We examine the relation between audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process. We find that total compensation and cash retainers paid to audit committees are positively correlated with audit fees and the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, our proxies for the demand for monitoring. Our results are robust to the inclusion of audit committee quality, measured as the committee chair financial expertise. Our results suggest a recent willingness by firms to deviate from the historically prevalent one-size-fits-all approach to director pay in response to increased demands on audit committees and differential director expertise.

We investigate going-private decisions in response to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). We study firms that go private from 1998 to May 2005 and find: (1) the quarterly frequency of going-private transactions has increased after the passage of SOX, and (2) abnormal returns surrounding both the passage of SOX and the going-private announcement are significantly related to proxies for the costs and benefits of SOX and the net benefits of being a public firm. Our empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that SOX has affected firms’ going-private decisions.

This paper examines the impact of social trust on stock price crash risk. Social trust measures the level of mutual trust among the members of a society. Using a large sample of Chinese listed firms for the 2001–2015 period, we find that firms headquartered in regions of high social trust tend to have smaller crash risks. This result is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests and is more prominent for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), for firms with weak monitoring, and for firms with higher risk-taking. Moreover, we observe that firms in regions of high social trust are associated with higher accounting conservatism and fewer financial restatements. Our study suggests that social trust is an important variable that is omitted in the literature investigating the predictors of stock price crashes.

We derive the default cascade model and the fire-sale spillover model in a unified interdependent framework. The interactions among banks include not only direct cross-holding, but also indirect dependency by holding mutual assets outside the banking system. Using data extracted from the European Banking Authority, we present the interdependency network composed of 48 banks and 21 asset classes. For the robustness, we employ three methods, called Anan, Hała and Maxe, to reconstruct the asset/liability cross-holding network. Then we combine the external portfolio holdings of each bank to compute the interdependency matrix. The interdependency network is much denser than the direct cross-holding network, showing the complex latent interaction among banks. Finally, we perform macroprudential stress tests for the European banking system, using the adverse scenario in EBA stress test as the initial shock. For different reconstructed networks, we illustrate the hierarchical cascades and show that the failure hierarchies are roughly the same except for a few banks, reflecting the overlapping portfolio holding accounts for the majority of defaults. We also calculate systemic vulnerability and individual vulnerability, which provide important information for supervision and relevant management actions.

This study investigates the governance role of multiple large shareholders (MLS hereafter) in firms' investment decisions. Using a sample of 1640 Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock markets, we compare the investment efficiency of firms having MLS with that of firms having a single large shareholder and find that the presence and power of MLS are associated with significantly higher investment efficiency. The results are robust after we address endogeneity and sample selection concerns. Further tests show that MLS exert governance mainly through “voice.” MLS tend to lower potential overinvestment and increase future investment performance. The impact of MLS on investment efficiency does not vary with a firm's access to resources and is less prominent in firms with stronger governance and less information asymmetry. Our results imply that MLS play a governance role and alleviate a firm's agency costs and information asymmetry manifested in a firm's investment efficiency.

This paper investigates how performance risk impacts a board's ability to learn about the unknown talent of a chief executive officer (CEO). We theorize that the information content of performance is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We provide robust empirical evidence that the likelihood of CEO turnover is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk and that turnover-performance-sensitivity is also increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We further investigate relations between the threat of termination and CEO compensation, showing that for retained CEOs, both subsequent pay-performance-sensitivity and pay levels decrease in the probability of turnover.

Shorting flows remain a significant predictor of negative future stock returns during 2010–2015, when daily short-sale volume data are published in real time. This predictability decays slowly and lasts for a year. Long-term shorting flows are more informative than short-term shorting flows. Indeed, abnormal short-term shorting flows do not predict future returns or anticipate bad news. We find that short sellers exploit prominent anomalies. A comparison with the Regulation SHO data indicates that the predictability is much shorter-term during 2005–2007. Short sellers appear to have shifted from trading on short-term private information to trading on long-term public information that is gradually incorporated into prices.

We examine stock and bond market reactions to the key events leading to the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act to assess the markets’ expectations about the effectiveness of the Act on systemically important financial firms. Using small/medium sized domestic financial institutions as a control group, we find that large financial institutions overall had negative abnormal stock returns and positive abnormal bond returns, suggesting that the markets expect the Act to be effective in reducing these banks’ risk-taking. We further investigate the market reactions for (1) larger and more interconnected financial institutions; and (2) the Big 6 banks to evaluate the markets’ assessment about the effectiveness of the act in ending the too-big-to-fail policy. We document that larger and more interconnected financial institutions experienced more negative abnormal stock returns and more positive abnormal bond returns as compared to other banks in our sample, but these relations are not present during the final phase of the passage. Likewise, we find that both shareholders and bondholders of the Big 6 banks initially experienced significant negative returns, followed by insignificant returns during the final phase of the passage. These results appear to suggest the markets are doubtful about the effectiveness of the final version of the bill to end the too-big-to-fail status in particular for the Big 6 banks.

We examine the effects of banking deregulation on bank board policies—specifically, whether deregulation affects the performance and risk exposure measures used in bank CEO turnover decisions. Using the staggered adoption of interstate branching as our setting, we find that bank CEO turnover is more (less) sensitive to stock (accounting) performance after deregulation. We also find that deregulation is associated with a higher sensitivity of bank CEO turnover to the idiosyncratic component of tail risk. Moreover, such changes in turnover policies primarily exist in large banks and federally chartered banks, which are best positioned to exploit growth opportunities, and in banks that expand branch operations after deregulation. Our results indicate an increased emphasis on stock performance and tail risk in turnover decisions when growth opportunities are greater in the deregulated environment. The findings provide evidence that the information used in board decisions varies with features of the competitive environment.

Both sell-side analysts and the media are information intermediaries in capital markets. This study investigates the association between sell-side analyst research and information in firm-specific news coverage. More frequent recent news coverage is associated with stronger market reactions to analysts' research revisions, and primarily explained by soft information in news coverage. The primary result is robust to using both an instrumental variable and a quasi-natural experimental setting to generate exogenous variation in media coverage, alleviating concerns about endogeneity. In addition, using textual analysis, we document that explicit media references in analyst research reports are significantly associated with more frequent analyst revisions and stronger market reactions to revisions. Our study provides empirical evidence of analysts' assimilation of information from the financial press and their role in the efficiency of capital markets.