This study investigates how sophisticated market participants use tax‐based information by examining whether analysts' street effective tax rates (ETRs) are informative. When assessing firm performance, analysts exclude items they believe do not reflect current performance, resulting in “street” metrics such as street ETR. However, evidence on the properties of the components of street earnings is limited. Examining the informativeness of street ETRs is important because taxes are a significant component of earnings, and the extent to which analysts understand taxes and incorporate them into their analyses is not clear. Using a hand‐collected sample of analyst reports, we find that while approximately 35% of street ETRs have at least one tax‐specific exclusion, over 90% reflect the tax effects of pre‐tax exclusions. Further, both tax‐specific exclusions and the tax effects of pre‐tax exclusions significantly contribute to differences between GAAP and street ETRs. Consistent with analysts' understanding of the implications of tax and nontax exclusions, our results suggest that street tax metrics exhibit greater predictive ability about future tax outcomes and provide more information to investors than GAAP tax metrics. We also find that ETR exclusions are of higher quality when the magnitude of the potentially excluded item is greater and when managers disclose pro forma earnings. Collectively, our findings suggest that analysts understand taxes, but selectively exert effort to incorporate tax‐based information into their assessment of firm performance. Our study should be informative to regulators and users of financial information because it provides evidence regarding the usefulness of street earnings metrics.

Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) Form 8‐K filings provide a venue where managers release information to the market as a whole that they designate as being material . Using this setting, we study trading patterns immediately prior to the public disclosure of material information. We offer three main results. First, using both intraday and daily trading data, we find abnormal trading volume of 21 percent (13 percent) in the hour (day) prior to the public disclosure, respectively. Second, we find that this pre‐disclosure abnormal trading volume is concentrated in firms that are smaller, have more growth opportunities, issue fewer voluntary disclosures, and have weaker external monitoring. Finally, we find that this pre‐disclosure volume is concentrated in subsamples in which the information relates to a firm's material contracts, a firm holds investor/analyst conferences, and there is insider trading activity in a firm's shares. Our results do not concentrate in a small number of firms or industries, and do not appear to be explained by the form through which managers first release the material information (e.g., Form 8‐K, press release, website posting, or social media). Our results are also robust to controlling for the firm's other filings and peer filings that occur around the disclosure. Overall, the trading patterns we document may show that, inconsistent with the spirit of Reg FD, a subset of investors trade on information managers deem material prior to its broad, public release.

This paper proposes a theory of endogenous differences in liquidity of assets based on the interaction between differences in their risk and differences in liquidity needs of agents. An equilibrium of the model displays a class structure, where agents sort themselves across different types of assets according to their types. High-liquidity-need agents hold on to safer portfolios than lower-liquidity-need agents whenever the variation in the value of liquidity across states raises the value of safe assets more than that of riskier assets, and vice versa. I also derive capital asset pricing model–like formulas for excess returns where the risk and liquidity premia are interdependent and specific to each type of agent.

We review the financial economics-based research on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) with an emphasis on corporate finance. In doing so we focus on the most debated and researched issues. Although a firm's ESG/CSR profile and activities are shown to be strongly related to the firm's market, leadership and owner characteristics as well its risk, performance and value, there still exist conflicting hypotheses and results that we show are not resolved, leading to continued questions and a need for more research.

In recent years, standard setters worldwide have considered how to enhance financial statement users’ understanding of the estimation uncertainty contained in many financial statement items. Our study examines two disclosures expected to help investors evaluate the reliability of subjective fair value estimates: a quantitative sensitivity analysis (QSA) and the auditor’s quantitative materiality threshold. Using an experiment, we predict and find that investors judge the reliability of a reported estimate to be higher and are more willing to invest when a QSA disclosure is indicative of low sensitivity (i.e., greater precision) compared to high sensitivity (i.e., greater imprecision), but only if the auditor’s materiality threshold is also disclosed. When materiality is not disclosed, investors fail to recognize differences in reliability between the two levels of sensitivity, even though the amount of imprecision in the low sensitivity condition represents a fraction of materiality, while in the high sensitivity condition, this amount exceeds materiality multiple times over. Furthermore, when both disclosures are absent and only a qualitative description of sensitivity is provided—as required by current standards—investors perceive the disclosure to be relatively uninformative and respond to the ambiguous disclosure by decreasing their willingness to invest. The results of our study should be informative to accounting and auditing standard setters as they continue to consider the types of disclosures that may help investors understand the most complex and subjective aspects of financial reporting.

