In 2005, the SEC suffered a high‐profile loss in its first court case, SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. , in an effort to enforce Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). We examine the impact of this loss on managers' selective disclosure to sell‐side analysts. We provide evidence that the informativeness of analyst reports increased after the Siebel decision, especially for observable instances of private meetings. This finding suggests that such selective disclosure increased significantly after the court's decision. Our results also suggest that the increased selective disclosure faded as the SEC resumed enforcement actions related to Reg FD in 2009. In exploratory analyses, we survey and interview law firm partners to investigate possible mechanisms for our results; their responses suggest that the Siebel outcome reduced manager concern about liability from selective disclosure. Collectively, our results highlight how the anticipated costs of regulatory enforcement affect private information flow from managers to analysts in particular.

Stock exchanges are important intermediaries in how firm information enters price. Trading halts are a key tool, often exercised at the exchanges' discretion, to prevent extraordinary price volatility when new information arrives. We investigate how exchanges use discretion and whether the discretion alters the effectiveness of the halts. We provide evidence consistent with halts reflecting the preferences of listed firms rather than the stated exchange objectives (i.e., minimizing excess volatility and off‐equilibrium trades). Furthermore, when exchanges exercise more discretion (unexplained by firm and information characteristics), the halts are less effective. Specifically, halts with more discretion are less likely to resume trading with efficient prices and are more likely to have been called unnecessarily (i.e., little to no price movement during the halt). These findings are consistent with exchanges using halts to cater to listed firms rather than to meet exchange objectives such as minimizing excess volatility or avoiding trades at off‐equilibrium prices.

This paper examines how employee earnings respond to a one-time cash flow shock in the form of a government R&D grant. In a regression discontinuity design, we find that the grant immediately increases average annual employee-level earnings by 2.9%. This benefit accrues only to incumbent employees and rises with job tenure. The grant also affects firm growth, but the initial wage patterns do not appear to reflect growth or productivity. Instead, the evidence supports implicit equity financing within the firm, where employees initially accept lower wages from financially constrained firms and earn more when the firm has ability to pay.

We link survey data on Danish people’s perceived income positions and fairness views on inequality within various reference groups to administrative records on their reference groups, income histories, and life events. People are, on average, well-informed about the income levels of their reference groups. Yet, lower-ranked respondents in all groups tend to overestimate their own position among others because they believe others’ incomes are lower than they actually are, whereas the opposite holds true for higher-ranked respondents. Misperceptions of positions in reference groups relate to proximity to other individuals, transparency norms, and visible signals of income. People view inequalities within their co-workers and education groups as significantly more unfair than overall inequality, yet underestimate inequality the most exactly within these groups. Views on the fairness of inequalities are strongly correlated with an individual’s current position, move with shocks like unemployment or promotions, and change when experimentally informing people about their actual positions. However, the higher perceived unfairness of income differences within co-workers and education groups stays unchanged. The theoretical framework shows that this can have important implications for redistribution policy.

In this address, I discuss differences across investor and manager motivations for considering sustainable finance— value versus values motivations—and how these differences contribute to misunderstandings about environmental, social, and governance investment approaches. The finance research community has the ability and responsibility to help clear up these misunderstandings through additional research, which I suggest.

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act charges management with the primary responsibility for internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). However, prior research tells us little about the ICFR process from management's perspective. We develop a theoretical model of the ICFR process from management's perspective and examine that model by surveying 145 and interviewing 35 accounting executives at large US public companies. Our primary finding is that executives feel constrained in their ability to direct ICFR and hold perspectives that reflect these constraints. Specifically, most executives feel compelled by auditors to follow the PCAOB's preferences even though executives believe these preferences often tend to distract management and auditors from riskier areas. Executives also believe that audit committees' involvement in ICFR is too passive and that auditors' assessments are sometimes too severe, prompting executives to push back on auditors. Overall, executives strive to make decisions that are optimal for their ICFR, but limited resources and other business conditions, such as restructuring events and lack of qualified personnel, limit the effectiveness of their ICFR efforts. We discuss the implications of our results for practitioners, regulators, and researchers.

We study how firms alter investment projects to mitigate exposure to political uncertainty. We examine deal-level merger data and find that, in addition to delaying and forgoing merger announcements, acquirers shift merger announcements earlier in time to avoid the period between announcement and effective dates overlapping an election, shift targets geographically away from election states, decrease the size of election-year deals, and shift from equity to cash financing for election-year deals. These results are stronger for acquirers with tighter financial constraints and deals more likely to be financed with equity and show financing matters to firms’ responses to election uncertainty.

Municipal bond markets began pricing sea-level rise (SLR) exposure risk in 2013, coinciding with upward revisions to worst-case SLR projections and accompanying uncertainty around these projections. The effect is larger for long-maturity bonds and not solely driven by near-term flood risk. We use a structural model of credit risk to quantify the implied economic impact and distinguish between the effects of underlying asset values and of uncertainty. The SLR exposure premium exhibits a trend different from house prices and is unaffected by house price controls. Together, our results highlight the importance of climate uncertainty in driving municipal bond prices.

We hypothesize that the well-documented negativity bias, the psychological tendency to asymmetrically emphasize negative over positive aspects, can help explain several financial market phenomena: why most individuals hold strongly bearish views of both short- and long-term equity return distributions, why individuals exhibit heterogeneous beliefs, and the stock market participation puzzle. Using variation in the perceived risk of mortality from the swine flu pandemic as our primary proxy for an individual's negativity bias, we find strong support for our hypothesis even when controlling for alternative mechanisms including optimism, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and anxiety.

We examine whether U.S. banks subject to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) reduce lending (an unintended consequence) and/or become more resilient to liquidity shocks, as intended by regulators. We find that LCR banks tighten lending standards, and reduce liquidity creation that occurs mainly through lower lending relative to non-LCR banks. However, covered banks also contribute less to fire-sale externalities relative to exempt banks. For LCR banks, we estimate that the total after-tax benefits of reduced fire-sale risk (net of the costs associated with foregone lending) exceed $50 billion from 2013Q2 to 2017, mostly accruing to the largest LCR banks. Non-LCR regulations enacted during our sample period cannot fully account for these findings. For the banking sector as a whole, lending migrates to smaller, non-LCR banks so that lending shares increase but fire-sale risk does not decrease. Our results highlight the trade-off between liquidity creation and resiliency arising from liquidity regulations that underlie the debate on whether the LCR should be extended following the banking crisis of March 2023.