This paper reassesses evidence of anticipatory income smoothing reported in DeFond and Park (DP) (J. Accounting Econom. 23 (1997) 115) in light of knowledge about measurement error in discretionary accrual estimates. We argue that the method DP use to measure un-managed earnings mechanically biases the evidence in a manner consistent with anticipatory income smoothing. Using an approximate randomization approach, we find that DP's results cannot be distinguished from those achieved when discretionary accruals are randomly assigned to firm-years in our sample. Overall, these results show that the ‘backing out’ approach to measuring un-managed earnings is ineffective in testing earnings management hypotheses.

This paper explores whether analyst forecasts impound the earnings management to avoid losses and small earnings decreases documented in Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, whether analysts are able to identify which specific firms engage in such earnings management, and the implications for significant forecast error anomalies at zero earnings and zero forecast earnings. We use data from Zacks Investment Research 1999 and find that analysts anticipate earnings management to avoid small losses and small earnings decreases. Further, analysts are much more likely to forecast zero earnings than firms are to realize zero earnings, and analysts are unable to consistently identify the specific firms that engage in earnings management to avoid small losses. This latter inability contributes to significant forecast pessimism associated with zero reported earnings and significant forecast optimism associated with zero earnings forecasts.

We examine the effects of trading after hours on the amount and timing of price discovery over the 24-hour day. A high volume of liquidity trade facilitates price discovery. Thus prices are more efficient and more information is revealed per hour during the trading day than after hours. However, the low trading volume after hours generates significant, albeit inefficient, price discovery. Individual trades contain more information after hours than during the day. Because information asymmetry declines over the day, price changes are larger, reflect more private information, and are less noisy before the open than after the close.

We examine repricing activity surrounding the FASB's 1998 announcement regarding accounting for repriced options. We find that repricing increases during, and decreases after, the 12-day window between the announcement and proposed effective dates, consistent with firms timing repricings to avoid recording an expense. We find that firms experiencing increasing earnings patterns, firms with earnings around zero, and growth firms are more likely to reprice in the window, but having repriced recently decreases the likelihood of doing so. The evidence suggests that firms trade off financial reporting benefits against reputation costs in decisions to time repricings to get favorable accounting treatment.

This paper builds a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms that explains why international trade induces reallocations of resources among firms in an industry. The paper shows how the exposure to trade will induce only the more productive firms to enter the export market (while some less productive firms continue to produce only for the domestic market) and will simultaneously force the least productive firms to exit. It then shows how further increases in the industry's exposure to trade lead to additional inter-firm reallocations towards more productive firms. These phenomena have been empirically documented but can not be explained by current general equilibrium trade models, because they rely on a representative firm framework. The paper also shows how the aggregate industry productivity growth generated by the reallocations contributes to a welfare gain, thus highlighting a benefit from trade that has not been examined theoretically before. The paper adapts Hopenhayn's (1992a) dynamic industry model to monopolistic competition in a general equilibrium setting. In so doing, the paper provides an extension of Krugman's (1980) trade model that incorporates firm level productivity differences. Firms with different productivity levels coexist in an industry because each firm faces initial uncertainty concerning its productivity before making an irreversible investment to enter the industry.

This paper develops a general method for constructing exactly similar tests based on the conditional distribution of nonpivotal statistics in a simultaneous equations model with normal errors and known reduced-form covariance matrix. These tests are shown to be similar under weak-instrument asymptotics when the reduced-form covariance matrix is estimated and the errors are non-normal. The conditional test based on the likelihood ratio statistic is particularly simple and has good power properties. Like the score test, it is optimal under the usual local-to-null asymptotics, but it has better power when identification is weak.

I use data from Williams College to implement a quasi-experimental empirical strategy aimed at measuring peer effects in academic outcomes. In particular, I use data on individual students' grades, their SAT scores, and the SAT scores of their roommates. I argue that first-year roommates are assigned randomly with respect to academic ability. This allows me to measure differences in grades of high-, medium-, or low-SAT students living with high-, medium-, or low-SAT roommates. With random assignment these estimates would provide compelling estimates of the effect of roommates' academic characteristics on an individual's grades. I also consider the effect of peers at somewhat more aggregated levels. In particular, I consider the effects associated with different academic environments in clusters of rooms that define distinct social units. The results suggest that peer effects are almost always linked more strongly with verbal SAT scores than with math SAT scores. Students in the middle of the SAT distribution may have somewhat worse grades if they share a room with a student who is in the bottom 15% of the verbal SAT distribution. The effects are not large, but are statistically significant in many models.

Why do similar households end up with very different levels of wealth? We show that differences in the attitudes and skills with which they approach finan-cial planning are a significant factor. We use new and unique survey data to assess these differences and to measure each household’s “propensity to plan. ” We show that those with a higher such propensity spend more time developing financial plans, and that this shift in planning is associated with increased wealth. These findings are consistent with broad psychological evidence concern-ing the beneficial impacts of planning on goal pursuit. Those with a high propen-sity to plan may be better able to control their spending, and thereby achieve their goal of wealth accumulation. We find direct evidence supporting this effortful self-control channel in the very strong relationship we uncover between the propensity to plan and budgeting behavior. I.

This paper asks how a household should choose between a fixed-rate (FRM) and an adjustable-rate (ARM) mortgage. In an environment with uncertain inflation a nominal FRM has a risky real capital value, whereas an ARM has a stable real capital value but short-term variability in required real payments. Numerical solution of a life-cycle model with borrowing constraints and income risk shows that an ARM is generally attractive, but less so for a risk-averse household with a large mortgage, risky income, high default cost, or low moving probability. An inflation-indexed FRM can improve substantially on standard nominal mortgages.