Knowledge that Transforms

I combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration for the period 1854–1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors. Governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage. Once allocated, they provide more tax exemptions, raise less revenue, and invest less. The promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform. (JEL D73, F54, H83, J45, M51, N43, N44)

We develop a general equilibrium model where entrepreneurs finance random investment opportunities using trade credit, bank-issued assets, or currency. They search for bank funding in over-the-counter markets where loan sizes, interest rates, and down payments are negotiated bilaterally. The theory generates pass-through from nominal interest rates to real lending rates depending on market microstructure, policy, and firm characteristics. Higher banks' bargaining power, for example, raises pass-through but weakens transmission to investment. Interest rate spreads arise from liquidity, regulatory, and intermediation premia and depend on policy described as money growth or open market operations. (JEL E43, E52, G21, G31, G32, L26)

This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the highest fraction of lies is from reporting the maximal outcome, but some participants do not make the maximal lie. More participants lie partially when the experimenter cannot observe their outcomes than when the experimenter can verify the observed outcome. Partial lying increases when the prior probability of the highest outcome decreases. (JEL C91, D12, D90, Z13)

The empirical methodology used by Persson and Rossin-Slater (2018) to estimate the causal effect of in utero exposure to stress contains a potentially significant flaw. They define the control group in a way that may bias their causal estimates and can lead to the finding of a significant relationship when there is none. In this note, I describe the source of the bias and suggest an alternative specification of the control group. (JEL I12, J12, J13)

We examine the effects of a quasi-experimental unconditional household income transfer on child emotional and behavioral health and personality traits. Using longitudinal data, we find that there are large beneficial effects on children's emotional and behavioral health and personality traits during adolescence. We find evidence that these effects are most pronounced for children who start out with the lowest initial endowments. The income intervention also results in improvements in parental relationships which we interpret as a potential mechanism behind our findings.

We examine the concerns that new technologies will render labor redundant in a framework in which tasks previously performed by labor can be automated and new versions of existing tasks, in which labor has a comparative advantage, can be created. In a static version where capital is fixed and technology is exogenous, automation reduces employment and the labor share, and may even reduce wages, while the creation of new tasks has the opposite effects. Our full model endogenizes capital accumulation and the direction of research toward automation and the creation of new tasks. If the long-run rental rate of capital relative to the wage is sufficiently low, the long-run equilibrium involves automation of all tasks. Otherwise, there exists a stable balanced growth path in which the two types of innovations go hand-in-hand. Stability is a consequence of the fact that automation reduces the cost of producing using labor, and thus discourages further automation and encourages the creation of new tasks. In an extension with heterogeneous skills, we show that inequality increases during transitions driven both by faster automation and the introduction of new tasks, and characterize the conditions under which inequality stabilizes in the long run. (JEL D63, E22, E23, E24, J24, O33, O41)

We document substantial increases in agricultural productivity, industrial output, and peasants' nutrition in Imperial Russia as a result of the abolition of serfdom in 1861. Before the emancipation, provinces where serfs constituted the majority of agricultural laborers lagged behind provinces that primarily relied on free labor. The emancipation led to a significant but partial catch up. Better incentives of peasants resulting from the cessation of ratchet effect were a likely mechanism behind a relatively fast positive effect of reform on agricultural productivity. The land reform, which instituted communal land tenure after the emancipation, diminished growth in productivity in repartition communes. (JEL J47, N13, N33, N43, N53, Q11)

We propose and estimate a novel specification of the labor demand curve incorporating search frictions and the role of entrepreneurs in new firm creation. Using city-industry variation over four decades, we estimate the employment -wage elasticity to be -1 at the industry-city level and -0.3 at the city level. We show that the difference between these estimates likely reflects the congestion externalities predicted by the search literature. Also, holding wages constant, an increase in the local population is associated with a proportional increase in employment. These results provide indirect information about the elasticity of job creation to changes in profits.

Many government programs transfer resources to older people and implicitly or explicitly tax their labor. We shed new light on the labor supply and welfare effects of such programs by investigating the Old Age Assistance Program (OAA). Exploiting the large differences in OAA programs across states and Census data on the entire US population in 1940, we find that OAA reduced the labor force participation rate among men aged 65–74 by 8.5 percentage points, more than one-half of its 1930–1940 decline, but that OAA’s implicit taxation of earnings imposed only small welfare costs on recipients. (JEL H24, H55, H75, J14, J22)

Policy uncertainty reduces individual welfare when individuals have limited opportunities to mitigate or insure against the resulting consumption fluctuations. We field an original survey to measure the degree of perceived policy uncertainty in Social Security benefits and to estimate the impact of this uncertainty on individual welfare. Our central estimates show that on average individuals are willing to forgo 6 percent of the benefits they are supposed to get under current law to remove the policy uncertainty associated with their future Social Security benefits. This translates to a risk premium from policy uncertainty equal to 10 percent of expected benefits.