The issuer's decision to include warrants as compensation to underwriters is studied for a sample of 1,991 negotiated firm commitment issues of seasoned equity. Using a two‐stage logit model to correct for self‐selection bias, we find direct evidence that warrant compensation functions as a bond, substituting for reputational capital and enabling the underwriter to certify the issue price. To a lesser degree, the decision also is affected by regulations on underwriter compensation and on the use of underwriter warrants. Issuers' decisions are consistent with an objective of minimizing total underwriting cost, including cash compensation, warrants, and underpricing.

The issuer's decision to include warrants as compensation to underwriters is studied for a sample of 1,991 negotiated firm commitment issues of seasoned equity. Using a two-stage logit model to correct for self-selection bias, we find direct evidence that warrant compensation functions as a bond, substituting for reputational capital and enabling the underwriter to certify the issue price. To a lesser degree, the decision also is affected by regulations on underwriter compensation and on the use of underwriter warrants. Issuers' decisions are consistent with an objective of minimizing total underwriting cost, including cash compensation, warrants, and underpricing.

Moment based tests for mispecification of parametric models (e.g., of mean equals variance in a Poisson model) are studied. The moment restrictions under test are embedded in an extension of the model so that the moment test is a score test of the hypothesis that a vector of added parameters is zero. Second-order asymptotic properties of the likelihood ratio version of this test are studied. Unlike the conventional test, the likelihood ratio version is Bartlett correctable. The correction depends on the curvature at the origin of the function used to incorporate the moment restriction in the extended model.

In contrast to prior studies suggesting that overallotment option (OAO) provisions reflect underwriters' exploitation of IPO firms, we provide evidence that issuers benefit in several ways. We estimate that OAO provisions lead to lower total issue cost, less negative post-IPO performance, lower post-IPO volatility, and larger IPOs. OAO provisions are more likely for large firms undertaking relatively large IPOs, especially where a large portion of the shares are offered by selling shareholders. Our evidence also indicates that managers and other insiders may benefit if their shareholdings would be locked up unless the OAO call option feature was exercised.

A test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation Tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross-section data. The test statistic can be simply output from any standard Tobit maximum likelihood package, and is asymptotically efficient. The procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous Tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual Tobit formula. We also provide the Lagrange Multiplier test of weak exogeneity. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

An econometric methodology is proposed for reconciling inaccurate measures of latent data which are subject to accounting constraints. The method deals with the case in which the measurement errors are serially correlated, generalizing previous contributions. A class of efficient estimators are derived for the latent data. Consistent estimators for the weight matrices applied to the observed information based on a linear regression procedure are obtained together with confidence interval estimators for these weight matrices. Approximate confidence intervals are suggested for the latent data themselves together with specification tests for the assumptions underlying the procedure. An application of the proposed method is made to U.K. Gross Domestic Product in constant prices for 1958Q1–1989Q4.

If there is an economically important optimal capital structure, then firms that deviate too far from the optimum will face greater risk of failure or acquisition. Using data from the oil industry we find no significant evidence that capital structure policy affects acquisition or failure probability. Firms appear to increase leverage when they face attractive growth opportunities or when poor operating performance reduces equity value or compels borrowing. Firms are acquired when rapid growth has reduced financial slack. In a clinical examination, we address the question of how firms with persistently low leverage can operate and survive for many years without being targeted for acquisition. Our evidence supports the pecking-order hypothesis, including acquisition among potential financing sources.

We study the role of banking relationships in IPO underwriting. When a firm in Japan goes public, it can engage an investment bank that is related through a common main bank, or can select an alternative investment bank. The main bank relationship can be an efficient way for the investment bank to acquire information generated by the main bank, but may give rise to conflicts of interest. We find that main bank relationships give small issuers increased access to equity capital markets, but that issuers of large IPOs often switch to non-related investment banks that are capable of managing large offerings. While investment banks seek to exploit bargaining power with related issuers, issuers respond to expected high issue cost by switching to non-related investment banks. The net result is that total issue costs through related and non-related investment banks are similar. With respect to aftermarket performance and use of proceeds, we find no evidence of conflict of interest or self-dealing for either the main bank or the investment bank.

Trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay payment. In this paper we document the rich variation in interfirm credit terms and credit policies across industries. We examine empirically the firm's basic credit policy choices: whether to extend credit or to require cash payment; and, if credit is extended, whether to adopt simple net terms or terms with discounts for prompt payment. We also examine determinants of variations in two‐part terms. Results are supportive primarily of theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer creditworthiness.