This paper extends the corporate governance literature such as Alchian and Demsetz (1972) by analyzing the use of special committees of disinterested directors by target firms during corporate takeovers. Our sample spans post Sarbanes–Oxley from 2003 through 2007, under which boards of directors are subject to increased scrutiny and additional regulatory mandates. This period is also characterized by a high level of management buyout activity that can exacerbate conflicts. Our results show that special committee use is positively related to conflicts and negatively related to factors and situations where insider knowledge is particularly valuable. Moreover, the propensity to form a committee is negatively related to the board's overall independence; hence special committees substitute for the monitoring not found in the overall board composition. Special committees, on average, are formed well in advance of the merger agreement, employ additional financial advisors, and are more likely to run an auction process. Target returns in deals with special committees are no different than deals without special committees. The evidence indicates that special committees enable target boards to adapt to situational conflicts, which helps explain when independent directors matter for corporate governance.

Using a sample of public and private banks, we study how social capital relates to bank stability. Social capital, which reflects the level of cooperative norms in society, is likely to reduce opportunistic behavior (Jha and Chen 2015; Hasan et al., 2017) and, therefore, act as an informal monitoring mechanism. Consistent with our expectations, we find that banks in high social capital regions experienced fewer failures and less financial trouble during the 2007–2010 financial crisis than banks in low social capital regions. In addition, we find that social capital was negatively associated with abnormal risk-taking and positively associated with accounting transparency and accounting conservatism in the pre-crisis period of 2000–2006, indicating that risk-taking, accounting transparency, and accounting conservatism are possible channels through which social capital affected bank stability during the crisis.

A faster exchange does not necessarily improve liquidity. On the one hand, speed enables a high-frequency market maker (HFM) to update quotes faster on incoming news. This reduces payoff risk and thus lowers the competitive bid-ask spread. On the other hand, HFM price quotes are more likely to meet speculative high-frequency bandits, and thus are less likely to meet liquidity traders. This raises the spread. The net effect of exchange speed depends on a security's news-to-liquidity-trader ratio.

We design an incentivized experiment to test whether measurement uncertainty elevates the risk that social bonds between auditors and reporters compromise audit adjustments. Results indicate that, when audit evidence is characterized by some residual uncertainty, the adjustments our auditor‐participants require are sensitive to whether auditors have an opportunity to form a modest but friendly social bond with reporters. In contrast, although auditors do not adjust fully even when misstatements are known with certainty, social bonding has no effect in this scenario. Accordingly, our experiment contributes beyond the main effects of social bonding and measurement uncertainty demonstrated in prior research by showing that these forces interact. A practical implication is that regulators and practitioners should consider both the technical and the social challenges facing audits of complex estimates.

This paper empirically investigates the effect of leverage on strategic preemption. Using new data on entry plans and incumbent investments from the American casino industry, I find that high leverage prevents incumbents from responding to entry threats. Facing the same set of entry plans, low-leverage incumbents expand physical capacity (by 30%), whereas high-leverage incumbents do not. This difference in investment matters because capacity installations preempt eventual entry. Stock market reactions to withdrawn plans imply that effective preemption increases incumbent firm value by 5%. My findings suggest that leverage matters for industry composition, not just firm-level investment.

Despite the evidence that full funding of defined benefit pension obligations is value maximizing, managerial price and volatility sensitivities (deltas and vegas) do not appear to influence funded status for all except the CFOs of plan sponsors with weak credit ratings (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014). Whether realized total compensation (as opposed to changes in the value of securities held) encourages full funding is an open question. Here we examine the empirical relation between realized managerial compensation and the extent to which plan liabilities are funded, and find that CEO pay bears a significant relation with funded status.

The provision of examples as implementation guidance is pervasive in accounting standards. Prior research has established that preparers engage in “example‐based reasoning,” a tendency to favor the accounting treatment in an example, even when the example does not exactly match the transaction at hand. In this paper, we investigate whether fact‐weighting guidance counteracts this tendency. Such guidance, now found in some accounting standards, indicates whether particular transaction facts are more important than others in determining the appropriate accounting treatment. Using an experiment, we find that fact‐weighting guidance does reduce preparers' tendency to favor the accounting treatment in an example. However, results also suggest that some degree of example‐based reasoning persists even with fact‐weighting guidance, and that preparers are not fully aware of how fact‐weighting guidance affects their judgments. Our findings have practical implications. They suggest to standard setters a potential remedy—namely, fact‐weighting guidance—for the misuse of accounting examples. They also provide insights to accounting preparers regarding how fact‐weighting guidance influences their judgments in ways they may not anticipate.

In this article, we provide a model of the macroeconomic implications of safe asset shortages. In particular, we discuss the emergence of a deflationary safety trap equilibrium with endogenous risk premia. It is an acute form of a liquidity trap, in which the shortage of a specific form of assets, safe assets, as opposed to a general shortage of assets, is the fundamental driving force. At the Zero Lower Bound, our model has a Keynesian cross representation, in which net safe asset supply plays the role of an aggregate demand shifter. Essentially, safety traps correspond to liquidity traps in which the emergence of an endogenous risk premium significantly alters the connection between macroeconomic policy and economic activity. “Helicopter drops” of money, safe public debt issuances, swaps of private risky assets for safe public debt, or increases in the inflation target, stimulate aggregate demand and output, while forward guidance is less effective. The safety trap can be arbitrarily persistent, as in the secular stagnation hypothesis, despite the existence of infinitely lived assets.

We summarize and extend the new literature on the term structure of equity. Short-term equity claims, or dividend strips, have higher average returns and Sharpe ratios than the aggregate stock market. The returns on short-term dividend claims are risky as measured by volatility, but safe as measured by market beta. These facts are hard to reconcile with traditional macro-finance models and we provide an overview of new models that can reproduce some of these facts. We relate our evidence on dividend strips to facts about other asset classes such as nominal and corporate bonds, volatility, and housing. We discuss the broader economic implications of our findings by linking the term structure of returns to real economic decisions such as hiring and investment. We conclude with an outline of empirical and theoretical extensions that we consider interesting avenues for future research.

We explore how the Balanced Scorecard ( BSC ), as a management accounting technique, was developed and marketed as a general management practice. Drawing on actor network theory ( ANT ), we analyze interviews with key actors associated with the BSC , insights gained from attending BSC training workshops, and other documentary evidence to construct a history of the BSC . Our historical analysis offers theoretical tools to understand how the various features of the accounting technique were translated and transformed, that is, shaped and solidified. This translation entailed processes of modification, labelling, framing, and specification of abstract categories and cause‐effect relations. We also examine the networks and associations that both shape the form of the BSC and mobilize the interests of various constituencies around it to produce what can be regarded as a global management technology. Finally, we highlight the strategies and actions used to maintain control of this technique through its continuous reinvention, and, by doing so, we emphasize the idea of strategic agency.