Financial Economics, International Relations/Trade

We analyze trade in both legitimate and counterfeit products. Domestic firms own trademarks and establish reputations for delivering high-quality products. Foreign suppliers export legitimate low-quality merchandise and counterfeits of domestic brand-name goods. Home consumers have rational expectations regarding counterfeiting. We describe the positive and normative effects of counterfeiting, and provide a welfare analysis of border inspection policy and of policy regarding the disposition of counterfeit goods that are confiscated at the border.

When governments meet in the international arena, their actions reflect the political situations at home. Previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. We study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned with both providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special-interest groups. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in noncooperative and cooperative policy equilibria.

Whether governments clash in trade disputes or negotiate over trade agreements, their actions in the international arena reflect political conditions back home. Previous studies of cooperative and noncooperative trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we take a first step toward introducing domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. We study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups. The analysis reveals the determinants of the structure of protection in a noncooperative trade war and in a cooperative trade agreement.

The authors develop a multicountry, dynamic general equilibrium model of product innovation and international trade to study the creation of comparative advantage through R$50D and the evolution of world trade over time. In their model, firms must incur resource costs to introduce new products, and forward-looking potential producers conduct R$50D and enter the product market whenever profit opportunities exist. Trade has both intraindustry and interindustry components, and the different incentives that face agents in different countries for investment and savings decisions give rise to intertemporal trade. The authors derive results on the dynamics of trade patterns and trade volume and on the temporal emergence of multinational corporations. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

We develop a multicountry, dynamic general equilibrium model of product innovation and international trade to study the creation of comparative advantage through research and development and the evolution of world trade over time. In our model, firms must incur resource costs to introduce new products, and forward-looking potential producers conduct R & D and enter the product market whenever profit opportunities exist. Trade has both intraindustry and interindustry components, and the different incentives that face agents in different countries for investment and savings decisions give rise to intertemporal trade. We derive results on the dynamics of trade patterns and trade volume and on the temporal emergence of multinational corporations.

In this paper we study the determinants of intersectoral factor mobility. Mobility is the outgrowth of a prior investment decision. In particular, we focus on the human capital (i.e., training) decisions of workers. Uncertainty isa critical feature in such training decisions. The acquisition of general (vs. specific) skills allows a worker to select the more favorable sector after uncertainty is resolved. Thus general training has option value, which is enhanced by increases in risk. General training is a form of self-insurance. We study the impact of conventional insurance opportunities on training decisions. We find that the availabilty of income insurance does not necessarily imply less mobile workers.

We study a world with national external economies of scale at the industry level. In contrast to the standard treatment with perfect competition and two industries, we assume Bertrand competition in a continuum of industries. With Bertrand competition, each firm can internalize the externalities from production by setting a price below those set by others. This out-of-equilibrium threat eliminates many of the “pathologies” of the standard treatment. There typically exists a unique equilibrium with trade guided by “natural” comparative advantage. And, when a country has CES preferences and any finite elasticity of substitution between goods, gains from trade are ensured.

We propose a theory of task trade between countries that have similar relative factor endowments and technological capabilities, but may differ in size. Firms produce differentiated goods by performing a continuum of tasks, each of which generates local spillovers. Tasks can be performed at home or abroad, but offshoring entails costs that vary by task. In equilibrium, the tasks with the highest offshoring costs may not be traded. Among the remainder, those with the relatively higher offshoring costs are performed in the country that has the higher wage and the higher aggregate output. We discuss the relationship between equilibrium wages, equilibrium outputs, and relative country size.