We examine theories of IPO underpricing using unique data from Israel where the allocation to subscribers is by equal proration. This enables us to simulate the return earned by uninformed investors. Consistent with Rock's (1986) theory of adverse selection, allocations were negatively related to underpricing. But uninformed investors earned a negative allocation-weighted initial return, although the average initial return was 12%. They could break even, however, by using publicly available information. The data also supports Welch's (1992) theory of information cascades: demand is either extremely high or there is undersubscription, with very few cases in between.

[We propose a new hypothesis-testing method for multipredictor regressions in small samples, where the dependent variable is regressed on lagged variables that are autoregressive. The new test is based on the augmented regression method (Amihud and Hurvich, 2004), which produces reduced-bias coefficients and is easy to implement. The method's usefulness is demonstrated by simulations and by testing a model where stock returns are predicted by two variables, income-to-consumption and dividend yield.]

Merton (1987) proposes that an increase in a firm's investor base increases the firm's value. In Japan, companies can reduce their stock's minimum trading unit—the number of shares in a “round lot”—which facilitates trading in the stock by small investors. We find that a reduction in the minimum trading unit greatly increases a firm's base of individual investors and its stock liquidity, and is associated with a significant increase in the stock price. Further, the stock price appreciation is positively related to an increase in the number of shareholders.

We propose an explanation for the “disappearing dividend” phenomenon: a decline in the information content of dividend announcements, which reduces the propensity of firms to use dividends as a costly signal. A reason for a decline in the information content of dividends is the rise in holdings by institutional investors that are more sophisticated and informed. Indeed, we find a decline in CAR at dividend change announcements since the mid–1970s. Across firms, CAR is a decreasing function of institutional holdings. Institutional investors exploit their superior information and buy before dividend increases. In addition, dividends are less likely to rise in firms with high institutional holdings.

This paper explains the phenomenon of price rigidity (or price smoothing) as the outcome of the optimal inventory policy of a multi-period profit-maximizing firm under demand and output uncertainties. Price smoothing may be manifested in two forms. First, price changes may be moderated with respect to those implied by the demand function; and second, the firm may choose to restrict price fluctuations by establishing upper and/or lower bounds on prices. We show that the extent of the asymmetry in price smoothing depends on the relationship between the inventory holding cost and the backlog penalty cost. Our model accommodates a wide range of price behaviour as observed in empirical studies on the issue.

We examine the Cohen and Wang (2013) conclusion that a staggered board lowers firm value based on the stock price reaction to two 2010 Delaware court rulings in the Airgas, Inc. case. The first ruling weakened the potency of a staggered board and the second restored it. We find that the Cohen and Wang results, for their sample, become insignificant after excluding a few penny stocks, stocks with value below $10 million, or over-the-counter (non-exchange) stocks. The effects of the rulings are also insignificant for an alternative sample.

This paper studies the effect of the bid-ask spread on asset pricing. We analyze a model in which investors with different expected holding periods trade assets with different relative spreads. The resulting testable hypothesis is that market-observed expexted return is an increasing and concave function of the spread. We test this hypothesis, and the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.

This study considers the problem of a price-setting monopolistic market-maker in a dealership market where the stochastic demand and supply are depicted by price-dependent Poisson processes [following Garman (1976)]. The crux of the analysis is the dependence of the bid-ask prices on the market-maker's stock inventory position. We derive the optimal policy and its characteristics and compare it to Garman's. The results are shown to be consistent with some conjectures and observed phenomena, like the existence of a ‘preferred’ inventory position and the downward monotonicity of the bid-ask prices. For linear demand and supply functions we derive the behavior of the bid-ask spread and show that the transaction-to-transaction price behavior is intertemporally dependent. However, we prove that it is impossible to make a profit on this price dependence by trading against the market-maker. Thus, in this situation, serially dependent price-changes are consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis.

We propose that stock market liquidity affects corporate investment and production. Illiquidity, which raises firms’ cost of capital, lowers investment in capital assets, R&D, and inventory. This effect holds after we control for endogeneity using exogenous liquidity events, the 2001 decimalization, and the 1997 Nasdaq reform and after employing instrumental variable estimation. Illiquidity affects investment regardless of firms’ financial constraints. Consequently, illiquidity induces firms to adopt less capital-intensive production processes. Illiquid firms have higher marginal productivity of capital, greater labor input increases for given increases in assets, and lower operating leverage, which means lower reliance on fixed costs.