We show that aggregate consumption risks embodied in cash flows can account for the puzzling differences in risk premia across book‐to‐market, momentum, and size‐sorted portfolios. The dynamics of aggregate consumption and cash flow growth rates, modeled as a vector autoregression, are used to measure the consumption beta of discounted cash flows. Differences in these cash flow betas account for more than 60% of the cross‐sectional variation in risk premia. The market price for risk in cash flows is highly significant. We argue that cash flow risk is important for interpreting differences in risk compensation across assets.
We provide evidence of private information in the foreign exchange market. The evidence comes from the introduction of trading in Tokyo over the lunch hour. Lunch‐return variance doubles with the introduction of trading, which cannot be due to public information since the flow of public information did not change with the trading rules. We then exploit microstructure theory to discriminate between the two alternatives: private information and mispricing. Four key results support the predictions of private‐information models. Three of these involve changes in the intraday volatility U‐shape. The fourth is that opening trade causes mispricing's share in variance to fall.
In empirical studies of differences between firms which are acquired and those which are not, researchers typically divide firms into two groups‐acquired and nonacquired. In this paper, we argue that cash takeovers may be sufficiently different from noncash acquisitionst hat failure to distinguish between them may lead to inappropriateg eneralizations. We provide evidence from the mid 1970s that three categories of firms can be distinguished:n onacquireda, cquiredi n a cash takeover, and acquired in an exchange of securities.
Asset management and pricing models require the proper modeling of the return distribution of financial assets. While the return distribution used in the traditional theories of asset pricing and portfolio selection is the normal distribution, numerous studies that have investigated the empirical behavior of asset returns in financial markets throughout the world reject the hypothesis that asset return distributions are normally distribution. Alternative models for describing return distributions have been proposed since the 1960s, with the strongest empirical and theoretical support being provided for the family of stable distributions (with the normal distribution being a special case of this distribution). Since the turn of the century, specific forms of the stable distribution have been proposed and tested that better fit the observed behavior of historical return distributions. More specifically, subclasses of the tempered stable distribution have been proposed. In this paper, we propose one such subclass of the tempered stable distribution which we refer to as the “KR distribution”. We empirically test this distribution as well as two other recently proposed subclasses of the tempered stable distribution: the Carr–Geman–Madan–Yor (CGMY) distribution and the modified tempered stable (MTS) distribution. The advantage of the KR distribution over the other two distributions is that it has more flexible tail parameters. For these three subclasses of the tempered stable distribution, which are infinitely divisible and have exponential moments for some neighborhood of zero, we generate the exponential Lévy market models induced from them. We then construct a new GARCH model with the infinitely divisible distributed innovation and three subclasses of that GARCH model that incorporates three observed properties of asset returns: volatility clustering, fat tails, and skewness. We formulate the algorithm to find the risk-neutral return processes for those GARCH models using the “change of measure” for the tempered stable distributions. To compare the performance of those exponential Lévy models and the GARCH models, we report the results of the parameters estimated for the S&P 500 index and investigate the out-of-sample forecasting performance for those GARCH models for the S&P 500 option prices.
The Accounting Review2026101(2), 281-311open access
Pay gaps, like gender or racial gaps, violate the widely held belief that employees should receive equal pay for equal work. This study examines whether a common control choice—framing pay raise budgets in percentages—contributes to perpetuating pay gaps. We predict that when the pay raise budget is framed as a percentage (the percentage frame), it inadvertently nudges managers to anchor individual raises on that budget percentage, thereby impounding prior salaries, and thus, existing inequities, into pay raises. We further predict that framing the pay raise budget as an absolute amount (the dollar frame) can un-nudge this behavior. As expected, we find in two experiments that the dollar frame perpetuates pay gaps less than the percentage frame, and that this difference is robust to varying levels of ambiguity about the source of salary differences. Our study examines a simple, cost-effective way to limit the perpetuation of pay gaps. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
We use audit firm data breaches as time-varying, reputation-harming events to examine the value of auditor reputation—independent of actual audit quality—in the IPO process. We find that auditor data breaches are negatively associated with IPO offer price revisions. We demonstrate that this effect is due to an increase in institutional investors’ perception of information risk. Specifically, the effect is mitigated when other parties involved in the IPO reduce information risk themselves and when institutional investors are less likely to rely on audited financial information. In additional tests, we find that the impact of breaches on IPO offer price revisions is concentrated in breaches with greater severity, saliency, and frequency, consistent with institutional investors reacting to the announcement of the data breach rather than some other confounding factor. Collectively, our evidence suggests that IPO investors perceive time-varying reputational value of the external auditor, independent of changes in audit quality.
We examine firm decisions to provide listings of sell-side analyst coverage on corporate investor relations (IR) websites. These listings are related to three major areas of financial research—voluntary disclosure, investor relations, and analysts. Our hand-collected data permit cross-sectional and time-series analyses. Firms are more likely to have such listings when analysts are more important information intermediaries and when firms are directly involved in managing their IR websites. For firms with listings, the probability of an analyst being included on the listing is increasing in firm awareness of and familiarity with the analyst, how active and favorable the analyst is, and the analyst’s reputation. Additional analysis indicates similar results across self-hosting versus third-party hosting IR websites, with a notable exception that self-hosting firms exhibit a stronger preference for analysts who issue more favorable research about the firm. Decisions to add or drop analysts from listings reinforce the main results. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.
Non-GAAP earnings provide managers the flexibility to exclude GAAP items to either produce a more informative performance measure or provide them the ability to opportunistically exclude recurring expenses from non-GAAP earnings. Prior literature examines the use of this form of disclosure at the firm level, although it is ultimately management's decision. We extend prior non-GAAP literature by examining whether the use and quality of non-GAAP earnings is influenced by CEO personality traits, namely, CEO narcissism. We find that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to exclude expenses from non-GAAP earnings and that the magnitude of exclusions is greater. We also find that those non-GAAP exclusions are more persistent and, thus, lower-quality. Our results shed light on the disclosure practice of non-GAAP earnings and show how narcissistic CEOs are more likely to take advantage of the discretion in financial reporting disclosures in order to benefit the firm and themselves.