Knowledge that Transforms

This paper explores the role of accounting in the attempted reform of the corporation during the “progressive era” in the United States. Focusing on the activities of three institutional bodies in the early twentieth century, the paper documents how their repeated recourse to “publicity,” which relied crucially on accounting technologies, failed to turn the corporation into an entity more sensitive to the public interest. Specifically, two interrelated contributions are made to existing literature on accounting and corporate governance. Firstly, the paper documents the early historical development of the now taken‐for‐granted phenomenon of accounting and adjudicating at the entity level (Miller and Power 2013). Secondly, the paper offers a rejoinder to present‐day projects of corporate governance which identify better and enhanced accountability as key to the successful reform of the corporation. During the progressive era, accounting expanded and territorialized new spaces, bringing trusts out of a hitherto secretive, private realm and into the view of the public. Yet this was not enough to engender substantive corporate reform.

Accountants making judgments with respect to a particular set of standards are increasingly aware of standards from other reporting regimes that offer additional or conflicting guidance. In fact, IFRS encourages reliance on out‐of‐regime standards when IFRS lacks guidance. This paper reports the results of two experiments which provide evidence that auditors in such circumstances are vulnerable to contrast effects , whereby reporting judgments under IFRS are systematically influenced away from the accounting treatment supported by standards from another regime (U.S. GAAP ). Contrast effects are observed (i) when out‐of‐regime standards are considered before making a reporting judgment under IFRS , and (ii) when out‐of‐regime standards are applied as local GAAP for a subsidiary of a foreign parent that reports under IFRS . We also find that contrast effects are reduced when auditors believe IFRS lacks guidance. These results have implications for financial statement preparers and auditors in the current incomplete‐convergence environment.

Using a large sample of executives in S&P 1500 firms over 1996–2010, we document significant salary and total compensation gaps between female and male executives and explore two possible explanations for the gaps. We find support for greater female risk aversion as one contributing factor. Female executives hold significantly lower equity incentives and demand larger salary premiums for bearing a given level of compensation risk. These results suggest that females’ risk aversion contributes to the observed lower pay levels through its effect on ex ante compensation structures. We also find evidence that the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards affects the size of the gaps. In firms with a higher proportion of female directors on the board, the gaps in salary and total pay levels are lower. Together, these findings suggest that female higher risk aversion may act as a barrier to full pay convergence, despite the mitigating effect from greater gender diversity on the board.

Since most audit engagements identify multiple proposed audit adjustments, auditors must decide how best to present and negotiate these adjustments with their clients. Prior research indicates that auditors can negotiate adjustments individually (a sequential strategy) or can negotiate multiple adjustments within the same negotiation setting (a simultaneous strategy). This paper examines the relative effectiveness of a simultaneous versus sequential negotiation strategy in eliciting concessions from clients and engendering greater client satisfaction. Participants negotiated audit adjustments with a simulated auditor who employed one of the two negotiation strategies. We find evidence that a simultaneous strategy elicits significantly greater total concessions from client managers and also generates more positive attitudes toward the auditor. We also manipulate the magnitude of the issues negotiated and find that significantly greater concessions are offered when larger issues are presented first. These findings have important implications for auditors, as they suggest that negotiating issues simultaneously and presenting larger issues first can result in significantly improved negotiation outcomes.

We examine the effects of the 1998 merger of Price Waterhouse ( PW ) and Coopers & Lybrand ( CL ) on the audit quality of the merged firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) at both the firm and office levels, where audit quality is surrogated by the auditor's propensity to issue a going‐concern opinion, clients’ likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, and clients’ accrual quality. At the firm level, we find that the merger increased audit quality for PwC relative to the audit quality of the other Big N firms. At the office level, our findings, albeit mixed, collectively suggest that the improvement in firm‐level audit quality was likely driven by the improvement in audit quality at PwC's overlapping offices, that is, offices in cities where both PW and CL had separate offices prior to the merger. Further, our findings suggest that although the PW / CL merger increased auditor concentration in local audit markets with PwC overlapping offices, the merger improved (rather than hurt) audit quality in those markets. Overall, our study contributes to the extant sparse literature on the effect of Big N mergers on audit quality, and is of potential interest to regulators.

