We experimentally examine whether audit seniors' use of simple cognitive processes for a complex task is affected by the strength of habits that they developed as staff. A habit is a mental association between a behavior and a specific context. We propose that, for seniors with stronger habits to use simple processes, the typical audit room context automatically activates those processes, making it harder to select the processes that are more effective for a complex task. As predicted, we find that seniors with stronger habits identify fewer issues with a complex estimate than seniors with weaker habits when in the typical context. Seniors with stronger habits perform better in an alternative context that does not activate the simple processes, while those with weaker habits do not. Additional analyses validate that habit strength underlies our results and explore how the audit setting influences the development and enactment of habitual behaviors.

Previous research demonstrates that auditors' directional goals influence their reporting decisions. For example, when auditors have goals of accepting client-preferred accounting methods, they tend to exploit ambiguity in reporting standards to justify those methods, even when they are aggressive (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). We report an experimental investigation of the likely effectiveness of regulation designed to curb this tendency. Specifically, regulators suggest that having auditors identify benchmarks or assess the quality of various methods will “raise the bar” for method acceptability, thereby reducing auditor acceptance of aggressive reporting methods. However, this reasoning ignores the fact that ambiguity typically surrounds quality assessment. Following motivated reasoning theory, we argue that, in order to meet the increased standard for acceptability, auditors with high commitment to directional goals will exploit the ambiguity surrounding the quality of various methods when making quality assessments, with the result that the client-preferred method will be deemed best, or at least of high enough relative quality to be used. This theory suggests that auditor acceptance will increase with goal commitment, and that the increase will be most dramatic when quality assessment is performed. Results of our experiment support our hypotheses that performing a quality assessment amplifies the effects of auditors' directional goals on their acceptance of client-preferred methods and on their ratings of the quality of that method. Moreover, auditors making quality assessments are more likely to identify the client's method as the most appropriate method when they are more committed to their directional goals. An implication of our theory and results is that regulation (such as SAS No. 90) that requires auditors to make quality assessments may decrease auditors' objectivity when auditors have directional goals to accept client methods.

Regulation requires auditors to raise significant audit issues and concerns to the attention of audit engagement leadership and requires leadership to encourage such communication. This research demonstrates, using an experiment and a survey, that audit team members' willingness to speak up about such issues is associated with their intrinsic motivational orientation. Based on this result, we test whether audit leadership can leverage this relationship to increase speaking up, particularly when audit issues are more ambiguous, by emphasizing intrinsic goals. Results across three additional experiments indicate that auditors whose leaders emphasize intrinsic goals, whether directly or through tone at the top and firm culture, are more likely to speak up than are other auditors. We also find that auditors are more likely to speak up when an audit issue is less versus more ambiguous. We conclude that leadership can fulfill their obligation to encourage upward communication by emphasizing intrinsic versus extrinsic goals, regardless of the level of ambiguity surrounding the audit issue.

Auditing standards require that auditors’ reliance on a specialist is commensurate with the specialist’s competence. In assessing competence, auditors encounter cues diagnostic of the specialist’s social status but less so of competence. In an experiment, we manipulate specialist status and find that auditors mistake status for competence unless they are prompted to separate the constructs. This raises the possibility that auditors could over-rely on high-status specialists. However, auditors also assess high-status specialists as more influential, and when the specialist disagrees with the client, they rely more on high-status specialists because of this perceived influence. Thus, high-status specialists can increase auditors’ willingness to challenge the client by providing a strong ally. Additional analyses suggest that auditors are aware that they rely on the specialist’s influence rather than competence, indicating that auditors do not use the process that auditing standards envision to evaluate and rely on specialists. Data Availability: Data are available upon request.

1. Introduction 2. The Uses and Limits of the Laboratory 3. What are Virtual Worlds? 4. Virtual World Economies 5. A Taxonomy of Experimental Methods in Virtual Worlds 6. Implementing Complex institutions in Virtual Worlds 7. Addressing the Challenges of Embedded Experiments in Virtual Worlds 8. Cost-Benefit Analysis. 9. Concluding Remarks. References

Auditors frequently seek informal advice from peers to improve judgment quality, but the conditions under which advice improves auditor judgment are poorly understood. We predict and find evidence of a trust heuristic among auditors receiving advice from advisors with whom they share a social bond. This heuristic is evident among non-specialists, who weight advice according to its justifiability when it is received from a weaker social bond advisor, but fail to objectively assess the quality of advice received and weight it heavily when it comes from a stronger social bond advisor, regardless of its justifiability. Specialists, while less prone to the trust heuristic in advice weighting, show inconsistencies in advice weighting and their assessments of advice quality. In particular, specialists discount better justified advice from stronger social bond advisors, despite rating this advice as being of relatively high quality. This defensiveness likely arises from an aversive social comparison process attributable to the high ego-relevance of a task within one's specialization. Future research is warranted to corroborate or refute this possibility.

Relevance and reliability (now referred to as “representational faithfulness”) are qualities of financial information that both the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board use in setting standards for financial reporting. Despite their importance, very little research has addressed how financial statement users apply these constructs. Via experiments set within the fair value context, we show that users do not view them as independent constructs. Instead, variations in properties that are associated with the reliability of a measurement influence users' assessments of the relevance of fair value. The relationship between assessed relevance and assessed reliability is unidirectional, in that factors underlying reliability influence judgments of relevance, but factors underlying relevance do not influence judgments of reliability. Our findings are important because inappropriate assessments of relevance can influence firm valuation. The results are particularly meaningful in the context of fair value because such measurements can vary widely in reliability.

Prior research indicates that audit and tax professionals' judgments are influenced by their client's preferences, both directly and indirectly (via information search). In an experiment with tax professionals as participants, we examine whether high practice risk (i.e., exposure to monetary and nonmonetary costs of making inappropriate recommendations) mitigates these effects. We find that, when facing a client with low practice risk, professionals' search is biased in a manner that leads judgments to be consistent with client preference; however, search is less biased when facing a client with high practice risk, and resulting judgments are less consistent with client preference. We also find that, after controlling for the impact of information search, professionals tend to adjust their recommendations away from the client-preferred position, regardless of practice risk. This study sheds light on the direct and indirect paths by which client preference and practice risk affect professionals' judgments.

Auditors experience significant problems auditing complex accounting estimates, and this increasingly puts financial reporting quality at risk. Based on analyses of the specific errors that auditors commit, we propose that auditors need to be able to think more broadly and incorporate information from a variety of sources in order to improve audit quality for these important accounts. We experimentally demonstrate that a deliberative mindset intervention improves auditors’ ability to identify unreasonable estimates by improving their ability to identify and incorporate into their analyses contradictory information from diverse parts of the audit and improving their ability to think critically about the evidence. We perform additional analyses to demonstrate that our intervention improves auditor performance by causing them to think differently rather than simply to work harder. We demonstrate that critical thinking can improve the identification of unreasonable estimates and, in doing so, we provide new directions for addressing audit quality issues.