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We examine whether free-speech protections influence corporate environmental performance. Using the staggered enactment of U.S. anti-SLAPP statutes in a stacked difference-in-differences design from 1990 to 2019, we find that these laws significantly reduce firms’ toxic emissions without curbing economic activity. Anti-SLAPP enactments also promote environmental investment through green innovation, abatement spending, and waste reduction management, and strengthen governance via improved sustainability oversight, ESG-linked executive pay, employee training, and supply chain management. The effects are stronger when stakeholder monitoring is stronger and when managerial incentives embed sustainability goals. Overall, free-speech protections generate powerful environmental benefits

We document a smaller expansion of the negative CDS-bond basis and lower selling pressure during the Covid crisis for bonds issued by firms with high environmental and social (E&S) scores, relative to bonds from low E&S firms. This pattern is consistent with lower investor outflows from sustainability focused funds rather than fund managers discriminating among which bonds to sell. Our results suggest that the relative performance of high and low E&S bonds during a crisis is influenced not only by shifts in firm fundamentals, but also by non-fundamental factors such as investor preferences and trading behaviour.

Firms with more competitive threats from the product market are less likely to commit violations and pay lower penalties. These findings are robust to alternative measures, specifications, and subsamples, as well as different attempts that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further analyses reveal that the disciplining effect of competition is more pronounced when managers have greater incentives to shirk and when internal governance is weaker, and that violations are associated with poor product market performance only in the presence of competitive pressure. Firms under competitive pressure are more likely to adopt ESG-related incentives in executive compensation contracts and exhibit better worker safety practices. Overall, our evidence suggests that product market threats reduce managerial slack in combating misconduct by increasing the expected damage of violations

Growing discussions of impact investing and stakeholder capitalism have increased interest in measuring companies' social impact. We conceptualize corporate social impact as the welfare loss that would be caused by a firm's exit. To illustrate, we quantify the social impacts of 74 firms in 12 industries using a new survey measuring consumer and worker substitution patterns combined with models of product and labor markets. We find that consumer surplus is the primary component of social impact, suggesting that consumer impacts deserve more attention from impact investors. Existing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) and social impact ratings are essentially unrelated to our economically grounded measures