The evaluation of numerous school reforms requires an understanding of the value of better schools. Given the difficulty of calculating the relationship between school quality and student outcomes, I turn to another method and use house prices to infer the value parents place on school quality. I look within school districts at houses located on attendance district boundaries; houses then differ only by the elementary school the child attends. I thereby effectively remove the variation in neighborhoods, taxes, and school spending. I find that parents are willing to pay 2.5 percent more for a 5 percent increase in test scores. This finding is robust to a number of sensitivity checks.

Under Ralston Purina Company's 1986 incentive contract 14 managers would receive 49.1 million in stock if within ten years the stock price closed above 100 for ten consecutive days. While the contract required a 57.8% increase in stock price, it did not motivate managers to create value because the rate of return required to reach 100 in ten years was substantially less than Ralston's cost of equity capital at the time of the contract's adoption. Barring any action by managers that would substantially change the market's expectations about the firm, reaching the 100 hurdle price would be easy. In fact, managers collected the contract's payoffs within five years despite an industry-adjusted loss of $2.1 billion in shareholder value.

An important factor driving energy policy over the past two decades has been the “energy paradox,” the perception that consumers apply unreasonably high hurdle rates to energy-saving investments. We explore one possible explanation for this apparent puzzle: that realized returns fall short of the returns promised by engineers and product manufacturers. Using a unique data set, we find that the realized return to attic insulation is statistically significant, but the median estimate (9.7%) is almost identical to a discount rate for this investment implied by a CAPM analysis. We conclude that the case for the energy paradox is weaker than has previously been believed.

Why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition? Analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two-dimensionality of the issue space. To give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two-dimensional. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two-party game, whose players have complete preferences over a two-dimensional policy space, generically fails to exist. I introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games, based on the fact of factional conflict within parties. Each party is supposed to consist of reformists, militants, and opportunists: each faction has a complete preference order on policy space, but together they can only agree on a partial order. Nash equilibria of the two-party game, where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions, and each party is represented by its partial order, exist, and it is shown that, in such equilibria, both parties propose progressive income taxation.

This paper examines the responses of prices at different stages of production to monetary policy shocks. In aggregate price analysis, the VAR of Christiano et al. (1996a, 1996b) is used to identify the policy shock as the federal funds rate innovation and trace out the responses of prices. In disaggregate price analysis, the adjustment of prices is examined by comparing inflation before and after a recent policy tightening identified by Romer and Romer (1989, 1992). At early stages of production, a monetary tightening causes input prices to fall more rapidly and by a larger amount than output prices.

Recently, several central banks have lost their bank supervisory responsibilities, in part because it has not been shown that supervisory authority improves the conduct of monetary policy. This paper finds that confidential bank supervisory information could help the Board staff more accurately forecast important macroeconomic variables and is used by FOMC members to guide monetary policy. These findings suggest that the complementarity between supervisory responsibilities and monetary policy should be an important consideration when evaluating the structure of the central bank.

We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants of pay. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients on the board and ownership structure variables suggest that CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. We also find that the predicted component of compensation arising from these characteristics of board and ownership structure has a statistically significant negative relation with subsequent firm operating and stock return performance. Overall, our results suggest that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse.

Output per worker varies enormously across countries. Why? On an accounting basis our analysis shows that differences in physical capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in output per worker—we find a large amount of variation in the level of the Solow residual across countries. At a deeper level, we document that the differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are driven by differences in institutions and government policies, which we call social infrastructure. We treat social infrastructure as endogenous, determined historically by location and other factors captured in part by language.