When valuing a firm, investors must assess not only its expected future cash flows but also the systematic risk inherent in these cash flows. In this paper, we model the process by which investors may learn about firms' betas from earnings and how this learning process affects the relationship between earnings, announcement returns, and expected future returns. The model's main predictions are: (i) earnings response coefficients vary with macroeconomic conditions and are lower in upswings than downturns; (ii) earnings positively and negatively predict future returns in economic upswings and downturns, respectively, leading to return autocorrelation; and (iii) real earnings management rises in economic downturns and contributes to systematic risk in the economy. These predictions are directly attributable to investors' uncertainty regarding firms' exposures to systematic risk

Informed by Perceptual Deterrence Theory, we conduct multiple experiments to investigate when and how auditor actions can help deter manager opportunism. In Study 1A, we find that managers are less likely to use real earnings management (REM) when they expect auditors to both increase scrutiny and communicate their observations to the board. However, this effect occurs only when managers' operational decisions are inconsistent (versus consistent) with peer behavior. Study 1B findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny alone (without auditor-board communication) is not likely to deter REM. In Study 2, we find that increased auditor scrutiny with communication to the board effectively deters both accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and REM, reducing the total level of manager opportunism. However, without communication, increased auditor scrutiny deters AEM, but also induces more REM. Our findings highlight the importance of auditor-board communication and demonstrate how auditor actions can contribute to the deterrence of manager opportunism. Data Availability: Contact the authors

This paper studies the disciplinary spillover effects of proxy contests on companies that share directors with target firms, that is, interlocked firms. In difference-in-differences tests, I find that interlocked firms reduce excess cash holdings, increase shareholder payouts, cut CEO compensation, and engage in less earnings management in the year after proxy contests. The effects are more pronounced when both the interlocked and target firms have a unitary board and when the interlocking director is up for election, is younger, or has shorter tenure. Overall, the evidence highlights the importance of directors’ career concerns in policy spillovers across firms with board interlocks

We provide evidence on the effect of personal shocks that reduce a CEO's expected career horizon on corporate policies. The timing of these events is not predictable based on observable characteristics, and affected CEOs experience greater turnover rates and shorter residual time-in-office. Following the shock, these firms moderate both R&D and capital expenditures and increase cash distributions. While these changes are consistent with greater short-term orientation, they are not detrimental to shareholders, as performance increases after the shock. Earnings management and firm risk remain unchanged, while both CEO total compensation and equity-based compensation decline. Overall, our results indicates that the improved performance comes from the implementation of more efficient firm policies, likely driven by an internal tournament effect after the shock rather than from opportunistic behavior

We examine whether worker representation on corporate boards results in improved monitoring or payroll maximization. Several economic theories predict that worker representatives would use control and voting rights in the boardroom to transform firm assets into private benefits and increased wages, but labor contract models suggest that workers’ inside information should permit improved monitoring. To investigate this conflict, we use mandatory worker representation on corporate boards in Germany. Using hand-collected data, our results suggest that the worker representatives’ payroll maximization incentives dominate their monitoring duties. Specifically, worker representatives reduce real earnings management when it results in wage cuts or job losses but not when it increases payroll or job security. Similarly, worker representatives are generally associated with improved monitoring of tax planning activities. However, when the risk of offshoring jobs is high, worker representatives do not promote tax planning for low-aggression firms and instead block aggressive tax planning for high-aggression firms. This evidence helps policymakers and researchers better understand the role of workers in corporate governance systems and contributes to the ongoing public debate about introducing worker representation in the United States and the United Kingdom

Building upon the premise that, under certain conditions, the ability of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to pressure the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is limited, we develop a measure of CFO resistance that captures the ability of the CFO to resist undue pressure from the CEO to manage earnings. In doing so, we consider various sources of power for both the CEO and CFO, and a market setting where CFO resistance is perceived to be high. We find that firms with resistant CFOs are less likely to engage in earnings management than firms with non-resistant CFOs, ceteris paribus. Additionally, while confirming prior evidence that CEOs with strong incentives are more likely to manage earnings, we show that this effect is significantly less pronounced in the presence of resistant CFOs. Overall, our findings suggest that firms can improve the quality of financial reporting by creating conditions that enable CFO resistance

We create a culture dictionary using one of the latest machine learning techniques—the word embedding model—and 209,480 earnings call transcripts. We score the five corporate cultural values of innovation, integrity, quality, respect, and teamwork for 62,664 firm-year observations over the period 2001–2018. We show that an innovative culture is broader than the usual measures of corporate innovation – R&D expenses and the number of patents. Moreover, we show that corporate culture correlates with business outcomes, including operational efficiency, risk-taking, earnings management, executive compensation design, firm value, and deal making, and that the culture-performance link is more pronounced in bad times. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that corporate culture is shaped by major corporate events, such as mergers and acquisitions

Leveraging the availability of three years of pre-IPO data and related vs unrelated-party customer information for Chinese firms, we examine the impact of customer strategic alliances (CSA) on IPO underpricing from 2007 to 2015. Our core findings suggest that IPO firms with CSAs have less IPO underpricing than those without such a relationship. The decrease in underpricing is more salient for IPO firms that have non-related-party customers. Additional analysis suggests that the core findings are primarily driven by firms with good information environment pre-IPO, including high audit quality, high analyst following, and low earnings management. We interpret the results as indicating that a good pre-IPO information environment enhances the credibility of CSA relationships and signals high IPO quality. Furthermore, we document that a CSA relationship has a positive impact on an IPO firm's post-IPO performance, especially when the firm has non-related-party customers. Overall, CSAs reduce IPO underpricing and enhance IPO returns post-IPO

Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) model a setting where investors disagree and short‐sales constraints cause pessimistic views of stock prices to be less influential, which leads to speculative stock prices. A theoretical implication of the model is that existing shareholders can exploit the speculative stock prices by (i) designing managerial compensation contracts that encourage short‐term performance, and (ii) subsequently selling their shares to more optimistic investors. We document empirical support for this theory by finding that an exogenous removal (Regulation SHO) of short‐sales constraints curbs the provision of short‐term incentives, an effect reflected in longer CEO compensation duration. The effect is concentrated among stocks with high investor disagreement and short‐term‐oriented institutional ownership. Consistent with prior work, we also find that longer CEO compensation duration leads to longer CEO investment horizons, less overinvestment, and less earnings management. Collectively, our results speak to the contributing role of speculative stock prices in corporate short‐termism. Finally, our study implies that effective policies to curb corporate short‐termism should address stock market speculation and promote mechanisms that tie executive compensation to longer‐term stock price performance

We examine the efficacy of public enforcement in weak investor protection countries by examining the outcomes of a comprehensive public enforcement campaign in China. The campaign, launched in 2007, was designed to help enforce China's first mandatory Corporate Governance Code, issued in 2002. The 2007 campaign was characterized by several important features: (i) the campaign required firms to identify their problems before the securities regulators conducted on‐site inspections; (ii) the campaign provided a detailed checklist of the status of a firm's compliance with the Code; (iii) the campaign was transparent with regard to the disclosure and correction of identified problems; and (iv) the campaign threatened penalties for firms that failed to correct the identified governance problems in a timely manner. Our empirical analyses suggest that the 2007 campaign was effective in improving publicly listed firms' corporate governance. The corporate governance improvement was associated with a reduction in earnings management, higher earnings response coefficients, and higher operating accounting performance. In addition, we find preliminary evidence that the detailed checklist is partially responsible for the efficacy of the campaign. Our results suggest that public enforcement, if properly implemented, works in increasing shareholder value in weak investor protection countries