In this paper, we use two comprehensive micro-data sets to study how the distribution of mortgage debt evolved during the 2000s housing boom. We show that the allocation of mortgage debt across the income distribution remained stable, as did the allocation of real estate assets. Any theory of the boom must replicate these facts, and a general equilibrium model shows that doing so requires two elements: (1) an exogenous shock that increases expected house price growth or, alternatively, reduces interest rates and (2) financial markets that endogenously relax borrowing constraints in response to the shock. Empirically, the endogenous relaxation of constraints was largely accomplished with subprime lending, which allowed the mortgage debt of low-income households to increase at the same rate as that of high-income households.

By employing a novel, hand-collected sample of withdrawn and completed share issue privatizations, we show that both groups undergo comparable restructuring processes over the 3 years preceding the event. We employ matching procedures to explicitly control for the restructuring effect, isolating the effect of the ownership transfer from state to private investors on corporate policies and performance. We document that, absent the ownership transfer, most of the gains realized during the restructuring process are reabsorbed over the posttreatment period. The transition from state to private ownership thus represents a necessary condition for the long-term success of privatization programs.

Over the past three decades, academic research has sought to understand how cash shortfalls impact a firm's ability to take all available value‐increasing investment projects. We investigate whether firms facing greater financing constraints turn to tax strategies that generate lower cash effective tax rates (ETRs) to mitigate the adverse effect of these financing constraints. We use the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006) as an exogenous shock to financing constraints for pension firms, but not for other firms. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we predict and find that pension firms experience a decrease in their cash ETRs by 1.8%–2.4% after the PPA 2006, relative to other firms. These cash tax savings mitigate the investment shortfall brought about by financing constraints by 19%. We also predict and find that the decline in cash ETRs is greater among firms more adversely affected by the PPA 2006. Our paper sheds light on the direction, causality, and economic magnitude of the association between financing constraints and tax planning activities. We also provide insight into the role of tax planning activities within firms' broader corporate business strategies in responding to financing constraints.

This paper reassesses two conflicting hypotheses on the valuation impacts of private placements of equity (PPEs), the monitoring/certification hypothesis and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, by focusing on the shareholder approval, active buyer, and premium pricing features of PPEs. We find that PPEs with these features have significant positive announcement returns and insignificant mean long-run returns, while the corresponding announcement and long-run returns for PPEs without such features are significantly negative. Firms with value-enhancing PPE features are better governed and use proceeds more efficiently. Thus, the heterogeneous nature of PPEs helps reconcile the puzzling return patterns and conflicting hypotheses regarding PPEs.

Using experiments with 58 corporate managers and 215 auditors, we examine whether managers attempt to reduce the perceived intentionality of their fraudulent misstatements by perpetrating fraud via omission, as opposed to a more active form of commission, and how auditors evaluate the resulting misstatements. We find that managers choose to omit a transaction from the financial statements rather than record a transaction inappropriately. They also choose to omit critical information from supporting documents rather than provide misleading information. However, auditors generally believe misstatements involving omissions are unintentional. Specifically, we find auditors are less skeptical of an omitted transaction compared to a misrecorded transaction. They are also less skeptical of a misstatement that results from management omitting information from a supporting document compared to misrepresenting information. Overall, our studies identify a method of fraud—omission—that managers are likely to use, but that auditors are unlikely to judge as being intentional.