We conduct a comprehensive study on the associations between debt covenant violations (“violations”) and auditor actions for financially distressed and nondistressed firms. Our study is motivated by a lack of research on the consequences of violations resulting from auditors' actions. We find that firms with violations have significantly higher audit fees, a greater likelihood of receiving a going‐concern opinion, and a greater likelihood of experiencing an auditor resignation. Importantly, the positive associations hold for all types of firms, including financially nondistressed firms. In fact, we find that, after controlling for other financial information, the relation between violations and an increased likelihood of a going‐concern opinion is stronger for nondistressed versus distressed firms. Our evidence is consistent with belief‐revision research in auditing that finds auditors react more strongly to information that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs. This study provides further evidence on the indirect yet significant consequences of covenant violations on firms resulting from auditor actions.

The recent financial crisis has brought to the forefront the need for companies to effectively manage their risks. In this regard, one approach that has gained prominence is enterprise risk management ( ERM ). Importantly, little is known about the link between ERM and the financial reporting process. This link is critical, because it is imperative that financial reporting adequately depicts the financial status (e.g., valuations, estimates) and associated risks of a company as revealed by ERM . Additionally, from an auditing perspective, ERM affects the risks of misstatement, which should impact audit planning. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to examine the experiences of audit partners, CFO s, and audit committee ( AC ) members (“the governance triad”) on the link between ERM and the financial reporting process. To determine whether members of the governance triad focus on monitoring, strategy, or both, we also examine their definition of and experiences with ERM with respect to agency and/or resource dependence theory. To address these issues, we conduct semistructured interviews of experienced individuals that form the governance triads from 11 public companies. There are three major findings from our study. First, importantly, all three types of participants see a strong link between ERM and the financial reporting process. Second, despite recognition of the broad nature of ERM , the predominant experiences of the actual roles played by triad members center on agency theory, while resource dependence may be relatively underemphasized by all triad members. Finally, CFO s and AC members indicate that auditors may be especially underutilizing ERM in the audit process, suggesting an “expectations gap.”

We use reverse mergers to examine the impact of litigation risk on audit fees. In a reverse merger, a private company merges with a public company, and the private company's management takes over the resulting publicly traded firm. Reverse mergers create a unique test setting to provide estimates on the litigation risk premium because, while the litigation risk for formerly private firms whose equity becomes publicly traded increases, the remaining auditee‐ and auditor‐related characteristics remain virtually unchanged. We document a litigation risk premium of approximately 27 percent. Moreover, we document that equity dispersion impacts the audit fee pricing of litigation risk and this relation is dramatically magnified in the publicly traded realm. Finally, we find that institutional investors demand higher audit effort in the form of higher audit fees in both the private‐ and public‐equity settings.

In this paper, we propose and empirically test a cross‐sectional profitability forecasting model which incorporates two major improvements relative to extant models. First, in terms of model construction, we incorporate mean reversion through the use of a two‐stage partial adjustment model and inclusion of a number of additional relevant determinants of profitability. Second, in terms of model estimation, we employ least absolute deviation (LAD) analysis instead of ordinary least squares because the former approach is able to better accommodate outliers. Results reveal that forecasts from our model are more accurate than three extant models at every forecast horizon considered and more accurate than consensus analyst forecasts at forecast horizons of two through five years. Further analysis reveals that LAD estimation provides the greatest incremental accuracy improvement followed by the inclusion of income subcomponents as predictor variables, and implementation of the two‐stage partial adjustment model. In terms of economic relevance, we find that forecasts from our model are informative about future returns, incremental to forecasts from other models, analysts’ forecasts, and standard risk factors. Overall, our results are important because they document the increased accuracy and economic relevance of a cross‐sectional profitability forecasting model which incorporates improvements to extant models in terms of model construction and estimation.

Although prior research reports that firms that consistently beat their earnings expectations are rewarded with a market‐valuation premium, most firms are inconsistent in the sign of their benchmark performance, sometimes missing and sometimes beating. In this paper, we report the results of multiple experiments to test the idea that potential investors, evaluating firms that have inconsistent benchmark performance, use a counting heuristic to discriminate among them. Our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that these investors distinguish among firms by counting the number of beats and misses they experience over an observed time interval. The judgmental effect of this beat‐frequency is incremental to the effect of the magnitude of the beats and misses of the benchmark. Our study has implications for firm managers who have inconsistent benchmark performance, suggesting that market participants do make systematic discriminations among such inconsistent firms. It also has implications for researchers by introducing a new theoretical construct to the literature—namely, the counting heuristic.