This review essay examines whether too-big-to-fail is as serious a problem as Gary Stern and Ron Feldman contend. This essay argues that Stern and Feldman overstate the importance of the too-big-to-fail problem and do not give enough credit to the FDICIA legislation of 1991 for improving bank regulation and supervision. However, this criticism of the Stern and Feldman book does not detract from many of its messages. The policy recommendations in their book have merit even if the too-big-to-fail problem is currently not that serious because these policies make it less likely that a banking crisis will occur even if driven by other factors.

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This paper draws several important lessons from the Tequila Crisis of 1994 and 1995. The overriding lesson is that the dynamics of financial crises in emerging market countries differ from those in industrialized countries because institutional features of their debt markets differ. Several policy lessons for emerging market countries also emerge from the analysis: (1) pegged exchange-rate regimes are extremely dangerous, (2) strong prudential supervision of the banking system is critical for prevention of financial crises, (3) financial liberalization must be managed extremely carefully and (4) different policies are needed to promote recovery in emerging market countries than those that are applicable to industrialized countries.

This paper extends previous work on the information in the U.S. term structure at longer maturities to Britain, West Germany, and Switzerland. We find strong evidence that the term structure does have significant ability to forecast changes in inflation, particularly at long maturities. On the other hand, the ability of the term structure to forecast changes in one-year interest rates is somewhat weaker; only at the very longest horizon (five years) is there significant forecasting ability for interest-rate changes.

This short paper argues that the view that monetary policy is ineffective during financial crises is not only wrong, but may promote policy inaction in the face of a severe contractionary shock. To the contrary, monetary policy is more potent during financial crises because aggressive monetary policy easing can make adverse feedback loops less likely. The fact that monetary policy is more potent than during normal times provides a rationale for a risk-management approach to counter the contractionary effects from financial crises, in which monetary policy is far less inertial than would otherwise be typical -not only by moving decisively through conventional or nonconventional means to reduce downside risks from the financial disruption, but also in being prepared to quickly take back some of that insurance in response to a recovery in financial markets or an upward shift in inflation risks.

This paper outlines what inflation targeting involves for emerging market/transition countries and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of this monetary policy strategy. The discussion suggests that although inflation targeting is not a panacea and may not be appropriate for many emerging market countries, it can be a highly useful monetary policy strategy in a number of them.

A heated debate has arisen over the policy ineffectiveness proposition associate with the work of Lucas, Sargent, and Wallace. It postulates that anticipated aggregate demand policy will have no effect on business-cycle fluctuations, so that one deterministic, feedback policy rule is as good as any other from the point of view of stabilizing the economy. This paper develops a methodology for empirically analyzing rational-expectations models displaying this neutrality result and then applies it to the important question of whether anticipated monetary policy matters to the business cycle.