ABSTRACT This paper examines the relation between accounting choice and U.S. institutional investor ownership in non‐U.S. firms. We predict that U.S. investors exhibit home bias in their preference for accounting methods conforming to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) because such methods are more familiar, reduce information processing costs, and are perceived as higher quality. We find that firms exhibiting higher levels (changes) of U.S. GAAP conformity have greater levels (changes) of U.S. institutional ownership. Lead‐lag regressions suggest that increases in U.S. GAAP conformity precede increases in U.S. investment, but changes in U.S. institutional holdings do not precede changes in accounting methods. We also find that the positive relation between U.S. GAAP conformity and U.S. investment holds regardless of a firm's visibility to U.S. investors (e.g., American Depositary Receipt listing, stock index membership, analyst following, firm size). However, we find that U.S. GAAP conformity has a significantly greater impact among firms already visible to U.S. investors.

ABSTRACT Although the shareholder benefits of investor conferences are well-documented, evidence on whether these conferences facilitate managerial opportunism is scarce. We examine whether managers opportunistically exploit heightened attention around the conference to “hype” the stock. We find that (1) managers increase the quantity of voluntary disclosure leading up to the conference, (2) these disclosures are more positive in tone and increase prices to a greater extent than post-conference disclosures, and (3) these disclosures are more pronounced when insiders sell their shares immediately prior to the conference. In circumstances where pre-conference disclosures coincide with pre-conference insider net selling, we find evidence of a significant return reversal––large positive returns before the conference and large negative returns after the conference––and that the firm is more likely to be named in a securities class action lawsuit. Collectively, our findings are consistent with some managers hyping the stock prior to the conference.

ABSTRACT We examine whether a shock to the enforceability of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) limited its ability to restrict the flow of private information between managers and investors. Although prior work provides evidence that Reg FD reduced managers’ selective disclosure of material information immediately following its promulgation, we posit that private information flows returned as a result of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) public enforcement failure in SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc . Using multiple settings, we find consistent evidence suggesting that Siebel changed the cost–benefit tradeoff for Reg FD compliance and effectively reversed the initial effects of the regulation. We also find that Siebel disrupted the equilibrium of selective disclosure activity, resulting in an unleveling effect among investors with respect to private information advantages. Finally, we find that Siebel also had real effects by altering managers’ capital structure decisions. Our findings run counter to the prevailing “mosaic theory” and gradual learning explanations for private information advantages in the extended post–Reg FD period and highlight the importance of enforcement in achieving intended regulatory outcomes.

ABSTRACT We classify all institutional investors that file Form 13-F over the period 1995–2013 as either “tax-sensitive” or “tax-insensitive” based on their trading behavior and portfolio characteristics. We examine tests of the effects of investor tax-sensitivity on portfolio rebalancing, price pressure, and fund performance, and compare our measure of tax-sensitive institutional investor ownership to three measures used in prior studies. We show that our measure of tax-sensitive investors dominates other measures in the portfolio rebalancing and price pressure tests. In the fund performance test, our measure of tax-sensitivity is the only one that finds that tax-sensitive investors have significantly lower returns on their portfolio stocks, which is a new result in the literature. JEL Classifications: G11; G20; H24.

This paper investigates the effect of regulation that mandates open access to information on managers' disclosure choices and investors' reactions to disclosures. The recently passed Regulation FD (Reg FD) requires firms to make material disclosures broadly available. Using a sample of firms that previously restricted access to conference calls and a sample of firms that voluntarily allowed unlimited access to their calls in the pre-Reg FD period, we examine the effect of the new rule on managers' decisions regarding the timing, use, and information content of calls, as well as the effect on investors' trading behavior during the call. Our results indicate that Reg FD had a significant negative impact on managers' decisions to continue hosting conference calls and on their decisions regarding the optimal time to hold the call. However, contrary to the concerns of many critics, the magnitudes of these changes are not large. We do not find evidence that Reg FD decreased the amount of information disclosed during the call period, contrary to the concerns of Reg FD opponents. Finally, we find evidence that the new rule increased price volatility for firms that previously restricted access to their calls (relative to firms that previously held open calls) and that the amount of individual investor trading increased following the rule change. Overall, our results suggest that Reg FD impacted trading during the conference call window for firms most affected by the new regulation.