Abstract We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Due to increased pollution, welfare decreases by € 1.57–5.57 billion. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and apply some of the key issues and lessons from similar privatization in other parts of the world to the partial privatization of the Bank of China Hong Kong (BOCHK). The empirical results of this paper indicate that some of the banks and non-bank financial institutions reacted negatively to the partial privatization announcements of the BOCHK. The empirical results also show that HSBC, the largest bank in Hong Kong had no significant reaction to the restructuring announcement or the listing announcement of the BOCHK. However, the Hang Seng Bank, the third largest bank in Hong Kong, suffered a loss after the announcement of the BOCHK listing. Compared with the banks and non-bank financial institutions in China, the BOCHK over-performed the rival firms in Mainland China 1year after its partial privatization.

Institutional cross-owners, specifically institutional investors with significant stakes in multiple firms in the same industry, are becoming increasingly common in the United States. In this paper, we investigate and find that the presence of institutional cross-owners facilitates a firm's financing of its investment opportunities, consistent with institutional cross-owners reducing the adverse selection concerns of those who provide capital for the investment opportunities. We then examine the conditions under which the presence of institutional cross-owners is likely to more significantly reduce adverse selection and thereby have even more of a positive effect on the financing of investment opportunities. We document that relative to transient institutional cross-owners, dedicated institutional cross-owners facilitate more financing of investment opportunities. We also find that institutional cross-owners facilitate the financing of investment opportunities even more for firms with greater dependence on external financing, those with an opaque financial reporting environment, and those with more product market competition. Our paper offers novel insight into how a firm can benefit from the presence of institutional cross-owners.

ABSTRACT How prior trust moderates investor responses to restatements is unknown. We examine how societal trust affects the changes in institutional investors’ shareholdings around a restatement. We consider two competing hypotheses based on the erosion of trust and confirmatory bias. We find the change in institutional investors’ shareholdings around a restatement is more negative for investors from high trust areas compared to low trust areas, consistent with an erosion of trust where high trust institutional investors view the restatement as a violation of trust. Further analyses show that our findings vary with the regulatory or economic environment, type of institution, and type of restatement. Our results are also robust to different tests that address endogeneity and use alternative societal trust measures. Overall, we contribute to the literature by examining the role of societal trust in a dynamic setting where investors’ trust-based beliefs about the credibility of accounting information are not realized. Data Availability: GSS Sensitive Data Files are not available from the authors. Persons interested in obtaining these data should contact the GSS at [email protected]. Other data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G11; G23; G41.

ABSTRACT A CFO gap arises when the CFO position is left vacant for a period between the departure of the old CFO and the appointment of a new CFO. We find that CFO gaps are fairly common; over the sample period 2004–2016, approximately one-third of CFO turnovers are associated with a CFO gap, lasting, on average, two quarters and two months. CFO gaps are more likely for firms that face more labor market search frictions and with financial reporting and performance issues, and are less likely for firms with succession plans and with greater growth opportunities. While CFO gaps are not associated with significant changes in firms' financial reporting quality, they are associated with significantly negative changes in firms' voluntary disclosure frequency and analysts' forecast quality. Our findings shed light on the factors that influence top executive gaps and the impact of such gaps on firms' information environment.

ABSTRACT We propose a measure of the valuation gap between debt and equity—debt‐equity spread (DES)—based on the difference between actual and equity‐implied credit spreads. DES predicts cross‐sectional stock and bond returns in opposite directions. This predictability is unique compared to existing mispricing measures and cannot be explained by exposures to various risk factors. High‐DES firms are more likely to issue equity and retire debt, and have more insider equity selling. These findings are consistent with DES capturing relative mispricing between debt and equity, and provide empirical support for the model of partially segmented markets in Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao (2018, Review of Financial Studies 31, 3307–3343).

We construct a unique political connection index to capture variations in the strength of firm political relations in China. The index incorporates various channels through which a firm's executives, chairperson, directors, and other senior officers are politically connected with government officials and bureaucrats. Overall, there is a negative relation between our index and firm value for the full sample, but such negative relation mainly exists for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and it becomes positive for non-SOEs. Furthermore, close examination shows an inverted U-shaped relation between political connections and firm value for the full sample in general and for non-SOEs in particular: Firm value increases initially at a lower level of connections and then begins to decrease at a higher level. The findings are consistent with the different business objectives and motivations of SOEs and non-SOEs in seeking political connections. Finally, our findings are robust after controlling for potential endogeneity and using an alternative headcount index construction method.

Abstract Although entry regulations are ubiquitous across countries, comprehensive evaluations on how such regulations affect firm dynamics and productivity are lacking. We examine a 2012-2014 pilot program in Guangdong (which later became a national policy) that was designed to reduce firm registration costs and encourage entrepreneurial activities. Using administrative data on firms' business registrations and annual reports, our analysis shows that the reform increased firm entry by 25% and firm exit by 8.7% in the manufacturing sector. The productivity of post-reform entrants was 1.1% higher than the productivity of pre-reform entrants, likely due to relaxed financial constraints and more intense competition.