We study the joint responses of commodity future prices and positions of various trader groups to changes of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) before and after the recent financial crisis. Financial traders reduced their net long positions during the crisis in response to market distress, whereas hedgers facilitated this by reducing their net short positions as prices fell. This “convective risk flow” induced by the greater distress of financial institutions led to a change in the allocation of risk with hedgers holding more risk than they did previously. The presence of such a risk flow confirms the market impact of financial traders conditional on trades they initiate.

This paper develops a model to explain the widely used investment mandates in the institutional asset management industry based on two insights: first, giving a manager more investment flexibility weakens the link between fund performance and his effort in the designated market, and thus increases agency cost. Second, the presence of outside assets with negatively skewed returns can further increase the agency cost if the manager is incentivized to pursue outside opportunities. These effects motivate narrow mandates and tight tracking error constraints to most fund managers except those with exceptional talents. Our model sheds light on capital immobility and market segmentation that are widely observed in financial markets, and highlights important effects of negatively skewed risk on institutional incentive structures.

Motivated by psychological evidence that attention is a scarce cognitive resource, we model investors’ attention allocation in learning and study the effects of this on asset-price dynamics. We show that limited investor attention leads to category-learning behavior, i.e., investors tend to process more market and sector-wide information than firm-specific information. This endogenous structure of information, when combined with investor overconfidence, generates important features observed in return comovement that are otherwise difficult to explain with standard rational expectations models. Our model also demonstrates new cross-sectional implications for return predictability.

This article analyzes the dynamic coordination problem among creditors of a firm with a time-varying fundamental and a staggered debt structure. In deciding whether to roll over his debt, each maturing creditor is concerned about the rollover decisions of other creditors whose debt matures during his next contract period. We derive a unique threshold equilibrium and characterize the roles of fundamental volatility, credit lines, and debt maturity in driving runs. In particular, we show that when fundamental volatility is sufficiently high, commonly used measures such as temporarily keeping the firm alive under runs and increasing debt maturity can exacerbate rather than mitigate runs.

This paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of bond markets in which two groups of agents hold heterogeneous expectations about future economic conditions. The heterogeneous expectations cause agents to take on speculative positions against each other and therefore generate endogenous relative wealth fluctuation. The relative wealth fluctuation amplifies asset price volatility and contributes to the time variation in bond premia. Our model shows that a modest amount of heterogeneous expectations can help explain several puzzling phenomena, including the “excessive volatility” of bond yields, the failure of the expectations hypothesis, and the ability of a tent-shaped linear combination of forward rates to predict bond returns.

By analyzing 20 developed economies over 1920–2012, we find the following evidence of overoptimism and neglect of crash risk by bank equity investors during credit expansions: (i) bank credit expansion predicts increased bank equity crash risk, but despite the elevated crash risk, also predicts lower mean bank equity returns in subsequent one to three years; (ii) conditional on bank credit expansion of a country exceeding a 95th percentile threshold, the predicted excess return for the bank equity index in subsequent three years is −37.3%; and (iii) bank credit expansion is distinct from equity market sentiment captured by dividend yield and yet dividend yield and credit expansion interact with each other to make credit expansion a particularly strong predictor of lower bank equity returns when dividend yield is low.

We present a multiperiod agency model of stock-based executive compensation in a speculative stock market, where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and stock prices may deviate from underlying fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option to sell the stock in the future to potentially overoptimistic investors. We show that optimal compensation contracts may emphasize short-term stock performance, at the expense of long-run fundamental value, as an incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a different perspective on the recent corporate crisis than the “rent extraction view” of executive compensation.

We develop a model of asset price bubbles based on the communication process between advisors and investors. Advisors are well-intentioned and want to maximize the welfare of their advisees (like a parent treats a child). But only some advisors understand the new technology (the tech-savvies); others do not and can only make a downward-biased recommendation (the old-fogies). While smart investors recognize the heterogeneity in advisors, naive ones mistakenly take whatever is said at face value. Tech-savvies inflate their forecasts to signal that they are not old-fogies, since more accurate information about their type improves the welfare of investors in the future. A bubble arises for a wide range of parameters, and its size is maximized when there is a mix of smart and naive investors in the economy. Our model suggests an alternative source for stock over-valuation in addition to investor overreaction to news and sell-side bias.

This paper uses segmented dual-class shares of Chinese firms—A shares traded in mainland China by local investors and H shares traded in Hong Kong by foreign investors—to document a rich pattern in the differential reactions of local and foreign investors to analyst recommendations. This pattern reveals that social connections between analysts and investors affect investor reactions to analyst recommendations. Because of the investors’ differential reactions, analyst recommendations may exacerbate, rather than attenuate, the market segmentation between the two share classes. Received January 28, 2016; editorial decision October 23, 2016 by Editor Robin Greenwood.

We study rollover risk and collateral value in a dynamic asset pricing model with endogenous debt financing by extending the framework of Geanakoplos (2009) with a generic binomial tree and time-varying heterogeneous beliefs. Optimistic borrowers face rollover risk if the belief dispersion between the borrowers and the pessimistic lenders widens after interim bad news. We demonstrate the optimality of the maximum riskless short-term debt financing for optimistic borrowers even in the presence of the rollover risk. We also highlight the role of interim trading which, by allowing creditors to sell seized collateral to other optimists with saved cashes, boosts the asset's collateral value and equilibrium price.