The mathematical complexity of auction theory has restricted empirical work to qualitative tests of its basic predictions, with mixed results. This paper exploits the theory of order statistics to derive a Nash bid function that is linear in its parameters , allowing direct estimati on by linear least squares. The bid function is fitted to a cross section of auctions for highway construction contracts from thirty-three states, and provides support for several hypotheses of the theory of common-value auctions.

Franchising is an important and controversial form of vertical integration. Allegations of opportunistic behavior by franchisors have led to calls for public regulation and in some states "fairness in franchising" laws. The advisability of such regulation depends on the long-run incentives to franchise. If franchising is a temporary step on the path to complete ownership integration, regulation may be called for. Alternatively, if complete or partial franchising is a permanen t market solution, regulation is at least contestable. This paper offer s new evidence on the incentives to franchise.

The optimal tariff for a large country equals the reciprocal of the foreign export elasticity of supply. However, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex ante optimal tariff is not time consistent because the ex post elasticity is less than the ex ante elasticity. We show all countries are worse off if the large country cannot precommit to its ex ante optimal tariff, and that all countries can gain if the large country taxes domestic production of importables.

Franchising is an important and controversial form of vertical integration. Allegations of opportunistic behavior by franchisors have led to calls for public regulation and in some states "fairness in franchising" laws. The advisability of such regulation depends on the long-run incentives to franchise. This paper offers new evidence on the incentives to franchise.

The mathematical complexity of auction theory has restricted empirical work to qualitative tests of its basic predictions, with mixed results. This paper exploits the theory of order statistics to derive a Nash bid function that is linear in its parameters, allowing direct estimation by linear least squares. The model fits the data reasonably well, and does not provide evidence that the winner's curse is a significant problem in the highway construction industry.