We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the typical industry colludes by threatening to punish deviations from an implicitly agreed-on pricing path. We use methods similar to those of Kydland and Prescott to calibrate linearized versions of both our model and an analogous perfectly competitive model. We then compute the two models' predictions concerning the economy's responses to a change in military spending. The responses predicted by the oligopolistic model are closer to the empirical responses estimated with postwar U.S. data than the corresponding predictions of the competitive model.

We investigate product-market competition when managers maximize shareholder value rather than their expected discounted value of profits. If shareholders are imperfectly informed about future profitability, shareholder-value maximization can lead to either more or less aggressive product-market strategies. Lower rivals’ profits lead investors to believe that the firm’s costs are low relative to those of its rivals and that the industry’s prospects are poor. If the former (latter) inference dominates, each firm tries to lower (raise) its rivals’ profits to increase its own stock price. We also consider implications for corporate financial structure.

[We investigate product-market competition when managers maximize shareholder value rather than their expected discounted value of profits. If shareholders are imperfectly informed about future profitability, shareholder-value maximization can lead to either more or less aggressive product-market strategies. Lower rivals' profits lead investors to believe that the firm's costs are low relative to those of its rivals and that the industry's prospects are poor. If the former (latter) inference dominates, each firm tries to lower (raise) its rivals' profits to increase its own stock price. We also consider implications for corporate financial structure.]

Hall has shown that, with perfect competition and price flexibility, total factor productivity measured using labor's share either in revenues or in costs will be acyclical regardless of the level of labor hoarding. We show that if firms producing a homogeneous good under constant returns must pick their prices before demand is known, both measures of productivity become procyclical. The model implies that productivity should be more procyclical the more important is labor hoarding. Empirically, productivity is more procyclical in industries and in nations where labor hoarding appears more important.

A dynamic model is used to understand how sharp changes in energy prices affect investment behavior, employment, and energy use. The authors discuss the theory behind their model selection, model specifications, estimation methods and data; list parameter estimates and elasticities for the selected model; and describe the simulations. They conclude that (1) the data strongly reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale within their specification of aggregate production; (2) the data indicate adjustment costs on labor are small, and (3) their results help reconcile some of the conflicting estimates of energy-demand elasticities appearing in recent literature. 23 references, 3 figures, 3 tables.

Modern neoclassical business cycle theories posit that the observed fluctuations in consumption and employment correspond to decisions of an optimizing representative individual. We estimate three first-order conditions that represent three tradeoffs faced by such an optimizing individual. He can trade off present for future consumption, present for future leisure, and present consumption for present leisure. The aggregate U. S. data lend no support to this model. The overidentifying restrictions are rejected, and the estimated utility function is often convex. Even when it is concave, the estimates imply that either consumption or leisure is an inferior good.

We study the movements in output, consumption and hours that are forecastable from a VAR and analyze how they differ from those predicted by standard real-business-cycle models. We show that actual forecastable movements in output have a variance about one hundred times larger than those predicted by the model. We also find that forecastable changes in the three series are strongly positively correlated with each other. On the other hand, for parameters whose implications are plausible in other respects, the model implies that output, consumption, and hours should not all be expected to move in the same direction

In macroeconomic models with flexible wages and prices, whether a tax is levied on producers or consumers does not affect its ultimate incidence. This equivalence breaks down in the presence of short-run nominal rigidities. Using both British and American data, we provide evidence against complete wage and price flexibility.

The authors construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the typical industry colludes by threatening to punish deviations from an implicitly agreed-on pricing path. They use methods similar to those of F. Kydland and E. Prescott (1982) to calibrate linearized versions of both their model and an analogous perfectly concerning model. The authors then compute the two models' predictions concerning the economy's responses to a change in military spending. The responses predicted by the oligopolistic model are closer to the empirical responses estimated with postwar U.S. data than the corresponding predictions of the competitive model.