[The performance of audit tasks has been modeled as a function of the auditor's ability, knowledge and experiences (Libby 1993). Thus, an important aspect of assigning audit tasks is identifying the levels of knowledge and types of experience an auditor must have to achieve a sufficiently high level of performance (Abdolmohammadi and Wright 1987). An objective of the current study is to determine whether auditors' knowledge of basic accounting principles and error frequencies improves over the course of their early careers so as to enhance performance of a common analytical procedure, ratio analysis. Research in psychology suggests that two characteristics of a task (say, analytical procedures) could diminish the accuracy with which auditors learn error frequencies from experience and apply their knowledge to a task. First, auditors' memories of financial statement errors are encoded while they perform other information-processing activities. These competing task demands could use enough of an auditor's information-processing capacity to diminish both the accuracy with which memory traces of errors are encoded and the accuracy of their knowledge of error frequency (Naveh-Benjamin and Jonides 1986). Second, auditors must consider a variety of evidence when performing analytical procedures. In diagnostic tasks like ratio analysis, inordinate attention is given to evidence that is highly diagnostic of low-frequency events, causing an "inverse base rate effect" in which auditors consider such events as more likely (Medin and Edelson 1988). Assessing the extent to which either of these characteristics of the analytical procedures context prevents auditors from learning and applying error frequency knowledge is a second objective of this study. To test hypotheses about these objectives, an experiment is conducted in which experienced auditors, accounting students, and non-accounting students learn the frequencies of financial statement errors through their experience in solving a series of problems using ratio analysis. Subjects are then tested for their accuracy in using frequency information by having them diagnose novel combinations of the same evidence. Other subjects perform similar tasks for an abstract medical diagnosis to provide a benchmark for comparison. The results indicate that differences in accounting knowledge influenced the subjects' performance of ratio analysis, and that neither potential source of inaccurate learning of event frequency knowledge holds in this setting. That is, subjects learned frequencies in the presence of competing task demands, and the inverse-base rate effect was not observed. These results suggest that experienced, but not novice, auditors use both their superior knowledge of accounting and of error frequencies learned through experience. Another implication is that the performance of novice auditors may be improved by increasing their knowledge of basic accounting principles and error frequencies.]

Abstract Some corporate decisions increase stockholder wealth while reducing the wealth of bondholders. When wealth transfers are large enough, stock prices can rise from decisions that reduce firm value. Yet, rational bondholders understand that actions taken after issuance will tend to increase stockholder wealth, and they forecast the value effects of future decision when bonds are sold. In an efficient market, the bond price at issuance reflects an unbiased forecast of the effects of such future actions. Thus, on average, bondholders will not suffer losses, although the firm (and hence its stockholders) must bear the costs of nonoptimal decisions motivated by wealth transfers from debtholders. Therefore, effective control of this bondholder-stockholder conflict can increase firm value. Bond covenants that constrain activities such as asset sales or dividend payments are examples of voluntary contracts that can reduce the costs generated when stockholders of a levered firm follow a policy that deviates from maximization of the firm's value. The cost-reducing benefits of covenants accrue to the firm's owners through the higher price the bonds command when issued. Furthermore, if covenants lower the costs that bondholders incur in monitoring managers, these cost reductions also are passed to stockholders through higher bond prices at issuance. Therefore, in structuring an optimal debt contract, the firm's managers face a trade-off between increased proceeds from the debt issue and reduced flexibility with respect to future policy choices. The constraints imposed through covenants are frequently specified in terms of accounting numbers. Debt covenants that employ accounting numbers are conventionally divided into (1) affirmative covenants, which require firms to maintain specified levels of accounting-based ratios, and (2) negative covenants, which limit certain investment and financing activities unless specified accounting-based conditions are met. For example, negative covenants restrict the payment of dividends, the disposition of assets, the issuance of additional debt, and merger activity; affirmative covenants specify minimum working capital and net worth requirements. Although standard covenants in debt issues require that accounting numbers be consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), they normally do not prohibit managers from switching between accepted methods. In some bank-loan agreements, firms are required only to provide unaudited, internally generated financial statements, but the contract also requires the firm to maintain substantially the same set of GAAP. If a change becomes necessary, the bank must be notified in writing prior to the change with the reasons detailed (see Zimmerman 1975). Since different accounting techniques imply different accounting numbers, firms have incentives to relax onerous constraints through the choice of accounting techniques. Academic accountants have devoted substantial effort to obtain empirical evidence on the importance of debt agreements in determining accounting policy. (Watts and Zimmerman 119861 and Christie [19901 provide reviews.) Initial studies adopted indirect methods to account for the effect of debt covenants on accounting decision by using the firm's debt-equity ratio as an explanatory variable in cross-sectional regressions. This ratio is a proxy for closeness to covenant constraints, as well as for the expected costs should a breach occur. Duke and Hunt (1990) and Press and Weintrop (1990) offer evidence to support the use of the debt-equity ratio as a proxy for the closeness to debt covenant constraints. Christie (1990) documents significant support for this debt hypothesis by aggregating cross- sectional studies of accounting choice, generally concluding that the larger the firm's debt-equity ratio, the more likely the firm's managers are to select accounting procedures that shift reported earnings to the current period from future periods. Researchers have generally interpreted support for this debt hypothesis as evidence that managers act opportunistically. However, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) question whether the documented association is misinterpreted by researchers. Rather than reflecting managerial opportunism, the evidence may reflect the association among firms' investment opportunity sets, financial policies, and their efficient set of accounting methods. Even in theory, it is difficult to distinguish between opportunism and contracting efficiency as determinants of accounting policy choice. Given positive contracting costs, there will be a positive efficient amount of opportunism. Distinguishing between opportunism and efficiency is difficult in empirical work also. For example, a significant relation between accounting policy choice and leverage could indicate that managers of firms with high leverage act opportunistically in selecting accounting techniques to reduce costs imposed by constraints in debt covenants. Alternately, it could indicate that corporations for which a particular set of accounting techniques is efficient also tend to be those firms for which high leverage is efficient. Firms examined in these cross-sectional studies are not necessarily close to their debt covenant constraints at the date examined. When firms are not close to debt covenant constraints, managerial opportunism is a less plausible explanation for the documented association between leverage and accounting choice. Yet, since it is costly for firms to switch back and forth between accounting procedures, firms that switch accounting methods to delay default are likely to continue to employ incomes increasing accounting procedures, even if default is no longer likely (see Sweeney 1992). A firm's current accounting policies thus should depend on its historical choices and the time series of variables hypothesized to influence accounting policy. Therefore, cross-sectional studies do not provide the most direct or most powerful tests of the relation between accounting choice and debt contracts. Recent studies overcome a number of limitations inherent in cross sectional analyses by examining accounting-based defaults in debt covenants. Careful examination of the default process, its causes and cures, provides evidence on important aspects of the lending process. In this article, 1 review this developing literature to provide a richer under-standing of the costs of leverage. These costs have important implications. For accountants, they offer potential explanations of a firm's accounting policy choice; for financial economists, they enrich our understanding of the firm's optimal capital structure.

This paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt. Increased short-term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often. It also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information, although better-than-average borrowers desire information sensitivity. The model implies that short-term debt will be senior to long-term debt, and that long-term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt. The model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults.

Abstract. A major function of financial statement analysis is to assess the risk of financial distress. Since Beaver's (1966) and Altaian's (1968) pioneering works, voluminous studies have been devoted to exploring the use of accounting information in predicting business failure. We apply survival analysis to study a class of financial distress when a financial analyst can identify an event that sets off the dynamic process of business adversity and would like to find out how long a firm can endure the adversity. We use the case of the oil and gas industry during the turmoil of the early 1980s and apply survival analysis to study how long a firm can endure this drastic oil price decline before facing financial distress. Our results indicate that the liquidity ratio, leverage ratio, operating cash flows, success in exploration, age, and size are significant factors affecting corporate endurance. Résumé. Une fonction majeure de l'analyse des états financiers consiste à évaluer le risque de difficultés financières. Depuis les travaux d'amorce de Beaver et Altman, de volumineuses études ont été consacrées à l'analyse approfondie de l'utilisation de l'information comptable dans la prédiction des faillites d'entreprises. Les auteurs appliquent l'analyse de survie à l'étude d'une catégorie de difficultés financières pour laquelle l'analyste financier parvient à déterminer un événement qui déclenche le processus dynamique des difficultés de l'entreprise et aimerait déterminer pendant combien de temps cette dernière pourra résister à ces difficultés. Les auteurs évoquent le cas du secteur pétrolier et gazier au cours de la période tumultueuse du début des années 80 et appliquent l'analyse de survie à l'étude du temps pendant lequel une entreprise pouvait résister à un déclin radical du prix du pétrole avant d'éprouver des difficultés financières. Les résultats de l'étude démontrent que le ratio de liquidité, le ratio de levier, les flux monétaires provenant de l'exploitation, le succès des activités d'exploration, l'âge et la taille de l'entreprise sont des facteurs importants qui influent sur sa résistance.

Abstract. This study examines the influence of accounting and capital market measures of firm performance on the reputations of corporate chief executives (CEOs). The empirical tests rely on pooled time‐series cross‐sectional data for approximately 900 top executives in about 500 firms drawn from 36 industries over the 1975–1987 period. CEO reputation measures are derived from securities analysts' annual evaluations of executive performance as reported by Financial World magazine. The study's results document a positive incremental association between profit performance and reputation, a finding consistent with the notion that accounting earnings convey information about CEO productivity beyond that present in stock returns. However, the sensitivity of CEO reputation to stock returns and earnings performance is modest, and the earnings‐reputation relation varies considerably across industry groups. Résumé. Les auteurs s'intéressent ici à l'influence qu'exercent sur la réputation des directeurs généraux de sociétés les mesures de la performance de l'entreprise relevant de la comptabilité et du marché des capitaux. Leurs tests empiriques s'appuient sur les données transversales de séries chronologiques groupées relatives à environ 900 cadres supérieurs de quelque 500 entreprises provenant de 36 secteurs d'activité, relevées entre 1975 et 1987. Les « mesures » de la réputation des directeurs généraux de sociétés sont dérivées de l'évaluation annuelle de la performance des cadres, produite par les analystes en valeurs mobilières, dont fait état le magazine Financial World. Les résultats obtenus révèlent une association prenant la forme d'un écart marginal positif entre la performance, en termes de profits, et la réputation, constatation qui corrobore la notion selon laquelle les bénéfices comptables livrent, au sujet de la productivité des directeurs généraux de sociétés, de l'information que ne livre pas le rendement des actions. La sensibilité de la réputation des directeurs généraux de sociétés au rendement de l'action et aux bénéfices est cependant modérée, et la relation bénéfices‐réputation varie largement selon les groupes sectoriels.

Keith C. Brown, W. V. Harlow, Seha M. Tinic, The Risk and Required Return of Common Stock following Major Price Innovations, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 101-116