We examine a distribution that is taxed as a capital gain rather than as a dividend. Since the distribution induces a realized capital gain while the price change is an unrealized gain, ex‐day return behavior provides evidence of the value of tax‐timing capital gains. We show that investors are compensated 7¢ in unrealized gains for each dollar of realized capital gains, that is, $1 of realized capital gains is equivalent to 93¢ of unrealized gains. An investor with a tax rate on realized gains of 15% has an effective tax rate on unrealized capital gains of 8.6%.

In the context of the statutory tax rate reductions enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, this paper investigates the degree to which capital market participants anticipate and correctly interpret temporary income effects of tax-motivated income shifting. We find evidence consistent with financial analysts' earnings forecasts failing to anticipate earnings management that shifts income from fourth quarters in higher tax rate years to immediately following first quarters of lower tax rate years. The evidence suggests that this failure is not the result of a decision to ignore the income shifting, but rather an inability to recognize temporary components of reported earnings. We also find evidence that market prices do not fully reflect the temporary income effects of tax-motivated income shifting, and that analyst inefficiency explains about half of the market inefficiency. We interpret these inefficiencies as potentially important costs of tax planning that could limit the ability of public firm managers to implement otherwise optimal tax strategies.

To explain persistence of credit card interest rates at relatively high levels, Calem and Mester (AER, 1995) argued that informational barriers create switching costs for high-balance customers. As evidence, using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, they showed that these households were more likely to be rejected when applying for new credit. In this paper, we revisit the question using the 1998 and 2001 SCF. Further, we use new information on card interest rates to test for pricing effects consistent with information-based switching costs. We find that informational barriers to competition persist, although their role may have declined.

This paper provides a first order asymptotic theory for generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators when the number of moment conditions is allowed to increase with the sample size and the moment conditions may be weak. Examples in which these asymptotics are relevant include instrumental variable (IV) estimation with many (possibly weak or uninformed) instruments and some panel data models that cover moderate time spans and have correspondingly large numbers of instruments. Under certain regularity conditions, the GMM estimators are shown to converge in probability but not necessarily to the true parameter, and conditions for consistent GMM estimation are given. A general framework for the GMM limit distribution theory is developed based on epiconvergence methods. Some illustrations are provided, including consistent GMM estimation of a panel model with time varying individual effects, consistent limited information maximum likelihood estimation as a continuously updated GMM estimator, and consistent IV structural estimation using large numbers of weak or irrelevant instruments. Some simulations are reported. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

We explore the role of interfirm alliances as a mechanism for sharing technological knowledge. We argue that knowledge flows between alliance partners will be greater than flows between pairs of nonallied firms, and less than flows between units within single firms. Using patent citations as a proxy for knowledge flows, we find results that are consistent with these expectations. We then explore how firm characteristics affect knowledge flows within alliances and find positive effects due to technological, geographic, and business similarities between partners. We use alliance data from MERIT, patent data from the USPTO, and firm data from Compustat.

Recent research provides evidence that the operating cash flows-to-price ratio subsumes accruals in explaining future annual returns. This suggests that the accrual anomaly is part of the overall value-glamour anomaly and does not represent the mispricing of earnings. We extend the literature by using multiple measures of abnormal accruals and separate analyses of future annual returns and future earnings announcement returns. The results reveal that the operating cash flows-to-price ratio does not subsume abnormal accruals in explaining future annual returns or future announcement returns. We also find that the operating cash flows-to-price ratio does not subsume total accruals in explaining future announcement returns. These results are not consistent with accruals being a manifestation of the value-glamour anomaly. Our study contributes to the current debate on the existence and the extent of the (abnormal) accrual anomaly. Moreover, the methodology employed can help researchers in exploring mispricing phenomena.

Observers of Silicon Valley's computer cluster report that employees move rapidly between competing firms, but evidence supporting this claim is scarce. Job-hopping is important in computer clusters because it facilitates the reallocation of talent and resources toward firms with superior innovations. Using new data on labor mobility, we find higher rates of job-hopping for college-educated men in Silicon Valley's computer industry than in computer clusters located out of the state. Mobility rates in other California computer clusters are similar to Silicon Valley's, suggesting some role for features of California law that make noncompete agreements unenforceable. Consistent with our model of innovation, mobility rates outside computer industries are no higher in California than elsewhere.

We examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features: agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves. We demonstrate that these institutions select Condorcet winners when they exist, provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. In policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics (where a Condorcet winner does not exist), the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near-dictator under relatively weak conditions. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

Labor supply theory predicts systematic heterogeneity in the impact of recent welfare reforms on earnings, transfers, and income. Yet most welfare reform research focuses on mean impacts. We investigate the importance of heterogeneity using random-assignment data from Connecticut's Jobs First waiver, which features key elements of post-1996 welfare programs. Estimated quantile treatment effects exhibit the substantial heterogeneity predicted by labor supply theory. Thus mean impacts miss a great deal. Looking separately at samples of dropouts and other women does not improve the performance of mean impacts. We conclude that welfare reform's effects are likely both more varied and more extensive than has been recognized.