The literature on managerial style posits a linear relation between a chief executive officer's (CEOs) past experiences and firm risk. We show that there is a nonmonotonic relation between the intensity of CEOs’ early‐life exposure to fatal disasters and corporate risk‐taking. CEOs who experience fatal disasters without extremely negative consequences lead firms that behave more aggressively, whereas CEOs who witness the extreme downside of disasters behave more conservatively. These patterns manifest across various corporate policies including leverage, cash holdings, and acquisition activity. Ultimately, the link between CEOs’ disaster experience and corporate policies has real economic consequences on firm riskiness and cost of capital.

We examine the relation between home CEOs and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our analysis shows home CEOs are associated with higher CSR engagement and increased firm value. These firms exhibit higher asset turnover, lower cost of equity , improved productivity, sales, and profit margins. Home CEOs focus more on community, environmental, and employee-related CSR, and are linked to reduced carbon emissions . This relationship is stronger in firms with higher local business concentration and investor monitoring. Firms led by home CEOs earn higher returns during recent crises. Our results suggest the value increase is not primarily due to agency effects and remain robust to endogeneity concerns. The study indicates a CEO’s community connection may influence CSR effectiveness, suggesting that mere CSR engagement may not suffice to boost trust and value. These results highlight the potential importance of local ties in corporate leadership and CSR strategy.

We investigate stock price reactions to Internet-related name changes in a market downturn. In contrast to the Internet boom period, during which there was a surge of dot.com additions, in the bust period, there is a dramatic reduction in the pace of dot.com additions accompanied by a rapid increase in dot.com name deletions. Following the Internet “crash” of mid-2000, investors react positively to name changes for firms that remove dot.com from their name. This dot.com deletion effect produces cumulative abnormal returns on the order of 64% for the 60 days surrounding the announcement day. Our results add support to a growing body of literature that documents that investors are potentially influenced by cosmetic effects and that managers rationally time corporate actions to take advantage of these biases.

We examine whether mutual funds change their names to take advantage of current hot investment styles, and what effects these name changes have on inflows to the funds, and to the funds' subsequent returns. We find that the year after a fund changes its name to reflect a current hot style, the fund experiences an average cumulative abnormal flow of 28%, with no improvement in performance. The increase in flows is similar across funds whose holdings match the style implied by their new name and those whose holdings do not, suggesting that investors are irrationally influenced by cosmetic effects.

We examine how the market values operating assets in the presence of time-varying ex ante risk that these assets may be tunneled away. We analyze pairs of Chinese publicly listed firms and their non-listed parents and examine the market valuation of current assets (cash balances, trade receivables, receivables due from the controlling shareholders, inventories) and fixed assets on the publicly listed firm's balance sheet. Our results show that in periods when the risk of tunneling from the publicly listed firm to its controlling shareholder increases, operating assets that are easy to tunnel (cash and receivables due from the controlling shareholder) are valued at larger discounts, while operating assets that are not easy to tunnel (trade receivables, inventories, fixed assets) are not valued at such discounts.

We examine a sample of 125 equity mutual funds that closed to new investment between 1993 and 2004. We find that funds close following a period of superior performance and abnormal fund inflows. Fund managers raise their fees when they close to compensate managers for losses in income due to the restrictions in size imposed by the fund closure decision. Managers reopen when fund size declines. However, they do not earn superior returns after reopening, suggesting that the fund closure decision does not provide information about superior fund managers.

Fintech and big tech companies are making rapid inroads into credit markets. We hand construct a global database of fintech and big tech lending volumes for 79 countries over 2013–2018. Using a panel regression analysis, we find these new forms of digital lending are larger in countries with higher GDP per capita (albeit at a declining rate), where banking sector mark-ups are higher, and where banking regulation is less stringent. We also find that these alternative forms of credit are more developed where the ease of doing business is greater, investor protection disclosure and the efficiency of the judicial system are more advanced, and where bond and equity markets are more developed. Overall, fintech and big tech credit seem to complement other forms of credit, rather than substitute for them.

We document a long-lasting association between a common societal phenomenon, early-life family disruption, and investment behavior. Controlling for socioeconomic status and family background, we find fund managers who experienced the death or divorce of their parents during childhood exhibit a stronger disposition effect, take lower risk, and are more likely to sell their holdings following risk-increasing firm events. The results are consistent with persistent symptoms of post-traumatic stress and strengthen as treatment intensifies. The evidence adds to our understanding of the role of social factors and “nurture” in finance as well as the origin of investment biases.