We examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the credit risk of companies around the world. We find that increased infection rates affect firms more adversely as reflected by the wider increase in their credit default swap (CDS) spreads if they are larger, more leveraged, closer to default, have worse governance and more limited stakeholder engagement, and operate in more highly exposed industries. We observe that country-level determinants such as GDP, political stability, foreign direct investment, and commitment to crisis management (income support, health and lockdown policies) also affect the sensitivity of CDS spreads to COVID-19 infection rates. A negative amplification effect exists for firms with high default probability in countries with fiscal constraints. A direct comparison between global CDS and stock markets reveals that the CDS market prices in a distinct set of corporate traits and government policies in pandemic times

We compare the market pricing of euro area government bonds and the corresponding Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). In particular, we analyse the “basis” defined as the difference between the premium on the CDS and the credit spread on the underlying bond. Our sample of weekly data covers the period from January 2007 to December 2012 and contains several episodes of sovereign market distress. Overall, we observe a complex relationship between the derivatives market and the underlying cash market characterised by sizable deviations from the no-arbitrage relationship (i.e. basis equal to zero). We show that short-selling frictions explain the persistence of positive basis deviations while funding frictions explain the persistence of negative basis deviations which are observed for countries with weak public finances. Moreover, we show that the “flight-to-quality/liquidity” phenomenon in bond markets is a key driver of the large positive basis of better rated countries

In this paper we modify and extend the framework of Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) to quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and banks in the euro area. Spillovers are estimated recursively from a vector autoregressive model of daily changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads with exogenous common factors. We account for interdependencies between sovereign and bank CDS spreads and derive generalized impulse response functions. Specifically, we assess the systemic effect of an unexpected shock to the creditworthiness of a sovereign or country-specific bank index on other sovereigns and bank CDSs between October 2009 and July 2012. Channels of shock transmission from or to sovereigns and banks are summarized in a Contagion Index and its four components: (i) among sovereigns, (ii) among banks, (iii) from sovereigns to banks, and (iv) from banks to sovereigns. We also highlight the impact of policy-related events on the Contagion Index

This paper estimates and compares two groups of high-frequency market-based systemic risk measures using European and US interbank rates, stock prices and credit derivatives data from 2004 to 2009. Measures belonging to the macro group gauge the overall tension in the financial sector and micro group measures rely on individual institution information to extract joint distress. We rank the measures using three criteria: (i) Granger causality tests, (ii) Gonzalo and Granger metric, and (iii) correlation with an index of systemic events and policy actions. We find that the best systemic measure in the macro group is the first principal component of a portfolio of Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads whereas the best measure in the micro group is the multivariate densities computed from CDS spreads. These results suggest that the measures based on CDSs outperform measures based on interbank rates or stock market prices

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country

On May 29, 2008 the Wall Street Journal published an article alleging that several global banks were reporting Libor quotes significantly lower than those implied by prevailing credit default swap (CDS) spreads. While acknowledging that the “analysis doesn’t prove that banks are lying or manipulating Libor,” it nevertheless conjectures that these banks may “have been low-balling their borrowing rates to avoid looking desperate for cash.” In this paper we compare Libor with other short-term borrowing rates, analyze individual bank quotes, and compare these individual quotes to CDS spreads and market capitalization data during three periods: 1/1/07–8/8/07 (Period 1), 8/9/07–4/16/08 (Period 2), and 4/17/08–5/30/08 (Period 3). We find some anomalous individual quotes, but the evidence is inconsistent with a material manipulation of the US dollar 1-month Libor rate

A main cause of the crisis of 2007–2009 is the various ways through which banks have transferred credit risk in the financial system. We study the systematic risk of banks before the crisis, using two samples of banks respectively trading Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and issuing Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). After their first usage of either risk transfer method, the share price beta of these banks increases significantly. This suggests the market anticipated the risks arising from these methods, long before the crisis. We additionally separate this beta effect into a volatility and a market correlation component. Quite strikingly, this decomposition shows that the increase in the beta is solely due to an increase in banks’ correlations. Thus, while banks may have shed their individual credit risk, they actually posed greater systemic risk. This creates a challenge for financial regulation, which has typically focused on individual institutions

We evaluate the most actively traded types of credit derivatives within a unified pricing framework that allows for multiple debt issues. Since firms default on all of their obligations, total debt is instrumental in the likelihood of default and therefore in credit derivatives valuation. We use a single factor interest rate model where the exponential default frontier is based on total debt and is made coherent with observed bond prices. Analytical formulae are derived for credit default swaps, total return swaps (both fixed-for-fixed and fixed-for-floating), and credit risk options (CROs). Price behaviors and hedging properties of all these credit derivatives are investigated. Simulations document that credit derivatives prices may be significantly affected by terms of debt other than those of the reference obligation. The analysis of CROs indicates their superior ability to fine-tune the hedging of magnitude and arrival risks of default

Raising capital on wholesale debt markets is an important source of funding for banks and non-banking institutions throughout the world. We investigate the determinants of wholesale funding costs for the Global Systematically Important Banks (G-SIBs) using credit default swaps, the proxy for the cost of wholesale debt funding. Using 25 G-SIBs which are heavily reliant on debt capital markets across multiple currencies, this paper investigates whether the default risk of the interbank lending system, i.e., LIBOR-OIS spread is a new global macroeconomic factor in determining G-SIBs’ CDS spreads. Based on time-fixed effects and bank-fixed effects, we find default risk from the US banking system seems to play a greater role in explaining the wholesale funding costs of the G-SIBs than that of their home-country equivalent default risk. Overall, the findings make an important contribution to domestic and international debt funding markets and provide an insight for financial intermediaries, regulators, and monetary-policy makers

When a firm writes incomplete debt contracts, its limited ability to commit to not strategically default and renegotiate its debt requires the firm to pay higher yields to its creditors. Hedged by credit derivatives, creditors have stronger bargaining power in the case of debt renegotiation, which ex-ante demotivates the firm to default strategically. In this paper, I aim to investigate theoretically and empirically whether credit derivatives could help reduce the cost of debt contracting stemming from the possibility of strategic default. I find that firms with a priori high strategic default incentives experience a relatively large reduction in their corporate bond spreads after the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) written on their debt. This result is robust to controlling for the endogeneity of CDS introduction. My finding is consistent with the presence of CDS reducing the strategic default-related cost of corporate debt, suggesting the beneficial role of credit derivatives as a commitment device for the borrower to repay the lender