FRNs. We estimate that they have been paying excess interest between 3 and 42 basis points above the implied interest of other Treasury securities. We interpret this fact through the lens of a model where money-like assets differ in their degrees of moneyness. Additional empirical evidence supports this interpretation.

Abstract Many companies use color codes in their internal performance reports to highlight how current performance compares to performance in a previous period. We examine whether the use of color coding affects managers' decision‐making in a resource allocation task. We argue that managers' decision accuracy will be lower if they receive noisier feedback, but that this detrimental effect of noise can be mitigated through color coding. Using two experiments, we find evidence consistent with our theory. Managers who receive reports in which performance increases are color‐coded green and performance decreases are color‐coded red are less affected by noise than managers who receive feedback reports without color coding. Supplemental analyses suggest that color coding induces managers to process feedback in a more holistic manner, which reduces the adverse effect of noise on managers' learning processes. Our findings have several important implications for research and practice.

Central banks are increasingly reaching out to the general public to motivate and explain their monetary policy actions. One major aim of this outreach is to ensure accountability and create trust; another is to guide inflation expectations. This article surveys a rapidly growing literature on central bank communication with the public, rather than with the financial markets. We first discuss why such communication matters and is more challenging than communicating with expert audiences. Then we turn to methods: How do central banks try to reach the public, and do they succeed? Next, and importantly, we survey the empirical evidence on the extent to which this new outreach affects inflation expectations. On balance, we see some promise in the potential to inform the public better, but many challenges along the way. (JEL D83, D84, E31, E52, E58, G53)

Abstract Based on an asset demand system, we develop a framework to quantify the impact of market trends and changes in regulation on asset prices, price informativeness, and the wealth distribution. Our leading applications are the transition from active to passive investment management and climate-induced shifts in asset demand. The transition from active to passive investment management had a large impact on equity prices but a small impact on price informativeness because capital did not flow from more to less informed investors on average. This finding is based on a new measure of investor-level informativeness that identifies which investors are more informed about future profitability. Climate-induced shifts in asset demand have a potentially large impact on equity prices and the wealth distribution, implying capital gains for passive investment advisors, pension funds, insurance companies, and private banking and capital losses for active investment advisors and hedge funds.