We allow a strategic trader to choose when to acquire information about an asset’s payoff, instead of endowing her with it. When the trader dynamically controls the precision of a flow of information, the optimal precision evolves stochastically and increases with market liquidity. Because the trader exploits her information gradually, the equilibrium price impact and market uncertainty are unaffected by her rate of acquisition. If she pays a fixed cost to acquire “lumpy” information at a time of her choosing, the market can break down: we show that no equilibria exist with endogenous information acquisition. Our analysis suggests caution when applying insights from standard strategic trading models to settings with information acquisition.

Abstract We study how dynamic research affects information acquisition in financial markets. In our strategic trading model, the trader performs costly research to generate private information but does not always succeed. Optimal research activity responds to market conditions and generates novel implications. First, more frequent public disclosures can “crowd in” private information acquisition, increase price informativeness, and harm liquidity, instead of “leveling the playing field.” Second, observed research activity does not necessarily imply that traders are better informed. Finally, improvements in research effectiveness or higher market participation by uninformed investors can simultaneously increase price informativeness and liquidity.

Abstract Stock prices aggregate investor information about investment opportunities and reflect managerial performance. These dual roles may be in tension: when prices are more informative about investment opportunities, they may be less effective at incentivizing managerial effort. This tradeoff has novel consequences. Lower information costs can lead to both more efficient investment but lower firm value. The principal may strictly prefer to delegate investment to a manager who has no informational advantage and makes ex-post inefficient choices. Investment in diversifying and (ex-ante) negative NPV projects mitigate agency problems. Finally, standard measures of price efficiency provide an incomplete picture of firm value.

No. In the presence of speculative opportunities, investors can learn about both asset fundamentals and the beliefs of other traders. We show that this learning exhibits complementarity: learning more along one dimension increases the value of learning about the other. As a result, regulatory changes may be counterproductive. First, increasing transparency (i.e., making fundamental information cheaper to acquire) can make prices less informative when investors respond by learning relatively more about others. Second, public disclosures discourage private learning about fundamentals, while encouraging information acquisition about others. Accordingly, disclosing more fundamental information can decrease overall informational efficiency by decreasing price informativeness. Received April 20, 2016; editorial decision September 30, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

ABSTRACT We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.

ABSTRACT The psychology literature documents that individuals derive current utility from their beliefs about future events. We show that, as a result, investors in financial markets choose to disagree about both private information and price information. When objective price informativeness is low, each investor dismisses the private signals of others and ignores price information. In contrast, when prices are sufficiently informative, heterogeneous interpretations arise endogenously: most investors ignore prices, while the rest condition on it. Our analysis demonstrates how observed deviations from rational expectations (e.g., dismissiveness, overconfidence) arise endogenously, interact with each other, and vary with economic conditions.

ABSTRACT We model the “feedback effect” of a firm's stock price on investment in projects exposed to a systematic risk factor, like climate risk. The stock price reflects information about both the project's cash flows and its discount rate. A cash‐flow‐maximizing manager treats discount rate fluctuations as “noise,” but a price‐maximizing manager interprets such variation as information about the project's net present value. This difference qualitatively changes how investment behavior varies with the project's risk exposure. Moreover, traditional objectives (e.g., cash flow or price maximization) need not maximize welfare because they do not correctly account for hedging and risk‐sharing benefits of investment.

We study debt and equity valuation when investors have private information and may exhibit differences of opinion. Our model generates several predictions that are consistent with empirical evidence but difficult to reconcile with traditional models. Belief dispersion relates to expected equity and debt returns in opposite directions. Similarly, expected debt (equity) returns typically increase (decrease) with default risk, though these relationships reverse for firms close to bankruptcy. Firms’ capital structures affect their valuations even without classical capital structure frictions (e.g., tax shields, distress costs) – when liquidity is higher in the equity than in the debt market, leverage can raise firm value.

Firm-specific information can affect expected returns if it affects investor uncertainty about risk-factor loadings. We show that a stock's expected return is decreasing in factor-loading uncertainty, controlling for the average level of its factor loading. When loadings are persistent, learning by investors can induce time-series variation in price-dividend ratios, expected returns, and idiosyncratic volatility, even when the aggregate risk-premium is constant and fundamental shocks are homoscedastic. Consistent with our predictions, we estimate that average annual returns of a firm with the median level of factor-loading uncertainty are 400 to 525 basis points lower than a comparable firm without factor-loading uncertainty.