About 30% of workers in the Current Population Survey have earnings imputed. Wage gap estimates are biased toward zero when the attribute being studied (e.g., union status) is not a criterion used to match donors to nonrespondents. An expression for “match bias” is derived in which attenuation equals the sum of match error rates. Attenuation can be approximated by the proportion with imputed earnings. Union wage gap estimates with match bias removed are presented for 1973–2001. Estimates for recent years are biased downward 5 percentage points. Bias in gap estimates accompanying other non–match criteria (public sector, industry, etc.) is examined.

This article decomposes the participation process of a prototypical program into eligibility, awareness, application, acceptance, and enrollment. With this decomposition, we determine the sources of unequal participation for different groups and demonstrate that variables often have very different effects at different stages in the participation process. Our analysis shows that personal choices substantially affect participation and that awareness of program eligibility is a major source of variation in participation.

The large literature on labor‐market rent sharing consists of closed economy analyses. In this article we examine whether profits are shared across borders and also conditioned by international linkages that help shape economic openness. In a sample of 1,014 Canadian manufacturing union contracts from 1980 through 1992, we find that U.S. industry profitability affects Canadian wage outcomes and that the pattern of rent sharing varies significantly across international linkages, including multinational ownership, union type, and trade barriers. There seems to be international rent sharing, with profit sharing across borders conditioned by firm‐ and industry‐level institutions.

There are relatively few direct tests of the economic effects of asymmetric information because of the difficulty in identifying exogenous information measures. We propose a novel exogenous measure of information based on the quality of property tax assessments in different regions and apply this to the U.S. commercial real estate market. We find strong evidence that information considerations are significant. Market participants resolve information asymmetries by purchasing nearby properties, trading properties with long income histories, and avoiding transactions with informed professional brokers. The evidence that the choice of financing is used to address information concerns is mixed and weak.

Using experimental design, this research examines the impact of the nation’s first family cap policy, implemented in New Jersey, on the fertility behavior of welfare recipients. We explore whether the change in welfare parameters mandated by the policy induces differential impact among black, white, and Hispanic recipients. We examine if impacts are conditioned by racial‐ethnic group concentration. Results show that reduced welfare payments have contributed to a decline in births for black women. While we find a large response for blacks (on average), we find no response for blacks who live in geographic areas where they form a racial‐ethnic majority.

We find that trading volume increases and market liquidity remains unchanged, while the adverse selection and order-processing cost components of the spread increase and decrease, respectively, after margin levels decline when stocks become margin-eligible. This evidence indicates that the information content of trades has increased, thereby improving market quality. However, no changes were detected after the 1997 regulatory reforms. These results have implications across a broad swath of corporate finance dimensions, including the (1) cost of capital, (2) public vs. private financing decision, (3) form of managerial compensation, (4) type of ownership structure, and (5) degree of shareholder monitoring.

To investigate how a fixed exchange rate affects monetary policy, this paper classifies countries as pegged or non-pegged and examines whether a pegged country must follow the interest rate changes in the base country. Despite recent research which hints that all countries, not just pegged countries, lack monetary freedom, the evidence shows that pegs follow base country interest rates more than non-pegs. This study uses actual behavior, not declared status, for regime classification; expands the sample including base currencies other than the dollar; examines the impact of capital controls, as well as other control variables; considers the time series properties of the data carefully; and uses cointegration and other levels-relationship analysis to provide additional insights.