The volume of new issuances in secondary loan markets fluctuates over time and falls when collateral values fall. We develop a model with adverse selection and reputation that is consistent with such fluctuations. Adverse selection ensures that the volume of trade falls when collateral values fall. Without reputation, the equilibrium has separation, adverse selection is quickly resolved, and trade volume is independent of collateral value. With reputation, the equilibrium has pooling and adverse selection persists over time. The equilibrium is efficient unless collateral values are low and originators' reputational levels are low. We describe policies that can implement efficient outcomes.

Why don’t VCs eliminate excess demand for follow-on funds by raising fees? We propose a model of learning that leads to informational holdup. Current investors learn about skill whereas outside investors observe only returns. This gives current investors holdup power when the VC raises his next fund: Without their backing, no-one will fund him, as outside investors interpret the lack of backing as a sign of low skill. Holdup power diminishes the VC’s ability to increase fees in line with performance, leading to return persistence. Empirical evidence supports the model. We estimate that up to two-thirds of VC firms lack skill.

We propose robust methods for inference about the effect of a treatment variable on a scalar outcome in the presence of very many regressors in a model with possibly non-Gaussian and heteroscedastic disturbances. We allow for the number of regressors to be larger than the sample size. To make informative inference feasible, we require the model to be approximately sparse; that is, we require that the effect of confounding factors can be controlled for up to a small approximation error by including a relatively small number of variables whose identities are unknown. The latter condition makes it possible to estimate the treatment effect by selecting approximately the right set of regressors. We develop a novel estimation and uniformly valid inference method for the treatment effect in this setting, called the “post-double-selection†method. The main attractive feature of our method is that it allows for imperfect selection of the controls and provides confidence intervals that are valid uniformly across a large class of models. In contrast, standard post-model selection estimators fail to provide uniform inference even in simple cases with a small, fixed number of controls. Thus, our method resolves the problem of uniform inference after model selection for a large, interesting class of models. We also present a generalization of our method to a fully heterogeneous model with a binary treatment variable. We illustrate the use of the developed methods with numerical simulations and an application that considers the effect of abortion on crime rates.

We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by antitakeover laws that are severe enough to effectively deter takeovers.

The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 illustrates how financial turmoil in advanced economies could trigger severe financial stress in emerging markets. Previous studies dealing with financial crises and contagion show the linkages through which financial stress are transmitted from advanced to emerging markets. This paper extends the existing literature on the use of financial stress index (FSI) in understanding the channels of financial transmission in emerging market economies. Using FSI of 25 emerging markets, our panel regression estimates show that not only advanced economies FSI, but also regional and nonregional emerging market FSIs significantly increase domestic financial stress. Our findings also suggest that there is a common regional factor significantly affecting domestic FSI in emerging Asia and emerging Europe. Furthermore, the results from a structural vector autoregression model with contemporaneous restrictions indicate that although a domestic financial shock still accounts for most of the variation in domestic FSI, regional shocks play an important role in emerging Asia.

Do progressive marginal income tax rates discourage self-employment? We assume risk neutrality to construct an implicit surtax on stochastic income relative to steady income, arising from a convex tax schedule. It is computed as part of a structural probit model with earnings equations and a tax simulator. The tax convexity variable and the net-of-tax income difference between self- and paid employment have the predicted signs and high levels of statistical significance for the probability of self-employment. A simulated flat tax reform suggests the tax effects are small.

The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design which has been adopted for many spectrum auctions worldwide. Since its inception, the CCA has been in almost continual evolution. We begin by reviewing some important changes which have already occurred. Despite these enhancements, we observe that the performance of the CCA is still limited by weak activity rules, suboptimal price feedback, and a missing-bid problem. We then describe further evolutionary changes, including new activity rules, new approaches to pricing, and an integration of non-mutually-exclusive bids, which will help to address these issues.

The influence of peers could play an important role in the take up of social programs. However, estimating peer effects has proven challenging given the problems of reflection, correlated unobservables, and endogenous group membership. We overcome these identification issues in the context of paid paternity leave in Norway using a regression discontinuity design. We find strong evidence for substantial peer effects of program participation in both workplace and family networks. Coworkers and brothers are 11 and 15 percentage points, respectively, more likely to take paternity leave if their peer was exogenously induced to take up leave. The most likely mechanism is information transmission about the costs and benefits of taking paternity leave, including increased knowledge of how an employer will react. The estimated peer effect snowballs over time, as the first peer interacts with a second peer, the second peer interacts with a third peer, and so on. This leads to long-run participation rates which are substantially higher than would otherwise be expected.

Given the wide use of child care subsidies across countries, it is surprising how little we know about the effect of these subsidies on children's longer-run outcomes. Using a sharp discontinuity in the price of child care in Norway, we are able to isolate the effects of child care subsidies on both parental and student outcomes. We find very small and statistically insignificant effects of child care subsidies on child care utilization and parental labor force participation. Despite this, we find significant positive effect of the subsidies on children's academic performance in junior high school, suggesting that the positive shock to disposable income provided by the subsidies may be helping to improve children's scholastic aptitude.

Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short‐termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short‐termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short‐term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long‐term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings‐increasing accruals.