Knowledge that Transforms

To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Innovation and Institutional Ownership

American Economic Review 2013 103(1), 277-304
We find that greater institutional ownership is associated with more innovation. To explore the mechanism, we contrast the “lazy manager” hypothesis with a model where institutional owners increase innovation incentives through reducing career risks. The evidence favors career concerns. First, we find complementarity between institutional ownership and product market competition, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts substitution. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes, and disaggregating by type of institutional owner, we argue that the effect of institutions on innovation is causal. (JEL G23, G32, L25, M10, O31, O34)

Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors

American Economic Review 2013 103(1), 360-377
Consider an investor who fears ruin when facing investments that satisfy no-arbitrage. Before investing he can purchase information about the state of nature as an information structure. Given his prior, information structure α investment dominates information structure β if, whenever he is willing to buy β at some price, he is also willing to buy α at that price. We show that this informativeness ordering is complete and is represented by the decrease in entropy of his beliefs, regardless of his preferences, initial wealth, or investment problem. We also show that no prior-independent informativeness ordering based on similar premises exists. (JEL D14, D81, D83, G11)

The Effect of Payment Schemes on Inventory Decisions: The Role of Mental Accounting

Management Science 2013 59(2), 436-451
Does the payment scheme have an effect on inventory decisions in the newsvendor problem? Keeping the net profit structure constant, we examine three payment schemes that can be interpreted as the newsvendor's order being financed by the newsvendor herself (scheme O), by the supplier through delayed order payment (scheme S), and by the customer through advanced revenue (scheme C). In a laboratory study, we find that inventory quantities exhibit a consistent decreasing pattern in the order of schemes O, S, and C, with the order quantities of scheme S being close to the expected-profit-maximizing solution. These observations are inconsistent with the expected-profit-maximizing model, contradict what a regular or hyperbolic time-discounting model would predict, and cannot be explained by the loss aversion model. Instead, they are consistent with a model that underweights the order-time payments, which can be explained by the “prospective accounting” theory in the mental accounting literature. A second study shows that the results hold even if all physical payments are conducted at the same time, suggesting that the framing of the payment scheme is sufficient to induce the prospective accounting behavior. We further validate the robustness of our model under different profit conditions. Our findings contribute to the understanding of the psychological processes involved in newsvendor decisions and have implications for supply chain financing and contract design. This paper was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations management.

The Effect of Education on Adult Mortality and Health: Evidence from Britain

American Economic Review 2013 103(6), 2087-2120
There is a strong, positive, and well-documented correlation between education and health outcomes. In this paper, we attempt to understand to what extent this relationship is causal. Our approach exploits two changes to British compulsory schooling laws that generated sharp across-cohort differences in educational attainment. Using regression discontinuity methods, we find the reforms did not affect health although the reforms impacted educational attainment and wages. Our results suggest caution as to the likely health returns to educational interventions focused on increasing educational attainment among those at risk of dropping out of high school, a target of recent health policy efforts.

Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisions

American Economic Review 2013 103(2), 831-862
We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing. Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry's bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of political influence on entry. (JEL D42, D72, L11, L12, L43, L81)

Economic Understanding in US High School Courses

American Economic Review 2013 103(3), 659-663
The effects of courses on student achievement are studied using 2006 data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) in economics. A regression analysis showed expected and significant achievement differences by course, with the highest scores in advanced economics, followed by general economics. Courses in business and personal finance were not substitutes for advanced or general economics courses. A probit analysis showed that students taking economics courses relative to personal finance courses are significantly more likely to think their courses helped them understand the US economy, the international economy, and current events--but not how to manage personal finances.

Two Perspectives on Preferences and Structural Transformation

American Economic Review 2013 103(7), 2752-2789
We assess the empirical importance of changes in income and relative prices for structural transformation in the postwar United States. We explain two natural approaches to the data: sectors may be categories of final expenditure or value added; e.g., the service sector may be the final expenditure on services or the value added from service industries. We estimate preferences for each approach and find that with final expenditure income effects are the dominant force behind structural transformation, whereas with value-added categories price effects are more important. We show how the input-output structure of the United States can reconcile these findings. (JEL E21, L16)

Using State Pension Shocks to Estimate Fiscal Multipliers since the Great Recession

American Economic Review 2013 103(3), 121-124
Has government spending raised income and employment since 2008? I use new data on state pension returns during the Great Recession to recover exogenous changes in spending. Instrumenting with these return shocks, I estimate that each dollar of windfall-financed spending raised local incomes by $1.43 and every additional $22,011 of spending created one contemporaneous job. These estimates are similar to those found in Shoag (2010) despite the non-overlapping datasets. Unlike Shoag (2010), however, the bulk of the employment increase post-2008 stems from decreases in unemployment rather than increased labor force participation.

Time Use During the Great Recession

American Economic Review 2013 103(5), 1664-1696 open access
Using data from the American Time Use Survey between 2003 and 2010, we document that home production absorbs roughly 30 percent of foregone market work hours at business cycle frequencies. Leisure absorbs roughly 50 percent of foregone market work hours, with sleeping and television watching accounting for most of this increase. We document significant increases in time spent on shopping, child care, education, and health. Job search absorbs between 2 and 6 percent of foregone market work hours. We discuss the implications of our results for business cycle models with home production and non-separable preferences. (JEL D31, E32, J22)

School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation

American Economic Review 2013 103(1), 80-106
In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Our methodology formalizes how the old mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism, including the new one. A number of similar transitions took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes. (JEL C78, D82, H75, I21, I28)