Knowledge that Transforms

I provide evidence on the effects of financial audit mandates in the charitable sector, in particular their influence on donor behavior. My empirical strategy relies on variation in size‐based exemption thresholds across states and differences in size driven by the nature of charities’ activities. Consistent with audit mandates reducing donors’ reliance on charity reputation, I find audit mandates are associated with a lower concentration of donations on the largest, most well‐known charities. I show this reallocation of resources allows the charitable sector to serve more diverse geographic areas and social needs. In terms of the effect on willingness to give, I document that audit mandates are associated with a higher proportion of taxpayers who donate. However, I only observe a sizable impact on total contributions in dollars for charities with high inherent information asymmetry. Collectively, these results suggest financial audit regulation reduces information frictions and thereby affects resource allocation in the market for charitable giving.

This paper studies the long‐term consequences of actions induced by vesting equity, a measure of short‐term incentives. Vesting equity is positively associated with the probability of a firm repurchasing shares, the amount of shares repurchased, and the probability of the firm announcing a merger and acquisition (M&A). However, it is also associated with more negative long‐term returns over two to three years following repurchases and four years following M&A, as well as future M&A goodwill impairment. These results are inconsistent with CEOs buying underpriced stock or companies to maximize long‐run shareholder value, but consistent with these actions being used to boost the short‐term stock price and thus equity sale proceeds. CEOs sell their own stock shortly after using company money to buy the firm's stock, also inconsistent with repurchases being motivated by undervaluation.

By linking sell‐side equity analysts to their deed records and LinkedIn profiles, I show that analysts with higher exposure to negative wealth shocks issue more pessimistic and less accurate forecasts. The effects are stronger when analysts have higher leverage in their homes and face career concerns. I also find that stocks recommended by exposed analysts underperform those of nonexposed counterparts, by an amount that is significant and economically large in magnitude. The results remain robust to unobserved skill differences, the potential endogeneity of housing prices, the self‐selection of analysts into neighborhoods with certain traits, and placebo tests where housing wealth shocks are randomized across analysts. Collectively, this study provides new evidence on if and how personal wealth shocks impact analysts' work productivity and forecast behavior.

We examine the relation between public firm presence and import competition. The information created by public firm presence may provide importers with insights they can use for competing with domestic firms. Consistent with this possibility, we document a positive relation between public firm presence and import competition. We find similar results when using differences in the expected costs of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in public firm presence after the act. We use differences in the proportion of German firms reporting publicly around a major enforcement reform as a natural mechanism experiment, and find evidence that financial reporting is a channel through which public firm presence relates to import competition. Additional mechanism tests and a falsification test estimated in the United Kingdom, where public and most private firms report publicly, further support this inference. In total, our evidence is consistent with foreign competitors using the information created by public firm presence, including what public firms disclose in financial reports, to compete with domestic firms. Consequently, our results provide evidence of competitors using the proprietary information disclosed in financial reports to compete with the disclosing firms and of information frictions affecting trade.

This paper studies the effects of managerial optimism on the optimal design of debt covenants. We find that managers who are more optimistic about the future success of their investment ideas provide lenders with greater control rights via tighter covenants. This is optimal for optimistic managers even though they understand that tighter covenants increase the probability of covenant violations and lead to excessive lender intervention. The broad reason for this result is that optimists wish to write contracts that repay lenders more frequently in bad states rather than in good states, and the only way to achieve this is by granting lenders more control rights. Our model generates new predictions and offers a novel explanation for the empirical evidence that covenants in debt contracts are set very tightly and are often violated.

This study uses a controlled experiment to examine the trade‐off between managers’ use of non‐GAAP and GAAP earnings to satisfy market expectations and how this relationship can be moderated by both formal and informal regulatory attention to non‐GAAP earnings. Our key takeaway is that allowing financial reporting discretion in an alternative disclosure channel, that is, non‐GAAP earnings, can reduce firms’ opportunistic GAAP reporting. However, statements by regulators about increased attention to non‐GAAP earnings constrain this channel, and this can result in more aggressive GAAP earnings management and reduced GAAP earnings quality. We triangulate these findings with a survey and archival analyses and find results that are consistent with this primary message. Our study provides evidence relevant to standard setters and regulators that non‐GAAP measures may serve an important role even if they can be used opportunistically.

I develop a theory to study the consequences of providing more detailed information to rationally inattentive investors. I first consider a simple data‐provision problem and show that adding more data or detail in financial statements can make it more difficult for investors to extract information. Consequently, investors who have limited information‐processing capacity may prefer less detailed information. I also show that when investors' decisions are complements, providing details in addition to a summary may reduce investors' welfare. More specifically, because of increased disclosure of details, a coordination failure could occur in investors' attention‐allocation decisions. By showing that adding more detail in financial statements can lead to an information overload problem for investors, this study yields valuable insights for accounting standard setters.

This paper finds that the disclosure of supervisory actions by bank regulators is associated with changes in their enforcement behavior. Using a novel sample of enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) and a change in the disclosure regime, we find that regulators issue more EDOs, intervene sooner, and rely more on publicly observable signals following the regime change. EDO documents become longer, more complex, and contain more boilerplate language. Our results also indicate that intervention happens sooner and more frequently in counties with higher news circulation, which suggests that regulators take into account the public perception of their actions. We evaluate potentially confounding factors, including the savings and loan (S&L) crisis and competition from thrifts, and find robust results. We also study bank outcomes and document that uninsured deposits decline at EDO banks in the disclosure regime, especially for those covered in the news. Finally, we observe that bank failure accelerates despite improvements in capital ratios and asset quality. Overall, our research provides new insights on the disclosure of regulatory actions.

Firm life‐cycle stage reflects a firm's current strategic direction toward exploration independent of age or size. We provide evidence that young life‐cycle firms are particularly vulnerable to negative innovation consequences from financial regulation but do not appear to experience any compensating financial reporting quality (FRQ) benefits. Using a generalized difference‐in‐differences design around Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), we document a significant reduction in both research and development (R&D) spending and innovation outputs for young life‐cycle stage firms after regulation. Declines in innovation manifest both from the diversion of scarce resources and from the imposition of an organizational culture mismatched to the pursuit of explorative innovation, resulting in a less generalizable and less diversified patent portfolio. However, we find no evidence that improvements to FRQ materialize to offset these costs. Event study analyses suggest that this negative impact was expected by market participants, and postregulation returns confirm this expectation.

We examine the relation between a measure of managers’ physical display—body expansiveness—and favorable reporting practices (in firm forecasts and valuation information) and performance (survival and funding success). We videotape 154 entrepreneurs pitching their business ideas, and use computer vision software to obtain information about speakers’ movements. We show that physical expansiveness correlates with higher forecast errors and proposed firm valuations and lower survival rates yet higher likelihood of funding success. We argue that investors may incorrectly interpret nonverbal communication in their assessments of entrepreneurs and propose a behavioral explanation. We further corroborate the proposed mechanism by studying investor perceptions of entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics. Overall, we shed light on an overlooked source of information—nonverbal behavior—and relate it to firm forecasting, valuation, survival, and financing success, which are important factors in the assessment of investment opportunities, deal structure, and monitoring.