International audience

In rational, efficiently functioning and complete markets, returns on derivative and underlying securities should be perfectly contemporaneously correlated. Due to market imperfections, one of these markets may reflect information faster. The use of high-frequency data and the choice for a small unit time interval to measure these lead-lag relations comes at the cost of some or many missing observations, causing traditional estimators to either under- or overestimate covariances and correlations. We use a new estimator to estimate lead-lag relationships between the cash AEX index, options and futures. We find that futures returns lead both options and cash index returns by approximately 10 minutes. The relationship between options and the cash market is not completely unidirectional.

Bloomfield, Marvão, and Spagnolo (2023) establish an interesting yet puzzling finding: Firms in concentrated industries that form cartels are more likely to use relative performance evaluation (RPE) compensation arrangements for their top managers. The paper interprets this as evidence that cartel members constrain managers' incentives to engage in costly sabotage when their compensation depends on their peer firms' performance. I argue that successful costly sabotage to gain an RPE advantage is extremely unlikely and that costly sabotage is more likely among cartel firms than non-cartel firms. It therefore is an unlikely explanation of the paper's main finding. I propose an alternative explanation, that RPE benchmarks include firms that are not cartel member firms.

Armstrong et al. (2022) review the various econometric methods that have been used to draw causal inference in the accounting literature and offer an alternative method for conducting research when causal methods are not applicable. This discussion provides background for the emphasis on causal inference in accounting. It also draws parallels between the authors' proposed quasi-causal method and the structural estimation methods that have been used in finance and that are starting to be used in accounting.

SEC confidential treatment (CT) orders are regulatory exemptions that enable firms to redact proprietary information from SEC filings if the disclosure would cause competitive harm and if the information is immaterial to investors. This study examines the role of firms' political connections in the SEC's decisions to approve versus reject CT requests before and after Congressional intervention and internal SEC scrutiny into the CT process. CT requests from politically connected firms are less likely to be rejected before Congressional intervention and internal SEC scrutiny and are more likely to be rejected following these events. When the SEC rejects CT requests, firms must disclose the contents of the unapproved redactions. These disclosures are informative to investors, on average, and are less informative following Congressional intervention and internal SEC scrutiny. Together, these findings contribute to the literature on political influence in SEC oversight and disclosure regulation and provide unique evidence on the role of Congressional intervention in SEC decision making.

In this study, I examine whether firms and executives with long-term political connections through contributions and lobbying incur lower costs from the enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I find that politically connected firms on average are less likely to be involved in SEC enforcement actions and face lower penalties if they are prosecuted by the SEC. Contributions to politicians in a strong position to put pressure on the SEC are more effective than others at reducing the probability of enforcement and penalties imposed by an enforcement action. Moreover, the amounts paid to lobbyists with prior employment links to the SEC, and the amounts spent on lobbying the SEC directly, are more effective than other lobbying expenditures at reducing enforcement costs faced by firms.

I provide big picture comments on the review of the banking literature in accounting by Beatty and Liao (2014). Beatty and Liao (2014) does a service to the accounting field by providing an intelligent, well organized and accessible point of entry to banking research in accounting. I complement Beatty and Liao by presenting my observations on the role of financial accounting in banking, focusing my discussion on real effects of accounting policy choices on individual bank risk taking and codependence of risk among banks. I also offer ideas on future research directions.

Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman [Leone, A., Wu, J., Zimmerman, J., 2005. Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] find that cash compensation (salary and bonus) is more sensitive to price decreases than to price increases. The authors interpret this result as consistent with Boards of Directors exercising discretion to reduce costly ex post settling up in cash compensation. I discuss potential alternative explanations. Specifically, the design of bonus contracts and the placement of the upper bound, and the effect of the Internal Revenue Code Section 162 (m) that limits the deductibility of cash compensation over one million dollars. I also link their results to the managerial power and rent extraction perspective.

This paper investigates circumstances under which accruals are predicted to improve earnings' ability to measure firm performance, as reflected in stock returns. The importance of accruals is hypothesized to increase (i) the shorter the performance measurement interval, (ii) the greater the volatility of the firm's working capital requirements and investment and financing activities, and (iii) the longer the firm's operating cycle. Under each of these circumstances, cash flows are predicted to suffer more severely from timing and matching problems that reduce their ability to reflect firm performance. The results of empirical tests are consistent with these predictions.