[This article examines the effect of household debt on investment decisions. We alter a simple portfolio choice model to allow households to retire outstanding debt and realize a risk-free rate of return equal to the interest rate on that debt. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, we find that households with mortgage debt are 10% less likely to own stocks and 37% less likely to own bonds compared to similar households with no mortgage debt. We calculate the costs of nonoptimal investment in the presence of various forms of household debt. We find that 26% of households should forgo equity market participation on account of the high interest rates they pay on their debt.]

[We model how three groups—insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors, and entrepreneurs planning to take firms public—compete for influence over politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify factors that push toward suboptimal investor protection, including corporate insiders' ability to use public firms' assets to influence politicians, and institutional investors' inability to capture fully the value of investor protection for outside investors. Entrepreneurs and public firms' interest in raising equity capital does not fully eliminate the distortions arising from insiders seeking to extract rents from capital in place. Our analysis produces many testable predictions concerning how investor protection varies over time and around the world.]

[We examine how long-run consumption risk arises endogenously in a standard production economy model where the representative agent has Epstein-Zin preferences. We show that even when technology growth is i.i.d., optimal consumption smoothing induces long-run risk—highly persistent variation in expected consumption growth. As a consequence, the model can account for a high price of risk, although both consumption growth volatility and the coefficient of relative risk aversion are low. The asset pricing implications of endogenous long-run risk depend crucially on the persistence of technology shocks and investors' preference for the timing of resolution of uncertainty.]

We present a model of intuitive inference, called “local thinking,” in which an agent combines data received from the external world with information retrieved from memory to evaluate a hypothesis. In this model, selected and limited recall of information follows a version of the representativeness heuristic. The model can account for some of the evidence on judgment biases, including conjunction and disjunction fallacies, but also for several anomalies related to demand for insurance.

[This article, which introduces the special issue on corporate governance cosponsored by the Review of Financial Studies and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), reviews and comments on the state of corporate governance research. The special issue features seven articles on corporate governance that were presented in a meeting of the NBER's corporate governance project. Each of the articles represents state-of-the-art research in an important area of corporate governance research. For each of these areas, we discuss the importance of the area and the questions it focuses on, how the article in the special issue makes a significant contribution to this area, and what we do and do not know about the area. We discuss in turn work on shareholders and shareholder activism, directors, executives and their compensation, controlling shareholders, comparative corporate governance, cross-border investments in global capital markets, and the political economy of corporate governance.]

[We investigate corporate financial policies in the presence of both temporary and permanent shocks to firms' cash flows. In our framework, cash flows can be negative and are imperfectly correlated with firm value, and earnings volatility differs from asset volatility. These results are consistent with empirical stylized facts. They are also contrary to the implications of existing dynamic capital structure models that allow only for permanent shocks to cash flows. Temporary shocks increase the importance of financial flexibility and may provide an intuitively simple and realistic explanation of empirically observed financial conservatism and low leverage phenomena. The theoretical framework developed in this article general enough to be used in various corporate finance applications.]

[There is a strong inverse relation between insider trading and institutional demand the same quarter and over the previous year. Our analysis suggests a combination of factors contribute to this relation. First, institutional investors are more likely to provide the liquidity necessary for insiders to trade. Second, insiders are more likely to buy low valuation and low lag return stocks while institutions are attracted to the opposite security characteristics.Last, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that insiders are more likely to view their securities as overvalued (undervalued) following a period when institutions were net buyers (sellers).]

[This article advocates a theory of expectation formation that incorporates many of the central motivations of behavioral finance theory while retaining much of the discipline of the rational expectations approach. We provide a framework in which agents, in an asset pricing model, underparameterize their forecasting model in a spirit similar to Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), except that the parameters of the forecasting model and the choice of predictor are determined jointly in equilibrium. We show that multiple equilibria can exist even if agents choose only models that maximize (risk-adjusted) expected profits. A real-time learning formulation yields endogenous switching between equilibria. We demonstrate that a real-time learning version of the model, calibrated to U. S. stock data, is capable of reproducing regime-switching returns and volatilities, as recently identified by Guidolin and Timmermann]

Accounting rules for valuing retained interest from securitizations require management to make assumptions concerning discount rates, default rates, and prepayment rates. These assumptions provide management with discretion to determine the “gain on sale” of the receivables. We investigate whether CEO compensation is less sensitive to securitization gains than to other earnings components in the presence of proxies for how independent (outsiders, females, fewer CEO-selected directors) and informed (financial expertise) directors are. Overall, our results do not suggest that better “monitoring” reduces earnings management or CEO pay-sensitivity to reported securitization gains. Our results suggest that CEOs are rewarded for the gains they report and boards do not intervene.

Calls for eliminating differences between accounting earnings and taxable income in the US have been debated extensively. Proponents of increased book-tax conformity argue that tax compliance will increase and earnings quality will improve. Opponents argue that earnings quality will decline. We examine whether the level of required book-tax conformity affects earnings persistence and the association between earnings and future cash flows. We develop a comprehensive book-tax conformity measure and find that earnings have lower persistence and a lower association with future cash flows when conformity is higher. Our evidence suggests that increased book-tax conformity may reduce earnings quality.