Firms that entered the stock market in the 1990s were younger than any earlier cohort since World War I. Surprisingly, however, firms that IPO'd at the close of the 19th century were just as young as the companies that are entering today. We argue here that the electrification-era and the IT-era firms came in young because the technologies that they brought in were too productive to be kept out very long. The model assumes that the stage before IPO is a learning period during which the firm refines the idea before committing to it at the IPO stage. The better the idea, the higher is the opportunity cost of a delay in its implementation, and the earlier the firm will have its IPO.

Investment of US firms responds asymmetrically to Tobin’s Q: investment of established firms—“intensive” investment—reacts negatively to Q whereas investment of new firms—“extensive” investment—responds positively and elastically to Q. This asymmetry, we argue, reflects a difference between established and new firms in the cost of adopting new technologies. A fall in the compatibility of new capital with old capital raises measured Q and reduces the incentive of established firms to invest. New firms do not face such compatibility costs and step up their investment in response to the rise in Q.

We examine investment behavior among exchange-listed Korean manufacturing firms before and after the 1997 financial crisis using firm-level panel data. Starting with the standard Q-theory of investment, we augment it by allowing for a sales accelerator and the possibility of cash constraints, categorizing firms based on their age, size and affiliation to an industrial conglomerate (i.e., chaebol). We find that Tobin’s Q is a robust determinant of investment in a pooled sample for 1992–2001, but that it became more important for small firms and less important for chaebol-affiliated firms after the crisis. Investment by chaebol firms also became more sensitive to the availability of internal cash balances after the crisis. We interpret this as reflecting a shift in the Korean economy to a stronger market orientation after the crisis and to a business climate in which the quality of potential projects became more important relative to capital market imperfections in determining the destination of investment funds.

We study linkages between financial development, international trade, and long-run growth using data since 1880 for 17 now-developed “Atlantic” economies and a set of cross country and dynamic panel data models. We find that finance and trade reinforce each other in data before 1930, but that these effects do not persist after the Second World War. Financial development affects growth positively throughout the sample period, while trade affects growth strongly and independently after 1945. We attribute the rising importance of trade to major post-World War II changes in tariffs and quantity restrictions associated with the GATT, the establishment of the European Common Market, and the gradual elimination of capital controls after 1973. The findings are robust to the use of ‘deep’ fundamentals such as legal origin and indicators of the political environment as instruments for financial development and trade. Financial development, however, links more closely than trade to these fundamentals.

Using historical price records for Bordeaux Premiers Crus, we examine the impact of aging on wine prices and the long-term investment performance of fine wine. In line with the predictions of an illustrative model, young maturing wines from high-quality vintages provide the highest financial returns. Past maturity, famous châteaus deliver growing non-pecuniary benefits to their owners. Using an arithmetic repeat-sales regression over 1900–2012, we estimate a real financial return to wine investment (net of storage costs) of 4.1%, which exceeds bonds, art, and stamps. Returns to wine and equities are positively correlated. Finally, we find evidence of in-sample return predictability.