In dynamic models of unemployment in which the employed consume more than the unemployed, workers are finitely lived, and jobs are lasting, employment transfers consumption from future generations to those currently alive, resulting in a social surplus. That is, these transfers allow the current generation to consume more than its share of the output produced during its lifetime, without the increased consumption coming at the expense of future generations. Moreover, due to these intergenerational transfers, the allocation that maximizes steady-state output is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation with a higher level of steady-state employment.

In this paper, the authors model a job-specific shock process in the matching model of unemployment with noncooperative wage behavior. They obtain endogenous job creation and job destruction processes and study their properties. The authors show that an aggregate shock induces negative correlation between job creation and job destruction, whereas a dispersion shock induces positive correlation. The job destruction process is shown to have more volatile dynamics than the job creation process. In simulations, the authors show that an aggregate shock process proxies reasonably well the cyclical behavior of job creation and job destruction in the United States. Copyright 1994 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

In this paper, we analyse the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a particular class of monopolistic rational expectations models. We show the equivalence between the Kyle (1985) model of insider trading where the insider observes the amount of noise trading and the Kyle (1989) model of informed speculation when there is one risk-neutral insider and many risk-neutral market makers. We show that in these two equivalent models: (i) There exists a unique equilibrium independently of the distribution of uncertainty; (ii) This equilibrium minimizes the expected gains of the informed agent under incentive compatibility constraints. We extend our results to a class of signalling games.

This paper tests a straightforward implication of the basic Life Cycle model of consumption: that current consumption depends on expected lifetime income. The paper projects future income for a panel of households and finds that consumption is closely related to projected current income, but unrelated to predictable changes in income. However, future income uncertainty has an important effect: consumers facing greater income uncertainty consume less. The results are consistent with "buffer-stock" models of consumption like those of Deaton [1991] or Carroll [1992a, 1992b], where precautionary motives greatly reduce the willingness of prudent consumers to consume out of uncertain future income.

This paper assesses the impact of employer-provided health insurance on job mobility by exploring the extent to which workers are 'locked' into their jobs because preexisting conditions exclusions make it expensive for individuals with medical problems to relinquish their current health insurance. I estimate the degree of job-lock by comparing the difference in the turnover rates of those with high and low medical expenses for those with and without employer-provided health insurance. Using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, I estimate that job-lock reduces the voluntary turnover rate of those with employer-provided health insurance by 25 percent, from 16 percent to 12 percent per year.

ABSTRACT This article presents a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms choose between the Dutch auction method and the fixed price method. Dutch auction repurchases are more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation. The model yields empirical implications regarding price effects of repurchases, likelihood of takeover, managerial compensation, and cross‐sectional differences in the elasticity of the supply curve for shares.

This article presents a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms choose between the Dutch auction method and the fixed price method. Dutch auction repurchases are more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation. The model yields empirical implications regarding price effects of repurchases, likelihood of takeover, managerial compensation, and cross-sectional differences in the elasticity of the supply curve for shares.