Knowledge that Transforms

Online college courses are a rapidly expanding feature of higher education, yet little research identifies their effects relative to traditional in-person classes. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that taking a course online, instead of in-person, reduces student success and progress in college. Grades are lower both for the course taken online and in future courses. Students are less likely to remain enrolled at the university. These estimates are local average treatment effects for students with access to both online and in-person options; for other students, online classes may be the only option for accessing college-level courses. (JEL I23, I26)

Hayek (1945) argues that local information is key to understanding the efficiency of alternative economic systems and whether production should be centralized or decentralized. The Chinese experience of decentralizing SOEs confirms this insight: when the distance to the government is farther, the SOE is more likely to be decentralized, and this distance-decentralization link is more pronounced with higher communication costs and greater firm-performance heterogeneity. However, when the Chinese central government oversees SOEs in strategic industries, the distance-decentralization link is muted. We also consider alternative agency-cost-based explanations, and do not find much support. (JEL D22, D83, L25, L32, L33, O14, P31)

Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below. (JEL D63, D82)

We analyze sequential, binary voting schemes in settings where several privately informed agents have single-peaked preferences over a finite set of alternatives, and we focus on robust equilibria that do not depend on assumptions about the players' beliefs about each other. Our main results identify two intuitive conditions on binary voting trees, ensuring that sincere voting at each stage forms an ex post perfect equilibrium. In particular, we uncover a strong rationale for content-based agendas: if the outcome should not be sensitive to beliefs about others, nor to the deployment of strategic skills, the agenda needs to be built “from the extremes to the middle” so that more extreme alternatives are both more difficult to adopt, and are put to vote before other, more moderate options. An important corollary is that, under simple majority, the equilibrium outcome of the incomplete information game is always the Condorcet winner. Finally, we aim to guide the practical design of schemes that are widely used by legislatures and committees and we illustrate our findings with several case studies. (JEL D71, D72, I10, J16, J32, K10)

Kurmann and Otrok (2013) establish that the effects on economic activity from news on future productivity growth are similar to the effects from unexpected changes in the slope of the yield curve. This comment shows that these results become substantially weaker in the light of a recent update in the utilization-adjusted total factor productivity series produced by Fernald (2014). (JEL E23, E32, E43, E52, G12)

Almost all firms in developing countries have fewer than ten workers, with a modal size of one. Are there potential high-growth entrepreneurs, and can public policy help identify them and facilitate their growth? A large-scale national business plan competition in Nigeria provides evidence on these questions. Random assignment of US$34 million in grants provided each winner with approximately US$50,000. Surveys tracking applicants over five years show that winning leads to greater firm entry, more survival, higher profits and sales, and higher employment, including increases of over 20 percentage points in the likelihood of a firm having ten or more workers. (JEL D22, L11, L26, L53, M13, O14)

We present a decision-theoretic analysis of an agent's understanding of the interdependencies in her choices. We provide the foundations for a simple and flexible model that allows the misperception of correlated risks. We introduce a framework in which the decision maker chooses a portfolio of assets among which she may misperceive the joint returns, and present simple axioms equivalent to a representation in which she attaches a probability to each possible joint distribution over returns and then maximizes subjective expected utility using her ( possibly misspecified) beliefs. (JEL D11, D81, D83, G11)

This paper develops a method for forecasting the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of climate policy using three features of the failed Waxman-Markey bill. First, the MAC is revealed by the price of traded permits. Second, the permit price is estimated using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) comparing stock returns of firms on either side of the policy's free permit cutoff rule. Third, because Waxman-Markey was never implemented, I extend the RDD approach to incorporate prediction market prices which normalize estimates by policy realization probabilities. A final bounding analysis recovers a MAC range of $5 to $19 per ton CO 2 e. (JEL G12, G14, Q52, Q54, Q58)

We show that any well-behaved demand function can be represented by its “demand manifold,” a smooth curve that relates the elasticity and convexity of demand. This manifold is a sufficient statistic for many comparative statics questions; leads naturally to characterizations of new families of demand functions that nest most of those used in applied economics; and connects assumptions about demand structure with firm behavior and economic performance. In particular, the demand manifold leads to new insights about industry adjustment with heterogeneous firms, and can be empirically estimated to provide a quantitative framework for measuring the effects of globalization. (JEL F12, L11)

We establish new facts about the way consumers allocate debt among their credit cards using data for a representative sample of cardholders in Mexico. We find that relative prices are weak predictors of the allocation of debt, purchases, and payments. Consumers allocate a large fraction of their debt to high-interest cards, incurring a cost of 31 percent above the minimum. Using an experiment, we find that consumers do not substitute in the price margin, although they respond to salient temporary low-interest offers. We conclude that limited attention and mental accounting best rationalize our results and discuss implications for the market. (JEL D14, G21, O12, O16)