Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Speakers of weak future‐time reference (FTR) languages perceive the future as closer and more imminent. In this study, we examine the important question of whether the FTR properties of languages spoken by investors affect their demand for forward‐looking information, thereby influencing corporate management forecast practices in different countries. We predict that investors who speak weak‐FTR languages are more concerned about the future prospects of their investments and the ability of company management to respond to future changes, leading to a greater demand for management forecasts from these companies. We find that firms in weak‐FTR language countries exhibit a greater propensity for and frequency of issuing management forecasts and that they also issue more long‐horizon forecasts, compared to those in strong‐FTR language countries. Our results hold after controlling for other country‐level cultural factors. Within the same countries, firms with more foreign institutional ownership from weak‐FTR countries issue more (long‐horizon) management forecasts than their counterparts. Finally, firms from strong‐FTR countries significantly increase their issuance of (long‐horizon) management forecasts, after cross‐listing their stocks in Germany, a weak‐FTR country. This is the first study to examine language FTR as an antecedent to voluntary disclosures. We document a linguistic trait as a novel investor environment factor that shapes corporate voluntary disclosures and explains the cross‐country variations in management forecast practices.

ABSTRACT This study examines whether auditors can improve their judgment by drawing on the crowd within—that is, making the same judgment twice and averaging the two responses. Improvements in judgment are of special interest to auditors given that poor judgment threatens audit effectiveness and efficiency. The results from my experiment suggest that drawing on the crowd within helps auditors better use their task‐relevant knowledge, leading to more accurate auditor judgments relative to the judgments of an expert panel. Also, auditors can employ different task‐relevant knowledge that leads to more justifiable judgments when they are prompted (vs. not prompted) to make a limited, intuitive initial judgment as they draw on the crowd within. Overall, auditors appear to increase their task‐relevant knowledge as they develop expertise but do not appear to better use that knowledge absent intervention. Auditors can manipulate how they draw on the crowd within to achieve different audit objectives—for example, accuracy versus justifiability.

ABSTRACT In this study, we provide theoretical guidance for both analytical research and empirical research by considering how changing expectations of earnings affect a dishonest manager's strategy to overstate earnings and an auditor's strategy to exert effort in a two‐period setting. We expect our study's insights on changing economic conditions to help shape future research. We model the manager type as either honest or dishonest, which allows us to differentiate audit risk from audit effort. The key takeaways for future research are the insights on how changes in payoffs and expected earnings affect the associations that involve earnings overstatements and audit effort with audit risk and market price. For instance, researchers typically assume audit effort and audit risk are negatively associated, but we find the association can be positive when, for example, the auditor chooses a period 2 strategy based on the changes in period 1 game parameters. The results of our study provide two additional key insights on the design of future empirical tests. First, by dichotomizing, we show the importance of estimating the intercept in the market pricing equation when studying earnings quality, because market price also adjusts for expected bias through changes in the intercept. Second, our multiperiod setting demonstrates that the effects from a change in the manager's or auditor's incentives in period 1 may reverse in period 2. Empirical studies typically examine the contemporaneous effects of these changes on market price and/or audit risk but fail to identify the cross‐temporal effects we document in our study.

ABSTRACT We examine whether firms with managers that have prior internal audit experience are less likely to manage earnings. This examination is important because the internal audit function (IAF) is uniquely positioned to provide experiences that could influence future managerial behavior, including limiting the potential negative repercussions of earnings management. We find that firms with managers that have internal audit experience are associated with lower real earnings management (REM) but not accruals‐based earnings management. Effects are strongest when managers with internal audit experience have greater power or currently hold financial roles, or when there are a greater number of managers with internal audit experience. The results are robust to including firm fixed effects, using entropy‐balancing and performance‐matching approaches, using a subsample of firm‐years required to have an IAF, using a subsample of firms for which we can measure IAF quality, and measuring internal audit experience at a previous employer. These results point to an important benefit of manager internal audit experience, as research suggests that REM is common, difficult to detect, not always within the scope of financial reporting regulators, and detrimental to future performance.

ABSTRACT We provide evidence on the effect of political connections on the trade‐off between real and accrual‐based earnings management in the United States. This evidence is important because prior literature documents mixed evidence on whether political connections reduce the threat of SEC enforcement. By studying earnings management with a large sample, our study provides more generalizable insights into the effects of political connections on enforcement. We argue that politically connected firms face a lower threat of enforcement, which reduces the costs of accrual‐based earnings management and alters the trade‐off between real and accrual‐based earnings management. Consistent with our predictions, using a single‐step estimation method as well as a difference‐in‐differences test based on an exogenous shock, we find that connected firms engage in more accrual management and less real earnings management. Our results are driven by firms that have relatively high costs of real earnings management. Furthermore, we find that political connections mitigate the relation between SEC comment letters and earnings management. Overall, the evidence is consistent with politically connected firms facing a lower threat of regulatory enforcement and using this flexibility to increase accrual‐based earnings management and reduce real earnings management that is potentially value destructive. Our study complements and strengthens inferences in prior work that documents evidence of lax SEC enforcement for politically connected firms using small samples. Our findings should be of interest to policy‐makers, regulators, and other professionals that are interested in understanding the effects of political connections.

