We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (VC directors) on executive incentives at non-venture-backed public firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (delta). These effects are more substantial if VC directors are from highly reputable VC firms. Using the change of direct flight availability to VC hub cities caused by major airline mergers and annual estimates of VC dry powder per industry as instruments, we show that these results are causal. In addition, VC directors are more focused on growth performance goals in CEO compensation contracts. We also document that prior finding of greater research intensity and innovation when VC directors serve on boards of public firms is partly explained by stronger CEO incentives instilled by such directors. Lastly, we find that having VC directors on nominating and/or governance committees is associated with a higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover.

Abstract We construct measures of industry performance and welfare in the U.S. automobile market from 1980 to 2018. We estimate a demand model using product-level data on market shares, prices, and attributes, and consumer-level data on demographics, purchases, and stated second choices. We estimate marginal costs assuming Nash-Bertrand pricing. We relate trends in consumer welfare and markups to trends in market structure and the composition of products. Although real prices rose, we find that markups decreased substantially, and the fraction of total surplus accruing to consumers increased. Consumer welfare increased over time due to improved product quality and improved production technology.

Abstract We analyse efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk-sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any coalition formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term “trust”. We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviation coalitions symmetrically and show that higher trust tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates the formation of deviating coalitions. As a consequence, although trust facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of trust and efficient allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: trust is indeed a double-edged sword.

When race is not directly observed, regulators and analysts commonly predict it using algorithms based on last name and address. In small business lending—where regulators assess fair lending law compliance using the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) algorithm—we document large prediction errors among Black Americans. The errors bias measured racial disparities in loan approval rates downward by 43%, with greater bias for traditional vs. fintech lenders. Regulation using self-identified race would increase lending to Black borrowers, but also shift lending toward affluent areas because errors correlate with socioeconomics. Overall, using race proxies in policymaking and research presents challenges.

Abstract Diagnostic expectations constitute a realistic behavioural model of inference. This paper shows that this approach to expectation formation can be productively integrated into the New Keynesian framework. Diagnostic expectations generate endogenous extrapolation in general equilibrium. We show that diagnostic expectations generate extra amplification in the presence of nominal frictions; a fall in aggregate supply generates a Keynesian recession; fiscal policy is more effective at stimulating the economy. We perform Bayesian estimation of a rich medium-scale model that incorporates consensus forecast data. Our estimate of the diagnosticity parameter is in line with previous studies. Moreover, we find empirical evidence in favour of the diagnostic model. Diagnostic expectations offer new propagation mechanisms to explain fluctuations.

Abstract In the late nineteenth century, the North American bison was brought to the brink of extinction in less than two decades. We demonstrate that the loss of the bison had immediate, negative consequences for the Native Americans who relied on them and ultimately resulted in a persistent reversal of fortunes. Once amongst the tallest people in the world, the generations of bison-reliant people born after the slaughter lost their entire height advantage. By the early twentieth century, child mortality was 16 percentage points higher and the probability of reporting an occupation 19 percentage points lower in bison nations compared with nations that were never reliant on the bison. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into the present, income per capita has remained 25% lower, on average, for bison nations. This persistent gap cannot be explained by differences in agricultural productivity, self-governance, or application of the Dawes Act. We provide evidence that this historical shock altered the dynamic path of development for formerly bison-reliant nations. We demonstrate that limited access to credit constrained the ability of bison nations to adjust through re-specialization and migration.

ABSTRACT Drawing on confidential Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, we examine whether privately held corporations are more aggressive tax planners than their publicly held peers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no consistent evidence that private firms are more aggressive tax planners. We then examine whether private firms’ tax planning differs from that of public firms more generally. We find that private firms engage in more conforming tax planning (planning that also reduces pretax accounting income). However, tests of nonconforming tax planning reveal that private firms generally engage in the same or less planning relative to their public peers. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the belief that private firms are generally more aggressive tax planners than are public firms, but confirm that they engage in more of some forms of general (i.e., conforming) planning. Data Availability: The IRS provided confidential tax information to Michele S. Mullaney pursuant to an Intragovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 (IPA) agreement through the Statistics of Income (SOI) Joint Statistical Research Program (JSRP). JEL Classifications: H25; H26; K34; M41.

We investigate how the gender gap in confidence affects the views that evaluators (e.g., employers) hold about men and women. We find the confidence gap is contagious, causing evaluators to form overly pessimistic beliefs about women. This result arises even though the confidence gap is expected and even though the confidence gap shouldn’t be contagious if evaluators are Bayesian. Only an intervention that facilitates Bayesian updating proves (somewhat) effective. Additional results highlight how similar findings follow even when there is no room for discriminatory motives or differences in priors because evaluators are asked about arbitrary, rather than gender-specific, groups. (JEL D82, D83, D91, J16, J22, M51)

ABSTRACT We provide a simple model of investment by a firm funded with debt and equity and empirical evidence to demonstrate that, once we control for the debt overhang problem with credit spreads, asset volatility is an unambiguously positive signal for investment, while equity volatility sends a mixed signal: Elevated volatility raises the option value of equity and increases investment for financially sound firms, but exacerbates debt overhang and decreases investment for firms close to default. Our study provides a simple unified understanding of the structural and empirical relationships between investment, credit spreads, equity versus asset volatility, leverage, and Tobin's .