ABSTRACT I propose an explanation for the positive relation between R&D, future earnings, and future stock returns based on the fixed‐cost qualities of R&D. If R&D is relatively fixed over short horizons, demand shocks realized by some R&D firms will push these firms into R&D intensity levels that are suboptimal as common scale proxies—market equity, assets, and sales—respond more quickly to demand shocks than R&D. In response, R&D firms realizing negative demand shocks reduce future expenses and capital expenditures, producing higher future profitability on lower sales growth. Consistent with the fixed‐cost hypothesis, I find the higher future profits of high R&D firms are explained by cost cutting, not revenue growth. Collectively, the restructuring of cost and capital structures of the subset of high R&D firms realizing demand shocks explains the future profit and investment patterns of R&D firms, while the fixed‐cost qualities of R&D seem to explain patterns in future stock returns. My results have implications for literatures that examine how decisions on R&D investment levels affect future firm performance, growth, and stock returns.

ABSTRACT This study examines the processes by which English linguistic capital is legitimized as integral to professional accountants' distinction, prestige, and status in Jordan. Drawing on 27 interviews, the study reveals the dynamic and mutual interdependency of social hierarchies and Jordanian accountants' agency in embedding the English language in everyday practices and routines. Accountants in senior positions employ English linguistic practices and strategies linked to the global structures of the profession (e.g., IFRS, enterprise resource planning [ERP] systems, Big 4 firms). Typically, these respondents already have a good command of English due to their elite, socially and economically privileged upbringing. By comparison, less powerful accountants, not drawn from the elite, tend to accept and internalize the need for English in their field, despite being more proficient in Arabic. They employ coping strategies that largely reinforce their marginalization, although occasionally they are able to open up spaces for hybrid linguistic practices, as they adapt the use of Arabic and English to their practical, daily requirements. The data also suggest that all Jordanian accountants in this study, regardless of social background, experience emotional ramifications linked to the tensions between the global demand for English in their field and meanings associated with English and Arabic due to colonial history. Through the lens of Bourdieu's sociolinguistic and practice theory(s), Jordanian accountants experience frictions and internal contradictions, “split habitus/habitus clivé,” driving them to compartmentalize (decouple) their Arab and professional identities in a global accountancy context. Insights emanating from the study have implications for understanding and addressing unequal power and marginalization in professional accounting settings in Jordan and beyond.

ABSTRACT We examine how the presence of multiple supervisory agencies affects firm‐level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. This analysis is important because coordination problems among regulators are frequently present in practice but often overlooked in academic research. We exploit that banks are subject to equivalent risk disclosure rules under securities laws (IFRS 7) and banking regulation (Pillar 3 of the Basel II Accord) but that different regulators start enforcing the rules at different points in time. We find that banks substantially increase their formal risk disclosures upon the adoption of Pillar 3 even if they already had to comply with the same requirements under IFRS 7. The effects are stronger if the central bank is responsible for bank supervision and bank regulators are equipped with more supervisory resources, but are less pronounced if the securities market regulator is an independent entity. In turn, banks facing more market pressures are more compliant with the rules. We further find persistent liquidity benefits of the increased risk disclosures but only after Pillar 3 became effective and its compliance was enforced by the banking regulator. Our results suggest that formal and material compliance with risk disclosure regulation are a function of both the resources of the supervisory agency and its incentive alignment with the regulated firms. In our setting, the banking regulator seems more effective in fulfilling this role.

ABSTRACT We show that managers have a propensity to disproportionately report total revenues just above base‐ten thresholds (e.g., 10 million, 30 million, 1 billion) and examine motives for and consequences of this behavior. Focusing on base‐ten thresholds in revenues is important because, despite being unusually prevalent in revenue targets set in executive compensation contracts, analyst forecasts, and management forecasts, they have not been previously explored. We also show that pressure to beat these targets provides one explanation for the base‐ten bias in reported revenues. However, these incentive effects do not offer a complete explanation because base‐ten threshold‐beating is observed even in the absence of these explicit targets. We further find that when firms beat a base‐ten threshold for the first time, they experience increases in news coverage, institutional ownership, liquidity, and analyst following, even after controlling for whether they have beaten other common benchmarks. These results suggest that managers also beat base‐ten thresholds in order to increase their firms' overall visibility. Overall, we show that a preference for base‐ten numbers, which have no inherent economic meaning, has a measurable effect on the actions of market participants. These results open the door to a new range of managerial targets previously unexplored.

ABSTRACT Motivated by ongoing worldwide efforts to improve the comparability of accounting information, I examine the temporal trend in global financial reporting comparability. Regulators have made serious efforts to improve comparability, but numerous frictions may have limited their effectiveness. Accordingly, I examine the time‐series properties of comparability measures for a sample of the 36 largest economies and provide two key empirical insights consistent with expectations. First, I confirm comparability is increasing over 2002–2018. Second, I document that this increase primarily occurs in firms applying local accounting standards, as opposed to those applying global standards (defined as either US GAAP or IFRS). Additional analyses reveal that: (i) firms applying local standards are becoming more comparable to firms applying IFRS but not to those applying US GAAP, and (ii) comparability within global‐standards firms is not changing. I also document that certain market liquidity benefits of comparability are sustained in the long term, as firms increasing comparability over the sample period experience greater reductions in bid‐ask spread and zero‐return trading days relative to those decreasing comparability. Overall, the results reveal that comparability has increased—consistent with systematic regulatory efforts—but that this increase arises heterogeneously across firms, with the primary effects in recent years occurring among those applying local standards.